The phenomenon of flotillas carrying humanitarian aid to civilians in Gaza is not a recent development. Since 2010,[1] several initiatives have sought to challenge the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. In particular, between 2025 and 2026, two operations were organized by the Global Sumud Flotilla, which is described by its organizers as the largest independent initiative aimed at breaking the naval blockade imposed by Israel and delivering humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.[2] Both operations departed from the port of Barcelona: the first on 31 August 2025[3] and the second on 12 April 2026.[4] Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice has devoted extensive attention to the events related to the Flotilla, which raise longstanding questions of international law. This contribution will focus on 1) the Italian position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, 2) the rights of Italian volunteers on board, and 3) the attacks on the Flotilla and its interceptions by Israel on the high seas.
The Lawfulness of the Israeli Naval Blockade
On 1 October 2025, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, appeared as a guest on a national television program. When pressed on whether, in his view, the naval blockade imposed by Israel was lawful under international law, he replied that “it constitutes a violation of the law […] however, what the law says is important only to some extent”.[5] This statement provides two important insights into the position of the Italian Government: the first concerns the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade, while the second relates more broadly to the binding force of international law.
First, in response to a direct question, the Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the naval blockade imposed by Israel violates “the law”. Although he did not elaborate further, this statement echoes a long-standing debate[6] on the lawfulness of the blockade imposed on Gaza by Israel since 2009[7] and might indicate that, in the Government’s view, the blockade fails to meet at least some of the conditions required under international law.[8] First of all, there has traditionally been broad consensus that a naval blockade is a method of warfare that can be employed only within an international armed conflict.[9] In the context of such a conflict, a belligerent may prevent vessels of all nations from entering or exiting specified ports or coastal areas by declaring a blockade – provided that it is duly notified, non-discriminatory and effectively enforced.[10] Nevertheless, international law recognizes important humanitarian limitations.[11] First, a blockade is prohibited if it is intended to starve the civilian population or if it causes, or may be expected to cause, damage to civilians that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.[12] Moreover, even where a blockade is otherwise permissible, the blockading party must allow the free passage of foodstuffs and other essential supplies when the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately provided, subject to conditions such as local supervision and the conclusion of technical arrangements.[13] The humanitarian crisis in Gaza,[14] and the impact that the Israeli naval blockade has on its civilian population, may engage these considerations and could help explain the position expressed by Mr. Tajani. However, such reading should not be over-relied on. Indeed, on the day following the interview, Mr. Tajani appeared before the Senate of the Republic (349th Meeting, XIX Legislature, 2 October 2025) and clarified his earlier remarks by explaining at length that there are two competing doctrinal positions regarding the legality of the Israeli naval blockade: one maintains that it is lawful, while the other contends that it is not. On that occasion, he emphasized that the former is the prevailing view. The Ministry of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, seemingly adhered to such interpretation in speaking of the “legitimacy” of the blockade.[15]
The second insight that may be drawn from Mr. Tajani’s statement is a potential questioning of the binding nature of international law. Indeed, if the very survival of international law depends significantly on how States perceive it, such a statement – especially when considered alongside similar remarks by representatives of other States[16] – contributes to undermining the perceived authority of international legal obligations. At any rate, returning to the subject some time later, the Minister clarified that his intention was not that of dismissing international law entirely but, rather, to set aside doctrinal debates to focus on the immediate risk to the lives of people aboard the Flotilla.[17]
Diplomatic and Consular Assistance for Italians on the Flotilla and the Qualification of the Waters under the Blockade as Israeli Territorial Waters
On several occasions, Italy stressed that it would provide diplomatic and consular assistance to its nationals on board the Flotilla. For instance, on 11 September 2025, during briefings before both the Senate (340th Meeting) and the Chamber of Deputies (528th Meeting) regarding the operation launched in August 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:
To the 58 Italian citizens participating in the initiative, we will guarantee – as we have assured together with the Prime Minister – diplomatic and consular assistance, as we have always done for Italian citizens detained in Israel in similar initiatives. […] Our Embassy in Tel Aviv has been activated and, on my instructions, has raised awareness among the Israeli authorities regarding respect for the rights of all Italian nationals on board the flotilla, including some members of Parliament.
On 25 September 2025, during an urgent Government briefing before the Chamber of Deputies (537th Meeting), Mr. Crosetto announced that he had authorized the deployment of an Italian Navy frigate to the area and clarified:
it is not our intention to deploy military vessels in order to wage war against a friendly country. We are there to protect Italian citizens,[18] as we have done in the past, just as the Navy does in situations of danger in the Libyan Sea for Italian fishermen when they approach too close to the Libyan coast. It is the same protection mechanism […].
Overall, the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Italy to safeguard the activists participating in the Flotilla missions have been rather cautious and do not appear to have yielded significant practical results. Indeed, numerous accounts emerged alleging that the activists were subjected to physical and psychological violence, as well as other forms of degrading treatment, while in the custody of the Israeli authorities.[19]
In the same briefing, Mr. Crosetto explicitly addressed the territorial scope of the protection that could be afforded to the Flotilla, characterizing the waters subject to the blockade as Israeli waters. More specifically, he said: “I asked […] how far the Flotilla intended to go, and whether or not we should be concerned that this operation might, once it entered Israeli territorial waters, pose a risk to the citizens, to the people on board”. He added:
We are unable, once they leave international waters and enter the waters of another State, to guarantee safety – neither we nor any other country in the world, and I want this to be clear. It cannot be regarded as an exercise of freedom when that freedom enters another country and may be considered by that country as a hostile act.
Unless Mr. Crosetto was referring to the possibility that the Flotilla was heading towards Israeli territorial waters – a claim not supported by any statement from the activists – his remark appears to conflate Gaza’s territorial waters with those of Israel, thereby raising some legal concerns. Indeed, although deprived of the ability to fully exercise sovereignty due to ongoing military occupation, Gaza, including its territorial waters, remains an integral part of Palestine, as consistently recognized over time.[20] From another perspective, Mr. Crosetto refrained from taking a position on whether the qualification of the Flotilla’s navigation as a hostile act would be consistent with international law, adopting a reasoning that appears to be grounded more in political and diplomatic prudence than in the application of legal categories.
The Attacks on the Flotilla and Its Interceptions by Israel on the High Seas
The navigation of both missions launched by the Flotilla was obstructed on multiple occasions. On 9 September, while moored at the Tunisian port of Sidi Bou Said, two vessels participating in the Flotilla were struck by an incendiary device deployed by a drone, causing a fire to break out on board.[21] Two weeks later, during the night between 23 and 24 September 2025, a humanitarian convoy bound for Gaza was attacked in international waters, south of Crete. Activists reported that more than fifteen drones had targeted twelve vessels, using sound and stun grenades and pepper spray and throwing other unidentified objects.[22] Neither incident has been officially claimed by any State. On 24 September, Mr. Tajani commented on the latter attack, stating that he had already issued warnings to the Israeli authorities, requesting that any operation potentially carried out by Israeli armed forces be conducted in full compliance with international law and with the utmost caution.[23] On 25 September, Mr. Crosetto delivered an urgent briefing before the Chamber of Deputies (537th Meeting):
The Italian Government has expressed and continues to express the strongest condemnation for what has occurred. Actions of this kind, carried out against civilian vessels on the high seas, are totally unacceptable. The episode therefore serves as a powerful reminder of the fundamental values of our Republic: respect for international law, the protection of human life, and the defence of freedom of expression and of peaceful demonstration.
Apart from the aforementioned attacks, both missions were ultimately intercepted by the Israeli authorities, prompting two markedly different responses from the Italian Government. On 1 October 2025, the Israeli Navy intercepted and boarded the vessels of the Flotilla in international waters. On 2 October 2025, before the Chamber of Deputies (541st Meeting), Mr. Tajani noted that “[t]he boardings were peaceful and without violence, and were preceded by numerous approach measures, starting from the lead vessel Alma”. It is worth noting that Israel was under a legal obligation to refrain from using violence against the Flotilla. If one assumes, arguendo, the lawfulness of the Israeli blockade, the powers of a State enforcing a naval blockade are expressly regulated under international law and reflected in the San Remo Manual.[24] A blockading party may intercept and capture civilian vessels that breach or attempt to breach the blockade.[25] However, the use of force is permissible only in cases of resistance, must be anticipated by a warning and must remain proportionate.[26] If the Israeli naval blockade is regarded as unlawful, the operation could engage Israel’s extraterritorial obligations under international human rights law with respect to the individuals concerned. Alternatively, if the interception were to be characterized as having occurred within a conflict zone, the activists of the Flotilla would still be entitled to protection as civilians under international humanitarian law.[27]
Italy’s position became firmer in relation to the interceptions of the second Flotilla operation. On 29 April 2026, more than twenty vessels were intercepted by Israel in international waters, approximately 500 nautical miles off the Gaza coast.[28] The day after, the Italian Government stated that it
condemns the seizure of the vessels belonging to the Global Sumud Flotilla, which took place last night in international waters off the Greek coast, and calls on the Israeli Government to immediately release all Italians who have been unlawfully detained, to fully respect international law, and to provide guarantees regarding the physical safety of those on board.[29]
The interception of the remaining vessels of the Flotilla began on 18 May 2026 in international waters, approximately 250 nautical miles from Gaza.[30] On 20 May 2026, after the Israeli Minister of National Security released images showing the Flotilla activists detained by the Israeli authorities bound, blindfolded, forced onto their knees on concrete, and subjected to physical and verbal abuse, President Meloni and Minister Tajani issued the following joint statement:
The images of Israeli Minister Ben Gvir are unacceptable. It is unacceptable that these demonstrators, including many Italian citizens, should be subjected to treatment that undermines human dignity. […] Italy demands […] an apology for the treatment meted out to these demonstrators and for the utter disregard shown towards the Italian Government’s explicit requests. For these reasons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation will immediately summon the Israeli ambassador to request a formal explanation of what happened.[31]
On the following day, Mr. Tajani announced that he had requested, on behalf of the Italian Government, the adoption of European Union sanctions against Ben Gvir “for the unacceptable actions taken against the Flotilla, seizing the activists in international waters and subjecting them to harassment and humiliation, in violation of the most basic human rights”.[32] Notwithstanding the strong condemnatory language employed by some Italian political leaders, the Government’s response to the human rights violations perpetrated against the Flotilla’s activists has remained limited. Beyond requesting targeted sanctions against Ben Gvir, summoning the Israeli Ambassador and demanding a formal apology, no particularly robust follow-up measures seem to have been undertaken.[33]
In conclusion, Italy’s approach to the events surrounding the Flotilla missions has oscillated between political caution and a more clearly condemnatory position, particularly in response to the interception of the 2026 mission and the harsh treatment of the activists on board. Nevertheless, Italy has refrained from adopting any robust diplomatic or legal initiative vis-à-vis the Israeli Government, as well as from articulating a clear position on the lawfulness of the Israeli naval blockade.
Giulia Cagol
A quotable version of this post will be published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Giulia Cagol, “The Global Sumud Flotilla in Italy’s Discourse: Between Political Caution and Legal Reasoning”, IYIL XXXV (2025), 2026.
[1] Among the most well-known missions is an expedition that was intercepted on 30 May 2010 by the Israeli authorities (see infra note 6).
[2] Global Sumud Flotilla, “Legal Assessment of the Global Sumud Flotilla: Civil Resistance to an Unlawful Blockade, Humanitarian Access and Accountability under International Law”, November 2025, p. 2.
[3] Global Sumud Flotilla, “While we didn’t make it to Gaza With One Voice, the Whole World Stood with Palestine”.
[4] “Salpa da Barcellona una nuova Flotilla per Gaza, mille attivisti a bordo”, ANSA, 12 April 2026.
[5] Porta a Porta, Rai 1, 1 October 2025.
[6] The debate over the lawfulness of Israel’s naval blockade also came sharply to the fore following the incident of the Mavi Marmara. In 2010, the Free Gaza Movement organized a flotilla of six vessels bound for Gaza with humanitarian supplies. While most of the vessels were intercepted without incident, the ship Mavi Marmara was boarded on the high seas by Israeli forces, resulting in the death of several Turkish activists and prompting investigations both by a United Nations (UN) fact-finding mission and by the UN Secretary-General. The UN Commission of Inquiry concluded that the blockade was unlawful (Human Rights Council, “Report of the international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance”, A/HRC/15/21, 27 September 2010, paras. 59-61), whereas the UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry found it to be lawful (UN, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident”, also known as “Palmer Report”, September 2011, para. 81).
[7] Israel’s Ministry of Transport and Road Safety, Administration of Shipping and Ports, “NO. 1/2009 Blockade of Gaza Strip”.
[8] To be lawful, a naval blockade must comply with a number of requirements reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, adopted on 12 June 1994 by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (paras. 93-104). See also Ronzitti, Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati, 7th ed., Torino, 2021, pp. 304-306; Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, 2nd ed., Cheltenham/Northampton, 2025, pp. 438-440.
[9] Heintschel von Heinegg, “Blockade”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, October 2015. For a discussion on whether blockades may also apply to non-international armed conflicts see Drew, The Law of Maritime Blockade: Past, Present, and Future, Oxford, 2017, pp. 111-122.
[10] San Remo Manual, cit. supra note 8, paras. 93, 95 and 100.
[11] Sassòli, cit. supra note 8, p. 439.
[12] San Remo Manual, cit. supra note 8, para. 102.
[13] Ibid., para. 103.
[14] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (25 March 2026)”, 27 March 2026.
[15] On 2 October 2025, Mr. Crosetto, while commenting on Israel’s interception of the Flotilla, argued that “the arrests are lawful because the naval blockade was already deemed legitimate by the United Nations ten years ago”: Dritto e Rovescio, Rete 4, 2 October 2025. Mr. Crosetto was presumably referring to the conclusion reached in the Palmer Report concerning the Mavi Marmara incident, cit. supra note 6.
[16] “Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by ‘My Own Morality’”, The New York Times, 8 January 2026.
[17] See his speeches before the Senate (396th Meeting) and the Chamber (627th Meeting) on 5 March 2026.
[18] Notably, on the same occasion, Mr. Crosetto clarified that the Navy frigate had not been deployed exclusively to protect Italian citizens, but that it stood ready, if necessary, to come to the aid of all forty-four nationalities represented on board the Flotilla.
[19] “Flotilla, gli attivisti maltrattati. Ben Gvir: ‘Seguite le disposizioni’”, Huffington Post, 5 October 2025.
[20] Pertile, “The Borders of the Occupied Palestinian Territory are Determined by Customary Law: A Comment on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Territorial Jurisdiction of the ICC in the Situation Concerning Palestine”, JICJ, 2020, pp. 967 ff.
[21] Global Sumud Flotilla, cit. supra note 3.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Tajani briefed on attack on Gaza Flotilla. Italy reiterates request to Israel to ensure safety of embarked personnel”, Press release, 24 September 2025.
[24] San Remo Manual, cit. supra note 8, para. 98.
[25] Under Italian wartime law, an attempt to breach a naval blockade is deemed to occur only when a vessel approaches the blockade line and tries to cross it. By contrast, the US Navy’s Commander’s Handbook takes a broader view, considering the attempt to arise as soon as a vessel leaves port with the clear intention of violating the blockade (Ronzitti, cit. supra note 8, p. 305). However, the latter position does not reflect the most widely accepted view in international legal doctrine (ibid.).
[26] San Remo Manual, cit. supra note 8, paras. 60(e), 67(a) and 98.
[27] Sassòli, cit. supra note 8, p. 431.
[28] “La Global Sumud Flotilla è stata bloccata dalla marina israeliana vicino a Creta”, Il Post, 29 April 2026.
[29] Italian Government, “Global Sumud Flotilla, riunione a Palazzo Chigi”, 30 April 2026, Press release.
[30] “Israele torna a bloccare la Flotilla, italiani tra i fermati”, ANSA, 18 May 2026.
[31] Italian Government, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, “Dichiarazione del Presidente del Consiglio, Giorgia Meloni, e del Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Antonio Tajani”, 20 May 2026.
[32] Antonio Tajani, post on X, 21 May 2026.
[33] On 8 June 2026, the Rome Public Prosecutor’s Office, in the context of its investigation into the events related to the Flotilla, placed Ben-Gvir under formal investigation: “Caso Flotilla, indagato a Roma Ben Gvir. Il ministro israeliano contro l’Italia: ‘il Paese dello stivale è diventato quello delle ciabatte’”, ANSA, 8 June 2026.
