Throughout 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict continued to occupy a significant place within Italian political and parliamentary debates, although its centrality was, to some extent, reduced by the emergence of other pressing geopolitical developments.[1] First approved in 2022, the provision of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine has been subject to periodic renewals,[2] and most recently reconfirmed in December 2025 for the year ahead,[3] signalling a sustained commitment on the part of the Italian Government. In the context of this last authorization for the “transfer of means, materials and equipment in favour of the governmental authorities of Ukraine”, adopted with the favourable opinion of the Government, a deliberate terminological adjustment was introduced in the text of the decree-law during the parliamentary proceedings of a joint session (21 January 2026, XIX Legislature) of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber of Deputies. More specifically, one of the parties of the governing coalition successfully proposed to remove from the title the adjective “military” in reference to the “means, materials and equipment” for which the authorization for transfer was extended. However, the adjective was retained in the text of Article 1, even though the provision was supplemented by adding the words “and of civil defence”.
Such a modification, albeit formally limited in scope, appears to carry broader political significance. It may be understood as reflecting an effort to recalibrate the characterization of the assistance provided, by shifting from what some members of the Government perceive as a primarily military paradigm to a more comprehensive framework encompassing the civil defence dimension. This conceptual broadening arguably aligns with the Government’s consistently articulated emphasis on the defensive nature of its support, reinforcing the narrative that assistance is directed not only at military resilience but also at the protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the amendment may be read as an attempt to further anchor such measures within a discourse of proportionality and restraint, thereby mitigating potential concerns regarding escalation or direct involvement in the conflict.[4]
With the consistently reiterated aim of “enabling a people to defend themselves”, since the start of the war Italian support to Ukraine has thus materialized primarily through the continued provision of military aid, implemented, according to the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, “in line with the international commitments we have undertaken within NATO and the European Union” (Senate of the Republic, 264th Meeting, 21 January 2025). With regard to relations with NATO, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, commenting on developments in the crisis in Ukraine, informed the Senate (340th Meeting, 11 September 2025) that the Italian Government had proposed
a security mechanism based on mutual assistance, modelled on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. This is a proposal that the US President referred to during his talks in August, in which our Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, took part, and which has also garnered significant support from our other partners. The starting point is the establishment of a collective security clause that would allow Ukraine to benefit from the support of all its partners, including the United States, should it come under attack again.
The proposal was reaffirmed at the end of the year before the Chamber (586th Meeting, 17 December 2025) by the President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, who outlined its principal elements intended to prevent future conflicts. In particular, she referred to three key components: first, the need to ensure the maintenance of a robust Ukrainian military apparatus; second, the possible deployment of a multinational force in Ukraine “aimed at the regeneration of its armed forces” and based on the voluntary participation of individual States – though President Meloni clarified that Italy does not intend to deploy its own troops on Ukrainian territory; and third, the provision of security guarantees by international allies, including the United States, modelled on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Given that the defining features of such an initiative are yet to be clearly articulated, to date, the proposal does not appear to have been meaningfully taken into consideration by Ukraine’s allies or, at least, it seems to have lost momentum and remained without a concrete follow-up. In addition, as has repeatedly emerged from Italian parliamentary debates, there has been clear and consistent opposition to the prospect of deploying Italian troops to Ukraine, reflecting a broadly shared reluctance to contemplate any form of direct military involvement on the ground.[5] Before the Senate (340th Meeting, 11 September 2025), Minister Tajani stated firmly that “the Government is not currently considering the possibility of sending Italian troops to Ukraine. Instead, options are being considered for monitoring and training military personnel outside Ukraine’s borders, but only once hostilities have ceased”. Ms. Meloni had previously (Chamber of Deputies, 449th Meeting, 18 March 2025) also ruled out the deployment of “European troops” – a proposal initially put forward by the United Kingdom and France[6] – describing it as “a highly complex, risky and ineffective option”. In light of these statements, a certain tension appears to arise between the openness to voluntary troop contributions by individual States on the one hand, and the (previous) rejection of both Italian participation and the deployment of “European troops” on the other. From a legal standpoint, this position remains somewhat ambiguous, insofar as coalitions composed of European States may, in practice, result precisely in a European military presence, albeit outside a formal European Union framework.
The issue of training Ukrainian troops similarly exposes a certain ambiguity within the Italian Government’s position. Whereas, in 2024, the Undersecretary of State for Justice, Mr. Andrea Delmastro delle Vedove, had suggested that military training could be carried out on Italian soil while hostilities remained ongoing,[7] the abovementioned statement by Mr. Tajani appears to have later excluded that option altogether. This seeming shift introduces an additional layer of restraint into Italy’s approach and further complicates the identification of a coherent legal and political framework governing Italy’s support for Ukraine.
While demonstrating firm and sustained support for the continuation of military assistance to Ukraine, the Italian Government’s position is at the same time characterized by a set of cautionary qualifications. In particular, emphasis is placed on the strictly defensive nature that such assistance must retain, as well as on its grounding within the framework of Italy’s international and European commitments. This is complemented by references to security guarantees modelled on Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, alongside the clear and reiterated exclusion of any possibility of deploying Italian military personnel on Ukrainian territory. What thus emerges is an approach seeking to balance concrete support with the containment of the risks associated with direct involvement in the conflict. Ultimately, these elements converge in the reiteration that such support must be directed, as a matter of priority, towards the attainment of a ceasefire and the establishment of a “just and lasting peace”, as affirmed on 22 January 2025 by Mr. Crosetto, in delivering his statement before the Chamber of Deputies ahead of the renewal of military aid for 2025 (414th Meeting). It is worth noting that this position has been maintained notwithstanding the apparent shifts in stance expressed by the President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, which have introduced a degree of uncertainty into support for Ukraine and the broader transatlantic relations.[8]
On this point, Ms. Meloni, in welcoming the ceasefire proposal agreed on 11 March 2025 in Jeddah between the United States and Ukraine,[9] reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a closely aligned and coordinated approach with the United States, emphasizing the continued centrality of the transatlantic framework in ensuring both European and Ukrainian security (Senate, 286th Meeting, 18 March 2025). She made clear that
it is not conceivable to build effective and lasting security guarantees by dividing Europe and the United States. It is right for Europe to equip itself to play its part, but it is, at best, naïve – and at worst, reckless – to think that it can act alone today, without NATO, outside that Euro-Atlantic framework which, for seventy-five years, has ensured Europe’s security and which, over the past three years, has enabled Ukraine to resist.
With specific regard to the issue of peace negotiations, the Government’s position has also been articulated through statements made to the national press. On the margins of the “Ukraine Recovery Conference”, held in Rome on 10-11 July 2025, Mr. Tajani stated that “[t]he priority now is to bring all actors to the negotiating table. Europe and Italy must be at the forefront”.[10] In a similar vein, Mr. Crosetto observed, with reference to Russia and the United States, that “[t]wo strong countries cannot reach an agreement at the expense of the weaker one. The perimeter must be determined by the parties to the conflict”. He further emphasized that “[a] summit concerning an attacked country requires the presence of the representatives of that country’s people, who alone are the true holders of their own destiny”, concluding that “[n]o agreement is possible without the involvement and signature of Ukraine”.[11] However, in the context of a proposal put forward in the Senate (264th Meeting, 21 January 2025) for the adoption of a resolution concerning future commitments in support of Ukraine’s defence, Mr. Crosetto, speaking on behalf of the Government, expressed a negative opinion on the suggested “appointment of a special envoy for peace” by Italy. The resolution was ultimately adopted with no reference to such role. This position may be contrasted with the more recent support by Italy for the prospect of appointing a European representative for future peace negotiations, the emphasis shifting from national initiatives to a coordinated EU framework.[12]
Overall, the Italian Government’s approach throughout 2025 and into 2026 appears to have been characterized by a persistent attempt to reconcile three partially competing objectives: the continuation of meaningful support for Ukraine, the preservation of Italy’s international and Euro-Atlantic commitments, and the avoidance of any form of direct military involvement capable of escalating the conflict or altering Italy’s legal position vis-à-vis the hostilities. At the same time, the emphasis placed on the pursuit of a “just and lasting peace” demonstrates that the Government does not conceive military assistance as an end in itself, but rather as instrumental to the creation of conditions conducive to negotiations and long-term security guarantees. The insistence on Ukraine’s centrality in any peace process, together with the rejection of externally imposed solutions, reflects a position consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-determination underpinning the international legal order.
Nevertheless, the ambiguities emerged throughout the parliamentary debates also point to the difficulty of defining a coherent political stance capable of balancing support for Ukraine with domestic political sensitivities and the risks of international escalation.
Filomena Medea Tulli
A quotable version of this post will be published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Filomena Medea Tulli, “Continuity and Caution: Italy’s Evolving Legal Approach to Supporting Ukraine”, IYIL XXXV (2025), 2026.
[1] See the note by Amoroso here (and also published on this site) (to be updated).
[2] See Turrini, “Italy’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 432 ff., especially pp. 433-438 (also published on this site).
[3] DL no. 201 of 31 December 2025, converted into Law no. 27 of 27 February 2026.
[4] On this point, see again Turrini, cit. supra note 2, pp. 435-437.
[5] Speaking before the Chamber, prior to her December remarks, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had already articulated the Government’s position in unequivocal terms: “[e]ach nation will contribute to these efforts to the extent that it is able and deems necessary. Italy has already made it clear that it does not intend to send its own soldiers to Ukrainian territory” (552nd Meeting, 22 October 2025).
[6] Following the Paris summit of the “Coalition of the Willing” on 6 January 2026, France and the United Kingdom publicly supported the possible deployment of a multinational force in Ukraine after a ceasefire agreement, framed as a post-conflict reassurance and monitoring mission. The text of the declaration of intent, signed jointly with Ukraine, is available here.
[7] Turrini, cit. supra note 2, p. 438.
[8] For a detailed account of the numerous shifts in the position of the President of the United States with regard to support for Ukraine, see “A Timeline of Trump’s quotes, shifts and U-turns on Russia and Ukraine”, The Washington Post, 9 December 2025.
[9] The Jeddah understandings of 11 May 2025 refer to diplomatic engagements between the United States and Ukraine aimed at exploring the conditions for a possible ceasefire and future security guarantees. They do not constitute a legally binding international agreement, but rather lie at the basis of a negotiation process aimed at involving Russia and European partners. The text of the statement is available here.
[10] “Tajani: ‘No a demilitarizzare l’Ucraina. E nella Striscia di Gaza Netanyahu si fermi’”, Il Messaggero, 9 August 2025.
[11] “Crosetto: ‘Il governo di Israele ha perso ragione e umanità. Combattere i terroristi non è più una scusa’”, La Stampa, 11 August 2025.
[12] “Tajani: ‘Sarà Ue a scegliere rappresentante per negoziati pace Ucraina-Russia’”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 11 May 2026.
