The frequent recourse to armed force by States in 2025 and early 2026 has seriously challenged the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. States responsible for these conducts are increasingly reluctant to justify them under international law and face limited condemnation within the international community.[1] The Italian Government and Parliament have adopted variable positions on the legality of these military operations, selectively condemning the use of force. While Italy has frequently denounced the Russian aggression against Ukraine, often invoking Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,[2] it has shown a more lenient stance on military operations conducted by the United States (US) and Israel.
Here, Italy’s position is presented with respect to the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza and in the West Bank, the US intervention in Venezuela and President Donald Trump’s threats regarding Greenland, and the two US-Israeli operations against Iran.
The Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
Since the outbreak of the hostilities in Gaza in October 2023, the need for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip was frequently emphasized, alongside condemnation of Israel’s attacks on the civilian population and blockade of humanitarian aid.[3] Nevertheless, Italy has never explicitly labelled Israeli military operations as groundless under international law. Conversely, the Government has consistently maintained, in general terms, that Israeli military operations in Gaza constitute a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence.[4] Indeed, the Government has often held Hamas responsible for the ongoing armed conflict, qualifying the 7 October 2023 attack as an aggression.[5] The President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, reiterated this in her address to the UN General Assembly during the 80th session, noting that Italy does not “agree with those who place all the blame for what is happening in Gaza on Israel” because “[i]t was Hamas that started the war”.[6]
However, throughout 2025 this position became more nuanced. While continuing to affirm Israel’s right to self-defence, the Government made increasingly explicit its concerns as to the compatibility of these actions with the international rules on the use of force, a position that had already begun to emerge in 2024.[7] In her statement before the General Assembly, Ms. Giorgia Meloni affirmed:
the response to an aggression must always respect the principle of proportionality. […] And Israel has crossed that line, with a large-scale war that is disproportionately affecting the Palestinian civilian population. […] A choice that Italy has repeatedly defined as unacceptable, and which will lead to our vote in favour of some of the sanctions proposed by the European Commission against Israel.
Similar positions have also been expressed by the Minister of Interior, Mr. Matteo Piantedosi, who affirmed that “[t]he Israeli Government is pushing the conflict beyond all limits of reasonableness, proportionality, and humanity”.[8] Also, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, in a speech before the Senate of the Republic (349th Meeting, XIX Legislature, 2 October 2025), declared that Israel’s military action “went well beyond the right to self-defence”, a justification considered by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, “no longer convincing”.[9]
Thus, from the second half of 2025 onwards, Italy started to challenge the legality of Israel’s self-defence by making reference to the principle of “proportionality”. While it is not entirely clear whether in the Government’s diplomatic and political statements this concept is to be intended in its technical legal sense, limits on the exercise of self-defence are nonetheless acknowledged. By referring to proportionality as a “principle” to be respected when responding to an aggression, Ms. Meloni seems to have invoked the concept in its jus ad bellum meaning, which requires the defending State to do no more than it is necessary to defend itself.[10] Despite this, Italy’s stance has remained cautious, avoiding strong criticism of Israeli operations while emphasizing the illegality of Hamas’ actions.
The Threats or Use of Force by the US in Relation to Venezuela and Greenland
Since the beginning of 2026, members of Parliament and civil society have urged the Italian Government to address US interventionist policies, towards which it has adopted a rather deferential attitude. The military strike launched against Venezuela, which led to the capture of its President, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, was presented by President Trump as an effort to fight “narco-terrorism”.[11] However, this intervention, although clearly constituting a “flagrant and grave” violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,[12] has not elicited consistent reactions within the international community. While Russia, China, Iran, and most Latin American countries strongly condemned the intervention,[13] the Member States of the European Union (EU) adopted a more cautious stance. Indeed, even though, in commenting on the US strikes, the EU High Representative emphasized the need to uphold “the principles of international law and the UN Charter”, clear mentions of the prohibition of the use of force hardly appeared in individual declarations, with some exceptions including statements from Ireland, Slovenia and Spain.
In this context, Ms. Meloni acknowledged in a note that “external military action is not the path to end totalitarian regimes”. Still, she classified the operation as a “legitimate” defensive intervention against “hybrid attacks […] in the case of State entities that support and promote drug trafficking”.[14] A similar view was also endorsed by Mr. Tajani, who, in a radio interview, declared that “[d]rug trafficking is also a tool for attacking other countries”, thus suggesting the military intervention was acceptable given the security threat suffered by the US.[15] Mr. Crosetto, by contrast, expressed some concern, affirming that international law must be upheld, although he acknowledged that “in today’s world, the power of nations prevails”.[16] The Italian Government thus appears to have endorsed a greatly expansive understanding of self-defence, considering activities such as transnational drug trafficking as capable of triggering defensive military action. Significantly, the Government characterized the intervention as “legitimate” rather than “lawful”, seemingly supporting justifications for the use of force grounded in the need to respond to alleged security imperatives rather than in compliance with the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter. This might be considered a manifestation of opinio necessitatis (as opposed to opinio juris).
A partly different attitude is evident in the Government’s stance regarding President Trump’s threats to use force to annex Greenland. Following the White House’s statements considering the resort to the US military to acquire Greenland,[17] which shortly followed the intervention in Venezuela, seven EU countries, including Italy, signed a joint statement “upholding the principles of the UN Charter, including sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders”.[18] This position was then reaffirmed before Parliament, stressing once again the need to respect Greenland and Denmark’s sovereignty, despite sharing US “security concerns”.[19] However, during a press conference held in January 2026, Ms. Meloni ruled out the possibility of a military intervention in Greenland, a solution she did not agree with, emphasizing that when international law is disregarded, “we are all much more vulnerable”.[20] Again, she acknowledged the region’s strategic role for US security and interests, and interpreted Trump’s threats as an attempt to avoid “excessive interference from potentially hostile actors”.[21]
These statements demonstrate a differentiated pattern in Italy’s practice regarding the use of force by the US. While in relation to Greenland the Government invoked the prohibition of the use of force, albeit acknowledging US security concerns, in the case of Venezuela similar concerns were said to support the legitimacy of the US military action and used to displace legality issues.
The US-Israeli Military Operations in Iran
Large-scale US-Israeli military operations against Iran represent perhaps the most significant recent challenge to the prohibition of the use of force, providing another perspective through which inconsistencies in Italy’s practice can be analysed. On 13 June 2025, Israel began operation “Rising Lion”, which, like the subsequent US “Midnight Hammer” operation, targeted nuclear enrichment facilities and Iranian military sites. The declared objective of the operation was to counter the “Iranian threat to Israel’s very survival”, i.e. the Iranian nuclear programme.[22] The aggression prompted Iran to retaliate by attacking US military bases in Iraq and Qatar.[23] Despite the short duration of the hostilities, the US and Israel kept threatening further strikes if Iran did not stop its ballistic missile programme.[24] On 28 February 2026, those threats materialized when the two States launched a joint military operation. Once again, they sought to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme allegedly to defend themselves against “imminent threats from the Iranian regime”.[25] In the process, they killed the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, causing a counteroffensive by Iran and its proxies against Israel and other States in the region.[26]
In response to tensions in the Middle East, the Italian Government once again took a non-linear stance in assessing the legality of those military interventions. After the first strikes in June 2025, Mr. Tajani supported Israel’s right to self-defence, considering “absolutely grounded” its preoccupations towards the “imminent existential threat” posed by the Iranian nuclear programme.[27] However, Italy’s position became more critical after the launch of the joint operation in February 2026. During hearings before the Chamber of Deputies (627th Meeting, 5 March 2026) and the Senate (396th Meeting, 5 March 2026), Mr. Crosetto considered the “war” clearly “outside the rules of international law”, acknowledging Italy’s efforts to ensure compliance with them as “the only way to protect a nation like ours, or weaker nations, from the overwhelming power and destructive intent of other nations”.
Crosetto’s assessment was not isolated, since other members of the Government also recognized that the operation fell outside what is permitted under international law, although framing this conclusion as a consequence of the broader crisis affecting the international legal order. During a hearing before the Senate on the same day, Mr. Tajani admitted that “actions are being taken outside the context of international law”, attributing the cause to the UN, in particular its Security Council, which cannot “serve as a guarantor of compliance with international law” with Russia as one of its permanent members.[28] A similar position was also expressed by Ms. Meloni on a couple of occasions.[29] In agreeing with Mr. Crosetto that the US-Israeli military intervention against Iran was “outside the perimeter of international law”, she also depicted the current crisis of international law as “structural”, in particular as a “consequence of the war in Ukraine, in which a member of the Security Council has deliberately attacked a neighbouring country”.[30] What is most interesting is that, although she recognized the illegality of the attack on Iran, she explicitly refused to either endorse or condemn it, arguing that she lacked the necessary elements to take a categorical position on the veracity of the facts that the US and Israel had used to justify their military action (the alleged unwillingness of Iran to conclude an agreement that would prevent it from acquiring military nuclear capacity).[31] Ms. Meloni’s assessment was based on the premise that “we cannot afford to have an Ayatollah regime in possession of nuclear weapons”, as “such a scenario would spell the end of the international non-proliferation framework and trigger a nuclear arms race that would have dramatic repercussions for global security”.[32]
In conclusion, Italy’s response to recent crises reveals a selective, context-dependent approach to the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. While the Government has firmly invoked the Charter to condemn the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it has taken a less consistent position when addressing the actions of allied States, particularly the US and Israel. This inconsistency is evident in both the cautious language employed and the willingness to endorse, or at least tolerate, expansive interpretations of self-defence. Across the cases examined, Italy oscillates between a formal commitment to international law and deference to political and strategic considerations. Whether in Gaza, Venezuela, Greenland, or Iran, acknowledgement of legal constraints often coexists with a reluctance to condemn certain uses of force as unequivocally illegal, the attenuation of their gravity, or – what is most significant – the implicit acceptance of security-based justifications. Overall, this practice suggests a gradual shift towards a flexible interpretation of the jus ad bellum, mirroring broader international trends and risking undermining Italy’s credibility as a supporter of the rules-based international order.
Mario Pasquale Amoroso
A quotable version of this post will be published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Mario Pasquale Amoroso, “Selective Condemnations and Creeping Endorsements: Italy’s Recent Practice on the Prohibition of the Use of Force”, IYIL XXXV (2025).
[1] Following US and Israeli airstrikes across Iran, on 28 February 2026, the Security Council held an emergency session where only Russia, China, and Colombia condemned the military operations as violations of the prohibition of the use of force (“UN Security Council Falls Short of Fully Condemning US-Israeli Attack on Iran”, PassBlue, 28 February 2026). Similarly, during the emergency session held following the US intervention in Venezuela, several Council members were careful not to directly criticize the US, issuing only general statements that did not clearly refer to the prohibition under Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter (“In Hindsight: The Security Council’s Muted Response to the Venezuela Crisis”, Security Council Report, 1 February 2026).
[2] The Government has frequently referred to the Russian military operations as clearly amounting to an “aggression” under international law. In particular, the term has been used more than twenty times in various government declarations throughout 2025. For example, on 24 September, in her speech during the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, President Meloni condemned the Russian “large-scale aggression”, stating that the Russian Federation had “deliberately trampled on Article 2 of the UN Charter”. See Turrini, “Italy’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 432 ff. (also published on this site); Pertile, “The Reaction to the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Debate on the Provision of Weapons to the State Victim of Aggression”, IYIL, Vol. XXXII, 2022, p. 522 ff. (also published on this site).
[3] In particular, frequent reference was made to the Food for Gaza initiative, which allocated more than 110 million euros to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and development in the West Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the ‘Food for Gaza’ technical round table tomorrow. Further scholarships for Palestinian students”, Press release, 21 January 2025). Moreover, Italy also signed joint statements condemning the “inhumane killing of civilians” (Joint Statement on Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 21 July 2025; Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Situation in Gaza, 12 August 2025).
[4] Cagol, “Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 448 ff. (also published on this site).
[5] Ibid., p. 449.
[6] See supra note 2.
[7] On 19 March 2024, Ms. Meloni stated the following before the Senate (170th Meeting) and the Chamber (265th Meeting): “Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence must be exercised proportionately and in accordance with international humanitarian law”. See Cagol, cit. supra note 4, p. 451.
[8] “Piantedosi: ‘Israele ha superato ogni limite, gli effetti li sentiremo fino a qui’”, La Stampa, 20 September 2025.
[9] “Crosetto: ‘Il governo di Israele ha perso ragione e umanità. Combattere i terroristi non è più una scusa’”, La Stampa, 11 August 2025.
[10] Okimoto, The Distinction and Relationship between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, Oxford, 2011, pp. 62-75.
[11] “U.S. attacks Venezuela, captures Maduro and his wife; AG Bondi says charges include ‘Narco-Terrorism’”, CNBC, 3 January 2026.
[12] Uriburu and Arato, “Trump’s Illegal Attack on Venezuela and Its Consequences”, EJIL:Talk!, 5 January 2026.
[13] This condemnation is evident in the words of the Chinese Ministry of Political Affairs, who stated the attack “seriously violate[d] international law, violate[d] Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten[ed] the peace and security of Latin America and the Caribbean” (“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the U.S. Military Strikes on Venezuela”, 3 January 2026). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mexican President, Claudia Sheinbaum, even classified the military strikes as an “act of aggression” (“Russia reaffirms solidarity with Venezuela after ‘act of armed aggression’ by US, calls for dialogue”, CNN, 3 January 2026; “Mexico Says Venezuela Strikes Breach U.N. Charter, International Law”, The Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2026).
[14] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, “Sviluppi sulla situazione in Venezuela, nota di Palazzo Chigi”, Press release, 3 January 2026. See also, on this site, Amadio, “Italy’s reaction to the United States’ attack against Venezuela“, 8 January 2026.
[15] “L’intervento Usa in Venezuela, vista la minaccia, è stato legittimo”, Interview with Minister Tajani by RTL 102.5, 5 January 2026.
[16] “Caracas amara. I dubbi di Crosetto sul metodo Trump”, Huffington Post, 5 January 2026.
[17] “Trump discussing how to acquire Greenland, US military always an option, White House says”, Reuters, 7 January 2026.
[18] Joint Statement on Greenland, 6 January 2026.
[19] See the statements by Mr. Tajani before the Chamber (592nd Meeting, 13 January 2026) and the Senate (384th Meeting, 22 January 2026).
[20] “Conferenza stampa di inizio anno del Presidente Meloni”, 9 January 2026.
[21] Ibid.; “Punto stampa del Presidente Meloni a Seoul”, 18 January 2026.
[22] “Israel kills nuclear scientists, strikes sites in Iran: Who did it target?”, Al Jazeera, 13 June 2025.
[23] “What we know about Iran’s attack on US base in Qatar”, BBC, 24 June 2025.
[24] “US and Israel launch ‘pre-emptive’ attack against Iran”, Reuters, 28 February 2026.
[25] “Trump says new call for regime change in Iran justified by ‘imminent threats’ to US”, ABC News, 28 February 2026.
[26] “US and Israel pound Iran as Trump signals willingness to talk to new leaders after Khamenei’s death”, AP News, 2 March 2026.
[27] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Minister Tajani’s telephone conversations with the Ministers of Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria”, Press release, 17 June 2025. See also Ms. Meloni’s communication to the Senate (318th Meeting, 23 June 2025).
[28] Mr. Tajani’s statement before the Senate (396th Meeting, 5 March 2026).
[29] First during an interview (Fuori dal Coro, Rete 4, 8 March 2026) and then before the Senate (398th Meeting, 11 March 2026).
[30] See both sources quoted in the previous footnote. The reference to a “structural crisis” of international law, caused by international law rules “having fallen apart”, is in the interview. Similar accusations against Russia had already prompted a response from the Russian embassy in Rome, which contended that “[t]he root cause of the current crisis in the international legal system lies in the falsehood with which Western leaders seek to justify their reckless attacks on the United Nations Charter” (“Cosa ha detto Meloni sulla crisi in Iran e perché si è aperto uno scontro con l’ambasciata russa”, Fanpage.it, 4 March 2026).
[31] See again both sources quoted supra note 29.
[32] Ms. Meloni’s statement before the Senate referenced supra note 29.
