The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.
Continue readingTag Archives: Israel
Selective Condemnations and Creeping Endorsements: Italy’s Recent Practice on the Prohibition of the Use of Force
The frequent recourse to armed force by States in 2025 and early 2026 has seriously challenged the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. States responsible for these conducts are increasingly reluctant to justify them under international law and face limited condemnation within the international community.[1] The Italian Government and Parliament have adopted variable positions on the legality of these military operations, selectively condemning the use of force. While Italy has frequently denounced the Russian aggression against Ukraine, often invoking Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,[2] it has shown a more lenient stance on military operations conducted by the United States (US) and Israel.
Here, Italy’s position is presented with respect to the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and in the West Bank, the US intervention in Venezuela and President Donald Trump’s threats regarding Greenland, and the two US-Israeli operations against Iran.
Continue readingItaly’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change
Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.
Continue readingThe Legality of Arms Transfers to Israel after 7 October: The Relationship Between the International Legal Framework on Arms Trade and Law No. 185 of 1990
In Italy, as in several other countries, the debate on the legality of arms transfers to Israel assumed considerable political importance in late 2023 and early 2024.[1] After an initial period of shock over the Hamas attack on Israeli territory on 7 October, public and parliamentary attention to arms transfers to Israel increased in parallel with the growing number of Palestinian civilian casualties caused by the Israeli army’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Between November 2023 and April 2024, the Italian Government had to address the issue on at least five occasions during parliamentary debates.
Continue readingThe Resumption of Hostilities between Israel and Palestinian Armed Groups and the Qualification of Palestinian Civil Society Associations as Terrorist Organizations
The year 2021 was marked by the most violent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza since 2014. In May, clashes and protests for scheduled forced evictions of Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem, and for increasing Israeli settlement activity, spiraled into eleven days of military confrontation. On 17 May 2021, at the Security Council open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the European Union (EU) expressed its concerns over the upsurge in violence and called “for an immediate cessation of hostilities”.[1] Similarly, on 12 May, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General remarked that “de-escalation is an absolute must to protect the lives of civilians”.[2]
Continue readingThe Proposed Israeli Annexation of Parts of the West Bank
On 20 April 2020, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu, and the leader of the White and Blue political alliance, Mr Benjamin Gantz, signed the coalition agreement that ended the political stalemate resulting from the inconclusive results of three consecutive Israeli legislative elections, which had been held in April 2019, September 2019, and March 2020.
Continue readingTerritorial Issues Concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict
On the Status of the Golan Heights
On 25 March 2019, the President of the United States (US), Mr Donald Trump, issued a Presidential Proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The text of the Proclamation clarifies that the main reason behind this decision was Israeli security. More specifically, the relevant part of the text reads:
The State of Israel took control of the Golan Heights in 1967 to safeguard its security from external threats. Today, aggressive acts by Iran and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, in southern Syria continue to make the Golan Heights a potential launching ground for attacks on Israel. Any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel’s need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats. Based on these unique circumstances, it is therefore appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.[1]
Continue readingItaly’s stance on the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel
On 6 December 2017, the United States (US) President, Mr. Donald Trump, put into effect his presidential campaign promise to effectively recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thereby indicating a future move there for the US embassy from Tel Aviv. Such a decision has been interpreted by many as marking a turning point in the US approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Indeed, even though the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act adopted by the US Senate and House of Representatives committed the Federal Government to moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, since its enactment every US President has regularly availed himself of the possibility to invoke a six-month waiver of the application of the law. President Trump himself signed such a waiver twice, before (June 2017) as well as after (December 2017) his own declaration. Nonetheless, his announcement sparked controversy and many countries voiced their dissent. Italy is among those States and its stance will be discussed below. However, in order better to understand the dissent it expressed along with a number of other countries, it is useful to provide a factual and legal context, starting with Mr. Trump’s actual words.
In his speech, Mr. Trump motivated his decision as follows:
Israel is a sovereign nation with the right, like every other sovereign nation, to determine its own capital. […] But today we finally acknowledge the obvious. That Jerusalem is Israel’s capital. This is nothing more or less than a recognition of reality. It is also the right thing to do. It’s something that has to be done.
Continue readingThe position of Italy on the UNESCO Executive Board’s decision 200 EX/25 and the ‘Al Aqṣa Mosque/Al-Ḥaram Al-Sharif’ or ‘Temple Mount’ question
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, XVII LEGISLATURE, 699th MEETING, 26 OCTOBER 2016.
On 26 October 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr Paolo Gentiloni Silveri, answered three parliamentary questions regarding the abstention of Italy on Decision 200 EX/25 on Occupied Palestine approved by the UNESCO Executive Board on 13 October 2016. The decision was adopted with 24 votes in favour, 6 against, and 26 abstentions. The text of the decision regrets ‘the Israeli refusal to implement previous UNESCO decisions concerning Jerusalem’ and deplores ‘the failure of Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the persistent excavations and works in East Jerusalem particularly in and around the Old City’. In section 25.1.A, the decision makes reference to several issues related to the ‘Al Aqṣa Mosque/Al-Ḥaram Al-Sharif’ condemning, inter alia, ‘escalating Israeli aggressions […] against the freedom of worship and Muslims’ access to their holy site’, as well as deploring ‘the continuous storming’ of the mosque ‘by Israeli right-wing extremists and uniformed forces’. In doing so, the resolution does not make reference to the Jewish ‘Temple Mount’. Mr Gentiloni started by illustrating the Italian position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more generally:
Recognition of Palestine: Two Parliamentary Motions Approved
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, XVII LEGISLATURE, 383th MEETING, 27 FEBRUARY 2015.
On 27 February 2015, the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament was called upon to vote seven motions concerning initiatives for the recognition of the Palestinian State. Five of them were rejected (Motions nos. 1-00675, 1-00625, 1-00699, 1-00738 and 1-00747). Two were approved, but they do not seem to be fully consistent with each other. A full translation of the text of both motions is given hereunder.
