The Global Sumud Flotilla in Italy’s Discourse: Between Political Caution and Legal Reasoning

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The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.

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Continuity and Caution: Italy’s Evolving Legal Approach to Supporting Ukraine

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Throughout 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict continued to occupy a significant place within Italian political and parliamentary debates, although its centrality was, to some extent, reduced by the emergence of other pressing geopolitical developments.[1] First approved in 2022, the provision of weapons and military equipment to Ukraine has been subject to periodic renewals,[2] and most recently reconfirmed in December 2025 for the year ahead,[3] signalling a sustained commitment on the part of the Italian Government. In the context of this last authorization for the “transfer of means, materials and equipment in favour of the governmental authorities of Ukraine”, adopted with the favourable opinion of the Government, a deliberate terminological adjustment was introduced in the text of the decree-law during the parliamentary proceedings of a joint session (21 January 2026, XIX Legislature) of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber of Deputies. More specifically, one of the parties of the governing coalition successfully proposed to remove from the title the adjective “military” in reference to the “means, materials and equipment” for which the authorization for transfer was extended. However, the adjective was retained in the text of Article 1, even though the provision was supplemented by adding the words “and of civil defence”.

Such a modification, albeit formally limited in scope, appears to carry broader political significance. It may be understood as reflecting an effort to recalibrate the characterization of the assistance provided, by shifting from what some members of the Government perceive as a primarily military paradigm to a more comprehensive framework encompassing the civil defence dimension. This conceptual broadening arguably aligns with the Government’s consistently articulated emphasis on the defensive nature of its support, reinforcing the narrative that assistance is directed not only at military resilience but also at the protection of the civilian population and critical infrastructure. At the same time, the amendment may be read as an attempt to further anchor such measures within a discourse of proportionality and restraint, thereby mitigating potential concerns regarding escalation or direct involvement in the conflict.[4]

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Selective Condemnations and Creeping Endorsements: Italy’s Recent Practice on the Prohibition of the Use of Force

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The frequent recourse to armed force by States in 2025 and early 2026 has seriously challenged the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. States responsible for these conducts are increasingly reluctant to justify them under international law and face limited condemnation within the international community.[1] The Italian Government and Parliament have adopted variable positions on the legality of these military operations, selectively condemning the use of force. While Italy has frequently denounced the Russian aggression against Ukraine, often invoking Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,[2] it has shown a more lenient stance on military operations conducted by the United States (US) and Israel.

Here, Italy’s position is presented with respect to the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and in the West Bank, the US intervention in Venezuela and President Donald Trump’s threats regarding Greenland, and the two US-Israeli operations against Iran.

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To Cooperate, but on Its Own Terms: Italy, the WHO, and the Defence of Health Sovereignty

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In 2025 and 2026, Italy’s position towards the World Health Organization (WHO) and global health governance more in general was marked by a significant ambivalence. On the one hand, the Government repeatedly reaffirmed the need for international cooperation in the field of public health, acknowledging that global health emergencies cannot be addressed through unilateral action. On the other, Italy’s diplomatic and parliamentary practice showed a growing insistence on the preservation of the State’s margin of discretion in the implementation of international health standards.

During the 158th session of the WHO Executive Board in 2026, for instance, Italy affirmed that WHO is most effective when focused on its core functions and comparative advantages, and that its action should be “underpinned by national ownership”, since Member States retain “primary responsibility and prerogatives for health policies and health systems”.[1] The same attitude emerged in other contexts: Italy’s explanation of vote on the United Nations General Assembly resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy, the domestic debate on a possible withdrawal from the WHO, the rejection of all the 2024 amendments to the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), and Italy’s abstention on the WHO Pandemic Agreement.

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To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: The Repercussions of the Elmasry Case and Italy’s Gradual Distancing from the International Criminal Court

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In 2025, Italy was requested for the first time to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in arresting and surrendering a suspect; it failed to do so and was therefore found non-compliant and referred to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The “Elmasry case”, from the name of the Libyan suspect Italy first arrested and then brought back to Libya thus violating its obligations to cooperate with the ICC, revealed the Italian Government’s ambiguity with regard to its conditional support to international criminal justice.[1] Additionally, the case exposed a legal disagreement concerning the role of the Minister of Justice under Italian implementing legislation (Law no. 237 of 20 December 2012). In particular, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, appeared to rely on the view that the Government retained a margin of discretionary assessment as to the transmission and execution of the ICC’s cooperation requests.[2] However, as it will be explained below, the ICC has found Italy’s defences to be inconsistent with the obligations under the Rome Statute. In this connection, a case is currently pending regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of Law no. 237. This note will focus on the aftermath of the Elmasry case, at both the domestic and international levels, showing that, unless legal changes are made, there is a real risk that this episode will be only the first in a series of failures to cooperate by Italy.

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Separation of Powers and National Sovereignty in the Government’s Migration Policy

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Migration policy has recently sparked an open conflict between the Italian Government and the judiciary, with the Government openly challenging the judiciary at all levels. Domestically, the focus is on the separation of powers; at the international level, on the tension between national sovereignty and the authority of international and regional courts.[1] In both cases, migration is treated as a security issue, and the Government, drawing on its democratic mandate, claims competence to protect its citizens, while non-elected courts are perceived as a potential obstacle to this aim.

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The Future Recognition of the State of Palestine: Shades of Pragmatism

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On 22 September 2025, the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held in New York, was closed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that ten new States were recognizing the State of Palestine that day.[1] A few days later, on 25 September, the co-chairs of the Conference, France and Saudi Arabia, issued a joint statement to express satisfaction for the adoption by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, with a majority of 142 votes (including that of Italy), of the New York Declaration,[2] which had been drafted during the Conference from late spring onwards.[3] In their statement, the two countries welcomed the new acts of recognition but also stated that the “Conference, and the recognition of Palestine, aims at the realization of a sovereign, democratic and economically viable State of Palestine”, which is thus seen as an “objective” yet to be achieved.[4]

The New York Declaration recalls that “recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State”.[5] Accordingly, the Italian Government decided not to recognize the State of Palestine. Indeed, when, in late July, some countries announced their intention to recognize the Palestinian State during the forthcoming 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, said that such moves would risk being “counterproductive”, as they would lead to the false belief that the problem has been solved.[6] On his part, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, affirmed that those acts could amount to a “political provocation”.[7] Along the same lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, later stated that an act of recognition that is not grounded on the conditions supporting the birth of a State would push peace between Israel and Palestinians further away.[8] It should be stressed that, although these concerns are based on the alleged consequences of recognizing Palestine as a State, they are not per se irreconcilable with a position grounded in international law. In fact, in describing such action as “counterproductive” (as President Meloni had also done), the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Luca Ciriani, explicitly labelled it as “premature recognition”, one that is performed “in the absence of an actual State”.[9]

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Recognition of Governments: Italy’s Practice Concerning Contested Elections and Regime Changes

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Recognition of governments, its denial, or its promise conditioned on positive developments, such as improved respect for human rights, are elements of standard practice for Italy, and, in 2025, the Italian authorities faced the issue of recognition in their relations with Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria.

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Italy’s reaction to the United States’ attack against Venezuela

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The political and legal shockwaves caused by the unilateral US attack on the territory of Venezuela on 3 January 2026 are still being felt. However, the belief that this blatant use of force and the abduction of the President of Venezuela and his wife mark historical events and that other States’ reactions will contribute to shaping new coordinates of international law and international relations is already widespread (see here).

In this respect, the Italian authorities quickly expressed support for the US’s conduct, albeit with some ambiguity.

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The Ongoing Reform of the Italian Law on Arms Export and Recent Policy Trends in This Field

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Italy stands out as one of the first countries to have established a detailed legal regime for arms export control, with Law No. 185 of 1990. Despite having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, Italy has never introduced any implementing legislation or undertaken a substantial revision of Law 185/1990 to align it with the ATT obligations. The reform of such law – long awaited due to partial divergence from ATT provisions – thus appeared to many as necessary. Against this background, the draft amendments to Law 185/1990 were formally submitted to the Senate of the Republic on 11 August 2023 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in coordination with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior, of Justice, of Economy and Finance and of Enterprises and Made in Italy. However, it is striking that the current reform makes no explicit reference to the ATT, nor does it seem to address the need for legal harmonisation.[1] This calls for a closer examination of the actual drivers behind the reform of Italy’s legislation on arms export control.

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