Author Archives: Paolo Turrini

The Future Recognition of the State of Palestine: Shades of Pragmatism

On 22 September 2025, the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held in New York, was closed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that ten new States were recognizing the State of Palestine that day.[1] A few days later, on 25 September, the co-chairs of the Conference, France and Saudi Arabia, issued a joint statement to express satisfaction for the adoption by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, with a majority of 142 votes (including that of Italy), of the New York Declaration,[2] which had been drafted during the Conference from late spring onwards.[3] In their statement, the two countries welcomed the new acts of recognition but also stated that the “Conference, and the recognition of Palestine, aims at the realization of a sovereign, democratic and economically viable State of Palestine”, which is thus seen as an “objective” yet to be achieved.[4]

The New York Declaration recalls that “recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State”.[5] Accordingly, the Italian Government decided not to recognize the State of Palestine. Indeed, when, in late July, some countries announced their intention to recognize the Palestinian State during the forthcoming 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, said that such moves would risk being “counterproductive”, as they would lead to the false belief that the problem has been solved.[6] On his part, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, affirmed that those acts could amount to a “political provocation”.[7] Along the same lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, later stated that an act of recognition that is not grounded on the conditions supporting the birth of a State would push peace between Israel and Palestinians further away.[8] It should be stressed that, although these concerns are based on the alleged consequences of recognizing Palestine as a State, they are not per se irreconcilable with a position grounded in international law. In fact, in describing such action as “counterproductive” (as President Meloni had also done), the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Luca Ciriani, explicitly labelled it as “premature recognition”, one that is performed “in the absence of an actual State”.[9]

Continue reading →

Italy’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace

In 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained one of the main topics of debate in foreign policy matters in Italy. Among the aspects discussed by governmental representatives, the most significant ones are the extent of Italian support to Ukraine’s war effort, the final aim this support pursues (i.e., the conditions attached to a future peace arrangement), and military aid to Russia from other States.

Continue reading →

The Response to the Houthis’ Attacks in the Red Sea: Bathing in Ambiguity

Continue reading →

Of Castaways and Pirates: Migrants’ Rights from Departure to Arrival

Continue reading →

The Legality of Sanctions Between the Condemnation of Their Extraterritorial Application and Humanitarian Concerns

Continue reading →

The Dispute with France over the Territorial Boundary in the Mont Blanc Area

Continue reading →

The Classification of Italy’s Ports as Places Unsafe for Migrants Rescued by Foreign Vessels Outside the Country’s SAR Area

Continue reading →

Developments Concerning Austria’s Attempts to Grant Dual Nationality and Consular Assistance to German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans

Toned down during the first part of 2019, the diplomatic row between Italy and Austria over Vienna’s draft laws on dual nationality and consular assistance for German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans resurfaced[1] following the fall of the Austrian Government in May 2019.

Continue reading →

The Non-recognition of the Venezuelan President Between Democratic Standards and the Principle of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of Other States

Throughout 2018, the situation in Venezuela remained highly volatile. In May, snap presidential elections took place and the incumbent President, Mr Nicolás Maduro, declared victory; however, the election results were recognized neither by the opposition (which had mostly boycotted the poll) nor by a large part of the international community.[1] On 5 August 2018, following an alleged drone attack against Maduro, a further crackdown on opposition leaders ensued.[2] In the meantime, a report by the International Monetary Fund estimated a 1,370,000 percent inflation by the end of the year,[3] while the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 1.5 million Venezuelans had left the country since the beginning of the crisis and the number of asylum applications had spiked.[4]

The year 2019 started with the official inauguration of Maduro’s second term as President of Venezuela, on 10 January. On 23 January, however, Mr Juan Guaidó, President of the National Assembly (the Venezuelan Parliament) and leader of the opposition,[5] declared himself interim President of Venezuela by relying on Article 233 of the Constitution, which attributes the interim presidency to the head of the National Assembly should the President become “permanently unavailable to serve”.[6] Venezuela thus plunged into political and institutional chaos.

Continue reading →

The Scope and Means of Action of the United Nations Security Council as Seen by Italy during its “Shared Membership”

Italy has a long tradition of taking public stances on issues concerning the United Nations (UN) in general, and the Security Council (SC) in particular. The most important of such issues is perhaps the reform of the SC, a hotly debated question on which Italy has been taking a leading position for many years, promoting a series of proposals around which a group known as “Uniting for Consensus” has gathered.[1] This very same theme has been discussed by Italian representatives at the UN also in 2017 and 2018, when they reiterated and further clarified their country’s view.[2] Those years also correspond to the biennium that saw Italy and the Netherlands share a split non-permanent seat at the SC (the former being a member in 2017). Therefore, Italy has recently had many occasions to express its ideas on the action of the SC.

It is well known that the role of the SC has been progressively expanding since the end of the Cold War, so that nowadays its activities have a far wider scope than that envisioned in 1945 by the drafters of the UN Charter. Such legal developments can be said to be, by now, largely accepted by the international community, and even those States that occasionally veto or anyhow oppose certain SC resolutions, sometimes do that inconsistently and by putting forth political rather than legal justifications.[3] This notwithstanding, the issue of how far-reaching the powers of the SC are remains the subject of scholarly debate and is still of some practical importance for States. From this perspective, it may be useful to review Italy’s stances on the action of the SC.

Continue reading →