The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.
Continue readingCategory Archives: Human Rights
To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: The Repercussions of the Elmasry Case and Italy’s Gradual Distancing from the International Criminal Court
In 2025, Italy was requested for the first time to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in arresting and surrendering a suspect; it failed to do so and was therefore found non-compliant and referred to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The “Elmasry case”, from the name of the Libyan suspect Italy first arrested and then brought back to Libya thus violating its obligations to cooperate with the ICC, revealed the Italian Government’s ambiguity with regard to its conditional support to international criminal justice.[1] Additionally, the case exposed a legal disagreement concerning the role of the Minister of Justice under Italian implementing legislation (Law no. 237 of 20 December 2012). In particular, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, appeared to rely on the view that the Government retained a margin of discretionary assessment as to the transmission and execution of the ICC’s cooperation requests.[2] However, as it will be explained below, the ICC has found Italy’s defences to be inconsistent with the obligations under the Rome Statute. In this connection, a case is currently pending regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of Law no. 237. This note will focus on the aftermath of the Elmasry case, at both the domestic and international levels, showing that, unless legal changes are made, there is a real risk that this episode will be only the first in a series of failures to cooperate by Italy.
Continue readingSeparation of Powers and National Sovereignty in the Government’s Migration Policy
Migration policy has recently sparked an open conflict between the Italian Government and the judiciary, with the Government openly challenging the judiciary at all levels. Domestically, the focus is on the separation of powers; at the international level, on the tension between national sovereignty and the authority of international and regional courts.[1] In both cases, migration is treated as a security issue, and the Government, drawing on its democratic mandate, claims competence to protect its citizens, while non-elected courts are perceived as a potential obstacle to this aim.
Continue readingRecognition of Governments: Italy’s Practice Concerning Contested Elections and Regime Changes
Recognition of governments, its denial, or its promise conditioned on positive developments, such as improved respect for human rights, are elements of standard practice for Italy, and, in 2025, the Italian authorities faced the issue of recognition in their relations with Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria.
Continue readingItaly’s reaction to the United States’ attack against Venezuela
The political and legal shockwaves caused by the unilateral US attack on the territory of Venezuela on 3 January 2026 are still being felt. However, the belief that this blatant use of force and the abduction of the President of Venezuela and his wife mark historical events and that other States’ reactions will contribute to shaping new coordinates of international law and international relations is already widespread (see here).
In this respect, the Italian authorities quickly expressed support for the US’s conduct, albeit with some ambiguity.
Continue readingThe Ongoing Reform of the Italian Law on Arms Export and Recent Policy Trends in This Field
Italy stands out as one of the first countries to have established a detailed legal regime for arms export control, with Law No. 185 of 1990. Despite having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, Italy has never introduced any implementing legislation or undertaken a substantial revision of Law 185/1990 to align it with the ATT obligations. The reform of such law – long awaited due to partial divergence from ATT provisions – thus appeared to many as necessary. Against this background, the draft amendments to Law 185/1990 were formally submitted to the Senate of the Republic on 11 August 2023 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in coordination with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior, of Justice, of Economy and Finance and of Enterprises and Made in Italy. However, it is striking that the current reform makes no explicit reference to the ATT, nor does it seem to address the need for legal harmonisation.[1] This calls for a closer examination of the actual drivers behind the reform of Italy’s legislation on arms export control.
Continue readingItaly’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change
Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.
Continue readingThe Enforcement of Arrest Warrants Issued by the International Criminal Court: Between the Duty to Cooperate and Realpolitik
In late 2024 and early 2025 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued several arrest warrants in the context of politically sensitive investigations, including those regarding the ongoing armed conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine.[1] Some of these decisions concern alleged perpetrators holding high-level political positions in States that are close allies of Italy, such as Israel. Furthermore, in January 2025, Italy was requested by the Court to execute on its territory an arrest warrant issued against General Osema Almasri Najeem in the context of the investigation in Libya. Italy’s recent behaviour in relation to arrest warrants in the situations in Palestine and Libya is indicative of a shift from the traditionally supportive attitude to a more cautious (and lees cooperative) one in its relations with international criminal tribunals. This contribution analyses the Italian Government’s conduct, which shows a discrepancy between the rhetorical support for the ICC and the lack of actual cooperation in the execution of its requests.
Continue readingItaly’s Migration Policy in 2024: Pursuing the Externalisation Path
In 2024, Italy’s migration policy continued to be heralded by the Italian Government and parliamentary majority as a success and a model for other countries, while being vehemently criticised by opposition parties as well as civil society organisations active in the area of the protection of migrants. Even though Italy’s policy in this field has been wide-ranging in its acts and effects, the externalisation of migration management is arguably one of its guiding principles. Albeit not a legal notion, externalisation – by referring to a multitude of practices of controlling and managing migration beyond a State’s borders – raises compelling legal issues.[1] Therefore, it is not surprising that the Italian Government aimed to justify its outward-looking approach, affecting virtually all phases of the migration process, on a variety of legal grounds.
Starting with the departure of migrants, references to a supposed “right not to migrate” were again abundant in the Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice of 2024. This has been a leitmotiv of the current Italian Government and one of the theoretical premises and legal backbones of Piano Mattei, namely Italy’s flagship plan for investment in and cooperation with Africa. Among other instances, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, referred to this right in her address before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the Summit of the Future, on 23 September 2024. In connection with Piano Mattei and its approach (“neither paternalistic nor charitable or predatory”), Ms. Meloni stated that “[Piano Mattei] is our recipe to promote the development of a continent too often undervalued, build its stability, and finally guarantee one right that until now has been denied to too many young people – the right not to have to emigrate”.
Continue readingThe Arrest and Detention of Ilaria Salis in Hungary
On 13 February 2023, the Italian Embassy in Hungary was informed that Ilaria Salis, an Italian national, had been arrested in Budapest two days earlier. She had been taken into custody on charges of armed group violence for assaulting far-right activists during a demonstration. She was accused of being part of organised groups that allegedly planned to attack people present at the demonstration. The Embassy was informed that Ms. Salis was being held in a Budapest prison and that the prosecution was seeking a prison sentence of 11 years.
In 2024, while expressing concern for non-compliance with fair trial and minimum standards on detention, Italy initially only stressed the need to respect Hungary’s sovereignty and the impartiality of its judiciary.[1] On 29 January 2024, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, emphasised that “the Hungarian judiciary is sovereign” and that Italy could only take action through diplomatic channels to improve the conditions of detention.[2] Further statements by both Mr. Nordio and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, underlined that the principle of judicial sovereignty of a State would prevent interference in the conduct of the trial and Ms. Salis’s detention status.[3]
Continue reading