Category Archives: Other Organizations

To Cooperate, but on Its Own Terms: Italy, the WHO, and the Defence of Health Sovereignty

Leave a reply

In 2025 and 2026, Italy’s position towards the World Health Organization (WHO) and global health governance more in general was marked by a significant ambivalence. On the one hand, the Government repeatedly reaffirmed the need for international cooperation in the field of public health, acknowledging that global health emergencies cannot be addressed through unilateral action. On the other, Italy’s diplomatic and parliamentary practice showed a growing insistence on the preservation of the State’s margin of discretion in the implementation of international health standards.

During the 158th session of the WHO Executive Board in 2026, for instance, Italy affirmed that WHO is most effective when focused on its core functions and comparative advantages, and that its action should be “underpinned by national ownership”, since Member States retain “primary responsibility and prerogatives for health policies and health systems”.[1] The same attitude emerged in other contexts: Italy’s explanation of vote on the United Nations General Assembly resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy, the domestic debate on a possible withdrawal from the WHO, the rejection of all the 2024 amendments to the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), and Italy’s abstention on the WHO Pandemic Agreement.

Continue reading →

To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: The Repercussions of the Elmasry Case and Italy’s Gradual Distancing from the International Criminal Court

Leave a reply

In 2025, Italy was requested for the first time to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in arresting and surrendering a suspect; it failed to do so and was therefore found non-compliant and referred to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). The “Elmasry case”, from the name of the Libyan suspect Italy first arrested and then brought back to Libya thus violating its obligations to cooperate with the ICC, revealed the Italian Government’s ambiguity with regard to its conditional support to international criminal justice.[1] Additionally, the case exposed a legal disagreement concerning the role of the Minister of Justice under Italian implementing legislation (Law no. 237 of 20 December 2012). In particular, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, appeared to rely on the view that the Government retained a margin of discretionary assessment as to the transmission and execution of the ICC’s cooperation requests.[2] However, as it will be explained below, the ICC has found Italy’s defences to be inconsistent with the obligations under the Rome Statute. In this connection, a case is currently pending regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions of Law no. 237. This note will focus on the aftermath of the Elmasry case, at both the domestic and international levels, showing that, unless legal changes are made, there is a real risk that this episode will be only the first in a series of failures to cooperate by Italy.

Continue reading →

The Future Recognition of the State of Palestine: Shades of Pragmatism

Leave a reply

On 22 September 2025, the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held in New York, was closed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that ten new States were recognizing the State of Palestine that day.[1] A few days later, on 25 September, the co-chairs of the Conference, France and Saudi Arabia, issued a joint statement to express satisfaction for the adoption by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, with a majority of 142 votes (including that of Italy), of the New York Declaration,[2] which had been drafted during the Conference from late spring onwards.[3] In their statement, the two countries welcomed the new acts of recognition but also stated that the “Conference, and the recognition of Palestine, aims at the realization of a sovereign, democratic and economically viable State of Palestine”, which is thus seen as an “objective” yet to be achieved.[4]

The New York Declaration recalls that “recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State”.[5] Accordingly, the Italian Government decided not to recognize the State of Palestine. Indeed, when, in late July, some countries announced their intention to recognize the Palestinian State during the forthcoming 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, said that such moves would risk being “counterproductive”, as they would lead to the false belief that the problem has been solved.[6] On his part, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, affirmed that those acts could amount to a “political provocation”.[7] Along the same lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, later stated that an act of recognition that is not grounded on the conditions supporting the birth of a State would push peace between Israel and Palestinians further away.[8] It should be stressed that, although these concerns are based on the alleged consequences of recognizing Palestine as a State, they are not per se irreconcilable with a position grounded in international law. In fact, in describing such action as “counterproductive” (as President Meloni had also done), the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Luca Ciriani, explicitly labelled it as “premature recognition”, one that is performed “in the absence of an actual State”.[9]

Continue reading →

The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants Issued by the International Criminal Court: Between the Duty to Cooperate and Realpolitik

1 Reply

In late 2024 and early 2025 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued several arrest warrants in the context of politically sensitive investigations, including those regarding the ongoing armed conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine.[1] Some of these decisions concern alleged perpetrators holding high-level political positions in States that are close allies of Italy, such as Israel. Furthermore, in January 2025, Italy was requested by the Court to execute on its territory an arrest warrant issued against General Osema Almasri Najeem in the context of the investigation in Libya. Italy’s recent behaviour in relation to arrest warrants in the situations in Palestine and Libya is indicative of a shift from the traditionally supportive attitude to a more cautious (and lees cooperative) one in its relations with international criminal tribunals. This contribution analyses the Italian Government’s conduct, which shows a discrepancy between the rhetorical support for the ICC and the lack of actual cooperation in the execution of its requests.

Continue reading →

The Lifetime Extension of French Nuclear Power Plants

Leave a reply

Considering that most nuclear power plants are designed to last between 30 and 40 years and that the majority of European plants were built between the 1970s and 1990s, the issue of their lifetime extension is at the center of the expert and public debate on nuclear energy in Europe. Lifetime extension refers to the prolongation of the operation of a plant beyond the validity period of the license, the plant’s design life or the period set forth in national laws or regulations.[1]The climate change emergency and the related need to phase out fossil fuels as fast as possible have only added to the urgency of the issue, more recently compounded by the war in Ukraine and the ensuing desirability of ending European Countries’ dependency on Russian gas.[2]

Continue reading →

International Cooperation in the Fight against Covid-19 and the Efforts for Equal Access to and Distribution of Vaccines

Leave a reply

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy has played a proactive role in international initiatives aimed at countering health threats.[1] The Italian strategy in the fight against the pandemic was pursued through cooperation in different multilateral fora. Firstly, Italy participated in multilateral efforts undertaken within the World Health Organization (WHO), the European Union (EU) and the G20 and supported initiatives to reform global health law through the adoption of a new binding instrument on pandemic preparedness and response. Furthermore, Italy committed to ensuring the success of international procurement mechanisms for vaccines’ supply to low- and middle-income countries and advocated for exemptions to the international patent system to increase vaccines’ production.

Continue reading →

The Italian Government’s Stance on the Annexation of Crimea and the Sanctions against the Russian Federation

Leave a reply

On the Sanctions Adopted by the EU against the Russian Federation

On 5 June 2018, Italy’s newly appointed Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (President of the Council of Ministers), Mr Giuseppe Conte, made his first address to Parliament, seeking a confidence vote in the Senato della Repubblica (Senate of the Republic, 9th Meeting, XVIII Legislature). While outlining the foreign policy program of his Government, he also made reference to the sanctions adopted by the European Union after the annexation of Ukraine by the Russian Federation[1]. In this context, Mr Conte stated:

With regard to international scenarios, markets and security, firstly we intend to confirm our country’s convinced belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance, with the United States of America as a privileged, traditionally privileged, ally. But pay close attention! We will be advocates of an opening towards Russia. A Russia that has consolidated its international role in various geopolitical crises in recent years. We will push for a review of the sanctions system, starting from those [measures] that risk humiliating the Russian civil society.

It is noteworthy, however, that on the following day NATO Secretary General, Mr Jens Stoltenberg, emphasized the importance of political dialogue but also recalled the role of sanctions[2]. In similar terms, the US Ambassador to NATO, Mr Bailey Hutchinson, underlined the need to maintain sanctions and avoid any hesitation, highlighting that the lack of unity between allies would be a bad signal to Russia[3].

Continue reading →

The Scope and Means of Action of the United Nations Security Council as Seen by Italy during its “Shared Membership”

1 Reply

Italy has a long tradition of taking public stances on issues concerning the United Nations (UN) in general, and the Security Council (SC) in particular. The most important of such issues is perhaps the reform of the SC, a hotly debated question on which Italy has been taking a leading position for many years, promoting a series of proposals around which a group known as “Uniting for Consensus” has gathered.[1] This very same theme has been discussed by Italian representatives at the UN also in 2017 and 2018, when they reiterated and further clarified their country’s view.[2] Those years also correspond to the biennium that saw Italy and the Netherlands share a split non-permanent seat at the SC (the former being a member in 2017). Therefore, Italy has recently had many occasions to express its ideas on the action of the SC.

It is well known that the role of the SC has been progressively expanding since the end of the Cold War, so that nowadays its activities have a far wider scope than that envisioned in 1945 by the drafters of the UN Charter. Such legal developments can be said to be, by now, largely accepted by the international community, and even those States that occasionally veto or anyhow oppose certain SC resolutions, sometimes do that inconsistently and by putting forth political rather than legal justifications.[3] This notwithstanding, the issue of how far-reaching the powers of the SC are remains the subject of scholarly debate and is still of some practical importance for States. From this perspective, it may be useful to review Italy’s stances on the action of the SC.

Continue reading →

A statement of the Undersecretary of State for Defence on the operations of biometric data capture by the Italian Armed Forces abroad

Leave a reply

SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC, 4th PERMANENT COMMISSION (DEFENCE), XVII LEGISLATURE, 141st MEETING, 22 JULY 2015.

On 22 July 2015, the Undersecretary of State for Defence, Mr Gioacchino Alfano, answered a parliamentary question relating to the constitution and the deployment of an elite unit of the Armed Forces within the Task Force 45 (TF45) of the NATO-covered ISAF in Afghanistan. Being TF45 provided with biometric data capture equipment for their role of support to the Afghan security forces, Mr Gioacchino Alfano dwelled on the legal basis for the collection of such data. He stated:

Continue reading →

A Statement of the Undersecretary of State for Defence on MUOS

Leave a reply

SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC, XVII LEGISLATURE, 264th MEETING, 19 JUNE 2014

On 19 June 2014, the Undersecretary of State for Defence, Mr. Gioacchino Alfano, expressed the position of the Government on the project concerning the realization of the MUOS communication system in Niscemi, Sicily. The Minister of Defence had previously intervened, at that time before the Chamber of Deputies, on the same issues. In his statement, the Undersecretary highlighted that the MUOS project finds its foundation directly in the NATO treaties and subsequent agreements intervening thereon.

Continue reading →