Category Archives: European Union

The Global Sumud Flotilla in Italy’s Discourse: Between Political Caution and Legal Reasoning

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The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.

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Continuity and Caution: Italy’s Evolving Legal Approach to Supporting Ukraine

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Throughout 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict continued to occupy a significant place within Italian political and parliamentary debates, although its centrality was, to some extent, reduced by the emergence of other pressing geopolitical developments.[1] First approved in 2022, the provision of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine has been subject to periodic renewals,[2] and most recently reconfirmed in December 2025 for the year ahead,[3] signalling a sustained commitment on the part of the Italian Government. In the context of this last authorization for the “transfer of means, materials and equipment in favour of the governmental authorities of Ukraine”, adopted with the favourable opinion of the Government, a deliberate terminological adjustment was introduced in the text of the decree-law during the parliamentary proceedings of a joint session (21 January 2026, XIX Legislature) of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber of Deputies. More specifically, one of the parties of the governing coalition successfully proposed to remove from the title the adjective “military” in reference to the “means, materials and equipment” for which the authorization for transfer was extended. However, the adjective was retained in the text of Article 1, even though the provision was supplemented by adding the words “and of civil defence”.

Such a modification, albeit formally limited in scope, appears to carry broader political significance. It may be understood as reflecting an effort to recalibrate the characterization of the assistance provided, by shifting from what some members of the Government perceive as a primarily military paradigm to a more comprehensive framework encompassing the civil defence dimension. This conceptual broadening arguably aligns with the Government’s consistently articulated emphasis on the defensive nature of its support, reinforcing the narrative that assistance is directed not only at military resilience but also at the protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the amendment may be read as an attempt to further anchor such measures within a discourse of proportionality and restraint, thereby mitigating potential concerns regarding escalation or direct involvement in the conflict.[4]

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Separation of Powers and National Sovereignty in the Government’s Migration Policy

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Migration policy has recently sparked an open conflict between the Italian Government and the judiciary, with the Government openly challenging the judiciary at all levels. Domestically, the focus is on the separation of powers; at the international level, on the tension between national sovereignty and the authority of international and regional courts.[1] In both cases, migration is treated as a security issue, and the Government, drawing on its democratic mandate, claims competence to protect its citizens, while non-elected courts are perceived as a potential obstacle to this aim.

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The Future Recognition of the State of Palestine: Shades of Pragmatism

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On 22 September 2025, the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held in New York, was closed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that ten new States were recognizing the State of Palestine that day.[1] A few days later, on 25 September, the co-chairs of the Conference, France and Saudi Arabia, issued a joint statement to express satisfaction for the adoption by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, with a majority of 142 votes (including that of Italy), of the New York Declaration,[2] which had been drafted during the Conference from late spring onwards.[3] In their statement, the two countries welcomed the new acts of recognition but also stated that the “Conference, and the recognition of Palestine, aims at the realization of a sovereign, democratic and economically viable State of Palestine”, which is thus seen as an “objective” yet to be achieved.[4]

The New York Declaration recalls that “recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State”.[5] Accordingly, the Italian Government decided not to recognize the State of Palestine. Indeed, when, in late July, some countries announced their intention to recognize the Palestinian State during the forthcoming 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, said that such moves would risk being “counterproductive”, as they would lead to the false belief that the problem has been solved.[6] On his part, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, affirmed that those acts could amount to a “political provocation”.[7] Along the same lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, later stated that an act of recognition that is not grounded on the conditions supporting the birth of a State would push peace between Israel and Palestinians further away.[8] It should be stressed that, although these concerns are based on the alleged consequences of recognizing Palestine as a State, they are not per se irreconcilable with a position grounded in international law. In fact, in describing such action as “counterproductive” (as President Meloni had also done), the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Luca Ciriani, explicitly labelled it as “premature recognition”, one that is performed “in the absence of an actual State”.[9]

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Recognition of Governments: Italy’s Practice Concerning Contested Elections and Regime Changes

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Recognition of governments, its denial, or its promise conditioned on positive developments, such as improved respect for human rights, are elements of standard practice for Italy, and, in 2025, the Italian authorities faced the issue of recognition in their relations with Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria.

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Italy’s reaction to the United States’ attack against Venezuela

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The political and legal shockwaves caused by the unilateral US attack on the territory of Venezuela on 3 January 2026 are still being felt. However, the belief that this blatant use of force and the abduction of the President of Venezuela and his wife mark historical events and that other States’ reactions will contribute to shaping new coordinates of international law and international relations is already widespread (see here).

In this respect, the Italian authorities quickly expressed support for the US’s conduct, albeit with some ambiguity.

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Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change

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Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.

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Italy’s Migration Policy in 2024: Pursuing the Externalisation Path

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In 2024, Italy’s migration policy continued to be heralded by the Italian Government and parliamentary majority as a success and a model for other countries, while being vehemently criticised by opposition parties as well as civil society organisations active in the area of the protection of migrants. Even though Italy’s policy in this field has been wide-ranging in its acts and effects, the externalisation of migration management is arguably one of its guiding principles. Albeit not a legal notion, externalisation – by referring to a multitude of practices of controlling and managing migration beyond a State’s borders – raises compelling legal issues.[1] Therefore, it is not surprising that the Italian Government aimed to justify its outward-looking approach, affecting virtually all phases of the migration process, on a variety of legal grounds.

Starting with the departure of migrants, references to a supposed “right not to migrate” were again abundant in the Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice of 2024. This has been a leitmotiv of the current Italian Government and one of the theoretical premises and legal backbones of Piano Mattei, namely Italy’s flagship plan for investment in and cooperation with Africa. Among other instances, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, referred to this right in her address before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the Summit of the Future, on 23 September 2024. In connection with Piano Mattei and its approach (“neither paternalistic nor charitable or predatory”), Ms. Meloni stated that “[Piano Mattei] is our recipe to promote the development of a continent too often undervalued, build its stability, and finally guarantee one right that until now has been denied to too many young people – the right not to have to emigrate”.

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The Arrest and Detention of Ilaria Salis in Hungary

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On 13 February 2023, the Italian Embassy in Hungary was informed that Ilaria Salis, an Italian national, had been arrested in Budapest two days earlier. She had been taken into custody on charges of armed group violence for assaulting far-right activists during a demonstration. She was accused of being part of organised groups that allegedly planned to attack people present at the demonstration. The Embassy was informed that Ms. Salis was being held in a Budapest prison and that the prosecution was seeking a prison sentence of 11 years.

In 2024, while expressing concern for non-compliance with fair trial and minimum standards on detention, Italy initially only stressed the need to respect Hungary’s sovereignty and the impartiality of its judiciary.[1] On 29 January 2024, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, emphasised that “the Hungarian judiciary is sovereign” and that Italy could only take action through diplomatic channels to improve the conditions of detention.[2] Further statements by both Mr. Nordio and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, underlined that the principle of judicial sovereignty of a State would prevent interference in the conduct of the trial and Ms. Salis’s detention status.[3]

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The Legality of Arms Transfers to Israel after 7 October: The Relationship Between the International Legal Framework on Arms Trade and Law No. 185 of 1990

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In Italy, as in several other countries, the debate on the legality of arms transfers to Israel assumed considerable political importance in late 2023 and early 2024.[1] After an initial period of shock over the Hamas attack on Israeli territory on 7 October, public and parliamentary attention to arms transfers to Israel increased in parallel with the growing number of Palestinian civilian casualties caused by the Israeli army’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Between November 2023 and April 2024, the Italian Government had to address the issue on at least five occasions during parliamentary debates.

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