The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.
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Continuity and Caution: Italy’s Evolving Legal Approach to Supporting Ukraine
Throughout 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict continued to occupy a significant place within Italian political and parliamentary debates, although its centrality was, to some extent, reduced by the emergence of other pressing geopolitical developments.[1] First approved in 2022, the provision of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine has been subject to periodic renewals,[2] and most recently reconfirmed in December 2025 for the year ahead,[3] signalling a sustained commitment on the part of the Italian Government. In the context of this last authorization for the “transfer of means, materials and equipment in favour of the governmental authorities of Ukraine”, adopted with the favourable opinion of the Government, a deliberate terminological adjustment was introduced in the text of the decree-law during the parliamentary proceedings of a joint session (21 January 2026, XIX Legislature) of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber of Deputies. More specifically, one of the parties of the governing coalition successfully proposed to remove from the title the adjective “military” in reference to the “means, materials and equipment” for which the authorization for transfer was extended. However, the adjective was retained in the text of Article 1, even though the provision was supplemented by adding the words “and of civil defence”.
Such a modification, albeit formally limited in scope, appears to carry broader political significance. It may be understood as reflecting an effort to recalibrate the characterization of the assistance provided, by shifting from what some members of the Government perceive as a primarily military paradigm to a more comprehensive framework encompassing the civil defence dimension. This conceptual broadening arguably aligns with the Government’s consistently articulated emphasis on the defensive nature of its support, reinforcing the narrative that assistance is directed not only at military resilience but also at the protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the amendment may be read as an attempt to further anchor such measures within a discourse of proportionality and restraint, thereby mitigating potential concerns regarding escalation or direct involvement in the conflict.[4]
Continue readingTo Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: The Repercussions of the Elmasry Case and Italy’s Gradual Distancing from the International Criminal Court
In 2025, Italy was requested for the first time to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in arresting and surrendering a suspect; it failed to do so and was therefore found non-compliant and referred to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The “Elmasry case”, from the name of the Libyan suspect Italy first arrested and then brought back to Libya thus violating its obligations to cooperate with the ICC, revealed the Italian Government’s ambiguity with regard to its conditional support to international criminal justice.[1] Additionally, the case exposed a legal disagreement concerning the role of the Minister of Justice under Italian implementing legislation (Law no. 237 of 20 December 2012). In particular, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, appeared to rely on the view that the Government retained a margin of discretionary assessment as to the transmission and execution of the ICC’s cooperation requests.[2] However, as it will be explained below, the ICC has found Italy’s defences to be inconsistent with the obligations under the Rome Statute. In this connection, a case is currently pending regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of Law no. 237. This note will focus on the aftermath of the Elmasry case, at both the domestic and international levels, showing that, unless legal changes are made, there is a real risk that this episode will be only the first in a series of failures to cooperate by Italy.
Continue readingRecognition of Governments: Italy’s Practice Concerning Contested Elections and Regime Changes
Recognition of governments, its denial, or its promise conditioned on positive developments, such as improved respect for human rights, are elements of standard practice for Italy, and, in 2025, the Italian authorities faced the issue of recognition in their relations with Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria.
Continue readingItaly’s reaction to the United States’ attack against Venezuela
The political and legal shockwaves caused by the unilateral US attack on the territory of Venezuela on 3 January 2026 are still being felt. However, the belief that this blatant use of force and the abduction of the President of Venezuela and his wife mark historical events and that other States’ reactions will contribute to shaping new coordinates of international law and international relations is already widespread (see here).
In this respect, the Italian authorities quickly expressed support for the US’s conduct, albeit with some ambiguity.
Continue readingItaly’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace
In 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained one of the main topics of debate in foreign policy matters in Italy. Among the aspects discussed by governmental representatives, the most significant ones are the extent of Italian support to Ukraine’s war effort, the final aim this support pursues (i.e., the conditions attached to a future peace arrangement), and military aid to Russia from other States.
Continue readingThe Arrest and Detention of Ilaria Salis in Hungary
On 13 February 2023, the Italian Embassy in Hungary was informed that Ilaria Salis, an Italian national, had been arrested in Budapest two days earlier. She had been taken into custody on charges of armed group violence for assaulting far-right activists during a demonstration. She was accused of being part of organised groups that allegedly planned to attack people present at the demonstration. The Embassy was informed that Ms. Salis was being held in a Budapest prison and that the prosecution was seeking a prison sentence of 11 years.
In 2024, while expressing concern for non-compliance with fair trial and minimum standards on detention, Italy initially only stressed the need to respect Hungary’s sovereignty and the impartiality of its judiciary.[1] On 29 January 2024, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, emphasised that “the Hungarian judiciary is sovereign” and that Italy could only take action through diplomatic channels to improve the conditions of detention.[2] Further statements by both Mr. Nordio and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, underlined that the principle of judicial sovereignty of a State would prevent interference in the conduct of the trial and Ms. Salis’s detention status.[3]
Continue readingThe Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Issues of Recognition, Sanctions and the Supply of Weapons
During 2022, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, three main topics of discussion emerged in the Italian parliamentary practice: the recognition of the self-proclaimed “republics” of the Donbass, the issue of sanctions against the Russian Federation, and, finally, the question of the legality and political expediency of supplying arms to Ukraine. All these topics are explored in the ensuing analysis, highlighting the position taken by the Italian Government on each of them.
Continue readingThe Non-Recognition of the Taliban Government of Afghanistan
Following the so-called Doha Agreement,[1] in April 2021 the final phase of the withdrawal of the United States (US) Army and all North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces on Afghan territory began. In May 2021, the Taliban launched their offensive, conquering in a rapid succession most capitals of the country’s provinces. The peak of the Taliban military attack occurred on 15 August 2021, the day of the conquest of Kabul. The subsequent escape of the President of Afghanistan, Mr. Ashraf Ghani, to the United Arab Emirates marked the capitulation of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, the end of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which had been established in 2004, and the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by the Taliban.
Continue readingThe Lifetime Extension of French Nuclear Power Plants
Considering that most nuclear power plants are designed to last between 30 and 40 years and that the majority of European plants were built between the 1970s and 1990s, the issue of their lifetime extension is at the center of the expert and public debate on nuclear energy in Europe. Lifetime extension refers to the prolongation of the operation of a plant beyond the validity period of the license, the plant’s design life or the period set forth in national laws or regulations.[1]The climate change emergency and the related need to phase out fossil fuels as fast as possible have only added to the urgency of the issue, more recently compounded by the war in Ukraine and the ensuing desirability of ending European Countries’ dependency on Russian gas.[2]
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