On 22 September 2025, the High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, held in New York, was closed by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that ten new States were recognizing the State of Palestine that day.[1] A few days later, on 25 September, the co-chairs of the Conference, France and Saudi Arabia, issued a joint statement to express satisfaction for the adoption by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, with a majority of 142 votes (including that of Italy), of the New York Declaration,[2] which had been drafted during the Conference from late spring onwards.[3] In their statement, the two countries welcomed the new acts of recognition but also stated that the “Conference, and the recognition of Palestine, aims at the realization of a sovereign, democratic and economically viable State of Palestine”, which is thus seen as an “objective” yet to be achieved.[4]
The New York Declaration recalls that “recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State”.[5] Accordingly, the Italian Government decided not to recognize the State of Palestine. Indeed, when, in late July, some countries announced their intention to recognize the Palestinian State during the forthcoming 80th session of the UN General Assembly, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, said that such moves would risk being “counterproductive”, as they would lead to the false belief that the problem has been solved.[6] On his part, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, affirmed that those acts could amount to a “political provocation”.[7] Along the same lines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, later stated that an act of recognition that is not grounded on the conditions supporting the birth of a State would push peace between Israel and Palestinians further away.[8] It should be stressed that, although these concerns are based on the alleged consequences of recognizing Palestine as a State, they are not per se irreconcilable with a position grounded in international law. In fact, in describing such action as “counterproductive” (as President Meloni had also done), the Minister for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Luca Ciriani, explicitly labelled it as “premature recognition”, one that is performed “in the absence of an actual State”.[9]
Already in 2024, the Italian Government had singled out “national unity” – meaning, Palestine speaking with a single voice, that of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)[10] – and “territorial integrity” as the material conditions for the existence of a State of Palestine.[11] If one interprets the former requirement as that for an (effective) government under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, it can be said that Italy’s conduct is guided by the traditional understanding of statehood, which essentially requires three elements (the third one being a permanent population).
This explains the statements made by Italian Government’s representatives before Parliament, especially until the close of the New York Conference. On 23 June, in her communication to the Senate of the Republic (318th Meeting, XIX Legislature), President Meloni said that “a reformed Palestinian Authority should assume ever-greater governing responsibilities and security management in both the West Bank and Gaza”. On 30 July, before the Chamber of Deputies (520th Meeting), Minister Ciriani, after calling for the end of the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, emphasized that “only a Gaza Strip free from Hamas and reunited with the West Bank under a strengthened Palestinian Authority can pave the way for a future of peace and prosperity for the region”. And on 11 September, before the Senate (340th Meeting), Minister Tajani declared:
we are ready to contribute, by deploying Italian troops, to an Arab-led international mission under the auspices of the UN for peacekeeping in the Gaza Strip and for the reunification of the future Palestinian State, which must include both Gaza and the West Bank. Of course, Hamas cannot play any role in the future Palestinian State. […] Supporting the two-State solution also means safeguarding the conditions necessary for it. For these reasons, together with our European and Arab partners, we have strongly condemned the Israeli decision to press ahead with its settlement policy in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
All these conditions can be traced back to the three requirements of statehood: a unitary, PNA-led government exercising control[12] and ensuring law and order[13] within Palestine’s borders so as not to constitute a threat to Israel’s security (effective government); a territory bringing both Gaza and the West Bank together, not eroded by a creeping annexation of the West Bank by Israeli settlers (defined territory); and a Palestinian people who is not forced to flee due to harassment by these settlers[14] (permanent population). Italy put in place several measures that are capable of facilitating the completion of these objectives. In addition to expressing support[15] for the reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip adopted by the League of Arab States convened in Egypt on 4 March 2025,[16] and for the idea of contributing personnel to a UN peace mission coordinated by Arab States,[17] the Italian Government stressed its participation in other security-oriented and capacity-building missions, both agreed at the European level (such as the EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS missions[18]) and set up by Italy (MIADIT mission[19]). The Government also highlighted the country’s active involvement in the West Bank Protection Consortium, a programme aimed at preventing forcible transfers of Palestinians from the West Bank, as well as in the sanctioning – withing a European Union framework – of violent Israeli settlers.[20] It even described inter-university cooperation as a means of training the future leadership of Palestine.[21]
The rationale underlying these statements and activities is that “[r]ecognition must mark the culmination of a peace process negotiated between the parties, which requires Hamas to withdraw completely from the political arena, the achievement of full Palestinian unity under the leadership of the PNA […], and mutual recognition between the two sides”.[22] In other words, recognition is understood as the consequence of a long-term process: the meeting of the usual requirements of statehood and the concomitant resolution of all outstanding issues between Israel and Palestine.
However, the flurry of acts of recognition during the final session of the New York Conference, in September 2025, and the mounting pressure from public opinion, seem to have prompted a change in Italy’s stance. Although there has never been an official repudiation of the aforementioned view,[23] the Italian Government may have been influenced by the position taken by other States[24] in spelling out what appears to be a partly different approach to recognition. On 2 October, speaking before the Senate (349th Meeting), Minister Tajani declared:
The Government is prepared to recognize the State of Palestine, provided that certain non-negotiable preconditions are met: the release of all hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, and its exclusion from political and governmental roles. This means that Hamas cannot, in any form or in any way, play a role in those territories […]. We will continue to say that it is right to recognize the Palestinian State, but we cannot ignore the presence of Hamas, which is a terrorist organization. Hamas must first be eradicated, and then, without Hamas, I am ready to say as early as tomorrow morning that I am in favour of immediately recognizing the State of Palestine.[25]
On 13 October, Hamas released the last 20 living hostages, thus fulfilling one of the two conditions set by the Italian Government. Therefore, on 15 October, before the Senate (354th Meeting), Minister Tajani commented:
All the conditions are now in place for a Gaza freed from the nightmare of Hamas and placed under provisional international control […]. All this with a view to establishing a genuine, democratic, peaceful and secular Palestinian State, led by a PNA […] that has been thoroughly renewed in terms of both people and methods. It is obvious that there will have to be a Palestinian government in the future, because the aim is to establish a Palestinian State that is recognized by Israel and that recognizes Israel. And, given that things are slowly improving, Italy’s recognition of the Palestinian State is also drawing nearer.
This statement is not at odds with the prospect of Italy recognizing the State of Palestine even in the absence of a functioning Palestinian government (let alone a “democratic” and “secular” government, which is more easily interpreted as the culmination of the process rather than a condition attached to recognition). Indeed, on 22 October, before the Senate (357th Meeting), President Meloni confirmed:
Hamas must agree to play no role in the transitional government or in the future Palestinian State, and it must be disarmed to prevent it from continuing to pose a threat to regional stability. […] These are the necessary preconditions for Italy’s recognition of the State of Palestine, as also indicated by this Parliament. The Government is ready to act accordingly once these conditions have been met.[26]
This shift may be read as part of a pragmatic, adaptive approach that can be observed in other aspects of Italy’s stance on the Palestinian question. Throughout 2025, Italy expressed support for a number of proposals regarding the future of Palestine, some of which are not fully compatible with each other. One of them, the reconstruction plan prepared by the League of Arab States, came with a Cairo Statement adopting a traditional view concerning the Palestinian question, “based on ending the Israeli occupation and the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state based on the two-state solution and in accordance with international legitimacy resolutions, along the lines of June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital”[27] (which has always been also the Italian position[28]). The same objective, including the attainment of a “peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions”, is posited by the New York Declaration,[29] which Italy voted for in mid-September. At the same time, when, at the end of the same month, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, put forth his 20-point Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, the Italian Parliament committed the Government to furthering its implementation.[30] This plan was endorsed – and put into effect – by the UN Security Council with Resolution 2803,[31] which was also supported by Italy.[32]
Resolution 2803, which merely “notes”, rather than “reaffirms”, prior relevant Security Council resolutions, mentions both President Trump’s 2020 peace plan[33] and the “Saudi-French Proposal” (i.e., the New York Declaration and its addendum[34]). However, the two documents show considerable differences. By upholding the 1967 boundary lines as the starting point for any negotiations leading up to the establishment of a State of Palestine, the New York Declaration abides by the UN acquis on the subject. Correspondingly, it grounds Palestinians’ claims on their right to self-determination.[35] Contrariwise, the 2020 peace plan explicitly disavows UN resolutions on the Palestinian question and envisages a novel territorial arrangement for the two-State solution.[36] This is in line with the view that self-determination is not a right of the Palestinian people, but just a “legitimate desire” of theirs,[37] to be pursued through political channels rather than in accordance with legal principles. The language that reduces self-determination to mere “aspirations”, also found in the 2025 Comprehensive Plan,[38] can even be detected in official statements of Italian Government’s officials.[39]
It is true that Resolution 2803, which is meant to be operative in character, does not incorporate in full, by reference, the 2020 peace plan and the New York Declaration. It only uses them as (non-exclusive) benchmarks for the reforms the Palestinian governance needs to implement to turn into a functioning State. However, even in this respect the two documents differ widely. Although both of them are far-reaching, the 2020 peace plan is much more detailed than the plan annexed to the New York Declaration. If the “reform program” to be “faithfully carried out” by the PNA according to Resolution 2803 comprised all items listed in the 2020 peace plan, then the “pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” could be long.[40] The issue becomes even more important if we ask who is responsible for assessing the completion of the reform programme. While at the New York Conference the task of monitoring the implementation of its outcomes was assigned to a follow-up mechanism composed from the co-Chairs of the Conference and the Working Groups,[41] the 2020 peace plan dictates that criteria for statehood “must be determined to have occurred by the State of Israel and the United States, jointly, acting in good faith, after consultation with the Palestinian Authority”.[42] In the latter case – but also if compliance with the reform plan were to be assessed by the Board of Peace[43] legitimated by Resolution 2803 – any decision on Palestine’s progress toward statehood would essentially depend on the United States and, possibly, Israel. Palestine would not have substantial ownership of the process of its own self-determination.
Irrespective of this, the role of Israel remains decisive, as also proven by the ubiquitous references, in the statements by the Italian and other governments, to the need for a “negotiated” two-State solution.[44] Therefore, it may be important for a State to use its leverage to exert pressure on Israel. However, despite emphasizing that “courageous decisions are needed, first and foremost on the part of Israel”, in order to enable the PNA to assume greater government responsibilities in both Gaza and the West Bank,[45] the Italian Government showed some reluctance to take a firm stand on Israel.[46] In 2025, it refused to recall the Italian ambassador from Israel,[47] and expressed its contrariety to expelling Israel from the scientific research cooperation programme Horizon Europe and rescinding the association agreement between Israel and the European Union.[48] The Government revealed it had suspended the negotiation of an agreement on cyber-security with Israel,[49] but it supported the renewal – albeit with a wait-and-see approach – of a bilateral agreement on military cooperation due to expire in April 2026:[50] it was only at the last moment that Italy announced it would not be renewing the treaty.[51]
Overall, with regard to the situation in Palestine, in 2025 Italy showed a certain willingness to reconsider its position by easing the conditions Palestine has to meet to be recognized as a State by the Italian Government. It also proved ready to endorse all the proposals tabled by the actors involved: while this is also true of other countries, the issue remains that some of these proposals are not fully compatible with one another – or, first and foremost, with international law.
Paolo Turrini
A quotable version of this post will be published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Turrini, “The Future Recognition of the State of Palestine: Shades of Pragmatism”, IYIL XXXV (2025), 2026.
[1] Those were Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal and the United Kingdom (some of them had recognized Palestine the day before, while San Marino did so the day after, on 23 September). In fact, Belgium, which is one of the countries mentioned in President Macron’s speech and then in the joint statement quoted infra in the main text, in early September had already made it clear that it would recognize Palestine – by royal decree – only if the latter met certain conditions (the release of all hostages and the ousting of Hamas), which in January 2026 the Belgian Government said had not been met yet.
[2] New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution (UN Doc. A/CONF.243/2025/1, 4 August 2025), endorsed by the General Assembly on 12 September 2025 (UN Doc. A/80/L.1/Rev.1, 10 September 2025).
[3] Italy co-chaired the working group on “Security for Israelis and Palestinians” and sponsored the New York Declaration in that capacity but, unlike other States, did not make any official statement during the plenary session of the Conference in late July.
[4] Statement of the Co-Chairs of the Conference (25 September 2025), paras. 9 and 8, respectively. As a consequence, Italy’s stance – which is analysed in this contribution – may be not too dissimilar to that of (some of) the countries having recognized the State of Palestine. Motion no. 1-00442, adopted by the Chamber of Deputies (483rd Meeting) on 21 May 2025, reads: “[s]everal European countries have recognised Palestine as an independent State (most recently, on 28 May 2024, Spain, Ireland and Norway, and on 4 June 2024, Slovenia), as they are convinced that this would promote the ‘two-State solution’ and strengthen moderate Palestinian forces. Other Western governments, including Germany, France, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy, believe that such a move should form part of a broader set of actions aimed at ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieving the two-State solution” (recital 14 of the preamble). Accordingly, the proponents of both approaches appear to see recognition as instrumental to reaching an objective.
[5] New York Declaration, cit. supra note 2, para. 25.
[6] “Meloni a Repubblica: ‘Non è ancora il tempo dello Stato palestinese’”, la Repubblica, 26 July 2025.
[7] “Crosetto: ‘Il governo di Israele ha perso ragione e umanità. Combattere i terroristi non è più una scusa’”, La Stampa, 11 August 2025.
[8] Senate, 340th Meeting, 11 September 2025 (therefore, recognition would just be a “flag of convenience”). On other occasions, he ruled out recognition as merely a “symbolic” act (Senate, 309th Meeting, 28 May 2025) and as something “completely useless”, “a way of clearing one’s conscience” (Senate, 343rd Meeting, 18 September 2025).
[9] Chamber of Deputies, 520th Meeting, 30 July 2025. Based on these premises, on 28 January 2025 the Chamber of Deputies (418th Meeting) adopted two motions (nos. 1-00370 and 1-00375) only after expunging, inter alia, paragraphs committing the Government to recognize the State of Palestine. A resolution containing a similar paragraph (Resolution no. 6-00246) was rejected by the Chamber at its 631st Meeting on 11 March 2026.
[10] As Minister Tajani said, “[t]here is no Palestinian State yet: on the one hand there is Hamas, and on the other there is the Palestinian National Authority” (Senate, 343rd Meeting, 18 September 2025). However, this regards both the lack of a unitary government and the fact that part of the Palestinian leadership – Hamas – is at war with the occupying power: “[w]e cannot recognize a Palestinian State that does not recognise Israel and is not recognized by Israel” (ibid.).
[11] Cagol, “Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 448 ff., p. 454 (also published on this site).
[12] Cf. Minister Ciriani’s words: “Hamas cannot be allowed to regain control of the Strip. […] For this reason, we are at the forefront of the support for the Palestinian National Authority, our sole interlocutor. […] Only a strong Palestinian government will be able to resume exercising its sovereignty over Gaza” (Chamber of Deputies, 427th Meeting, 12 February 2025). The choice of the term “resumption” in connection with Palestine’s exercise of sovereignty may be somewhat infelicitous, as one can doubt that Palestinians have ever being sovereign in their land. He later stated that “[t]he first prerequisite for a Palestinian State is the ability to exercise control over its own territory, without it falling prey to Hamas terrorism, as has happened in the Gaza Strip” (Chamber of Deputies, 520th Meeting, 30 July 2025).
[13] “The strengthening of the Palestinian security forces […] is an essential pillar for the creation of a future Palestinian State” (Mr. Tajani before the Senate, 309th Meeting, 28 May 2025).
[14] With a view to achieving the two-State solution, the Government reiterated its “opposition to any form of forced displacement of the Palestinian population” (Mr. Tajani before the Chamber of Deputies, 507th Meeting, 9 July 2025).
[15] See, inter alia, Ms. Meloni’s speech before the Senate (286th Meeting) on 18 March 2025, and Resolution no. 6-00167 passed by the Senate on 24 June 2025 (319th Meeting).
[16] The plan is enclosed, together with a “Cairo Statement”, to the identical letters dated 11 March 2025 from the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/79/820-S/2025/151, 22 April 2025.
[17] “Italy is ready to contribute to an Arab-led peacekeeping mission deployed in the Gaza Strip, with a view to laying the foundations for a Palestinian State that recognizes Israel and is recognized by Israel” (Mr. Tajani before the Chamber of Deputies, 461st Meeting, 6 April 2025).
[18] Minister Tajani before the Senate (340th Meeting, 11 September 2025).
[19] Minister Ciriani before the Chamber of Deputies (520th Meeting, 30 July 2025).
[20] Written reply, dated 14 February 2025, by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Edmondo Cirielli, to Question no. 4-00940 raised in the Senate.
[21] Minister Tajani before the Senate (354th Meeting, 15 October 2025).
[22] Minister Ciriani before the Chamber of Deputies (524th Meeting, 6 August 2025).
[23] On the contrary, soon after the close of the Conference, President Meloni, in announcing the forthcoming resolutions quoted infra note 25, reiterated her “personal belief” that “recognizing Palestine, in the absence of a State that meets the criteria for sovereignty, does not solve the problem and does not produce any tangible, concrete results for the Palestinians”: recognition is thus seen as a tool for exerting “political pressure” on Hamas ( “La premier Meloni: ‘La maggiore pressione va fatta su Hamas che ha iniziato la guerra’”, RaiNews, 23 September 2025).
[24] See, e.g., Belgium’s position, supra note 1.
[25] On the same day, Mr. Tajani put forward the same idea, albeit phrased differently, before the Chamber of Deputies (541st Meeting). Also, the Senate adopted Resolution no. 6-00173, whereby it committed the Government “to take steps to recognize the State of Palestine, provided that Hamas releases all hostages and renounces any political or military presence in Gaza and the West Bank”, while the Chamber adopted Resolution no. 6-00202 committing the Government to the same. These conditions were reiterated, e.g., by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ms. Maria Tripodi, in her written reply, dated 10 November 2025, to Question no. 4-05526 raised in the Chamber of Deputies.
[26] The reference to Parliament pertains to the two resolutions cited in the previous footnote.
[27] Cairo Statement, cit. supra note 16, para. 2. It must be noted that Italy has never openly subscribed to the Statement – only to the reconstruction plan.
[28] See, e.g., Moinet, “Territorial Issues Concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, IYIL, vol. XXIX, 2019, p. 470 ff., p. 473 (also published on this site).
[29] New York Declaration, cit. supra note 2, paras. 6, 7 (quotation), 10, 19, 23 and 30. The text annexed to the Declaration (UN Doc. A/CONF.243/2025/1/Add.1, 6 August 2025) clarifies that the principle of non-recognition prevents all States from accepting a different territorial arrangement, “except as agreed by the parties through negotiations” (p. 12; see also p. 7). Cf. Resolution no. 6-00173, cit. supra note 25, speaking of “borders agreed and defined during negotiations between the parties and with the consent of the international community”.
[30] Resolutions nos. 6-00173 (cit. supra note 25) and 6-00179 (adopted by the Senate on 22 October 2025, 357th Meeting).
[31] UN Doc. S/RES/2803, 17 November 2025.
[32] Resolutions nos. 6-00214 and 6-00185 adopted on 17 December 2025 by the Chamber of Deputies (586th Meeting) and the Senate (371st Meeting), respectively.
[33] US Government, “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People”, 2020.
[34] See supra note 29.
[35] New York Declaration, cit. supra note 2, paras. 25 and 30. See also Cairo Statement, cit. supra note 16, para. 19.
[36] US Government, “Peace to Prosperity”, cit. supra note 33, Part A, p. 11 ff.
[37] Ibid., pp. 2 and 7-8.
[38] President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (annexed to Resolution 2803, cit. supra note 31), para. 19.
[39] As in Ms. Meloni’s speech before the Senate (357th Meeting) on 22 October 2025. Also, cf. the “right to have a State” (Mr. Ciriani, Chamber of Deputies, 520th Meeting, 30 July 2025) and, after the release of the Comprehensive Plan, the “dream of having a State” (Mr. Tajani, Chamber of Deputies, 541st Meeting, 2 October 2025). However, it is impossible to establish a causal link or draw cogent conclusions on the legal plane, as the “linguistic practice” is in fact mixed.
[40] Quotations are from Resolution 2803, cit. supra note 31, para. 2.
[41] Annex to the New York Declaration, cit. supra note 29, p. 18.
[42] US Government, “Peace to Prosperity”, cit. supra note 33, Part A, p. 34.
[43] Cf. Resolution no. 2026/1 of the Board of Peace, BOP/RES/2026/1, 22 January 2026. The resolution, which focuses solely on Gaza (just like the Comprehensive Plan it purports to implement) and thus entails the risk of undermining the unity of Palestine, establishes a governing mechanism where the Chairman of the Board – Mr. Trump, by explicit designation under the Board’s Charter (Article 3.2) – is the ultimate decision-maker. The resolution does not outline a detailed action plan in terms of reforms, but the transitional administration of Gaza is vested with broad governing powers and envisages no meaningful contribution by Palestinians themselves.
[44] See, e.g., the Declaration of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom on the West Bank of 24 December 2025 and the Joint Statement from the leaders of the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission on the situation in the West Bank of 22 May 2026. It is worth noting that the obligation for Israel to put an end to its breaches of international law with respect to its conduct in Palestine (which includes withdrawal from the Occupied Palestinian Territory) is legal in nature – as recognized by the International Court of Justice in Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, ICJ Reports, 2024, p. 753 ff., para. 267 ff. – and, therefore, is non-negotiable.
[45] President Meloni before the Chamber of Deputies (497th Meeting, 23 June 2025).
[46] See also the note by Cagol here (and also published on this site) (to be updated).
[47] President Meloni before the Chamber of Deputies (480th Meeting, 14 May 2025).
[48] Written reply, dated 29 October 2025, by Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Giorgio Silli, to Question no. 4-02413 raised in the Senate. On the Horizon programme, cf. the slightly more open stance of the Minister for University and Research, Ms. Anna Maria Bernini, before the Chamber of Deputies (536th Meeting, 24 September 2025).
[49] Undersecretary of State for Relations with Parliament, Ms. Matilde Siracusano, before the Chamber of Deputies (509th Meeting, 11 July 2025).
[50] Undersecretary of State for Defence, Mr. Matteo Perego di Cremnago, before the Chamber of Deputies (513rd Meeting, 17 July 2025).
[51] “Roma contro Netanyahu, sospeso il memorandum sulla difesa con Israele”, ANSA, 14 April 2026.
