Recognition of governments, its denial, or its promise conditioned on positive developments, such as improved respect for human rights, are elements of standard practice for Italy, and, in 2025, the Italian authorities faced the issue of recognition in their relations with Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria.
In the case of Georgia, where the October 2024 elections led to protests and accusations of electoral fraud,[1] Italy has largely followed the position of the European Union (EU). After the elections, the EU Parliament passed a resolution stating that it did not “recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024” and that it called “for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president”.[2] Still, the EU’s stance on the matter was largely limited by obstructionism from Slovakia and Hungary, allied with the leading Georgian party, Georgian Dream,[3] and no clear position was ultimately taken by the EU Council on recognition. Following in the footsteps of the EU, Italy never refused the Georgian Government its recognition but maintained a degree of ambiguity on its legitimacy. Indeed, the Italian Government expressed concern about the violence and protests that had spread after the elections, but it also stressed that while Italy and the EU had asked Georgia for clarity regarding the problems recorded in the October elections, “international observers did not deem [the elections] illegitimate”.[4] Similarly, on 29 October 2025, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Giorgio Silli, underlined that “at the EU level, there is no decision to not recognize the Georgian elections […]; this is also in order to avoid closing the door to the Georgian people, who look to Europe and feel European”.[5]
To the opposite end of the spectrum is the Italian approach to recognition in the case of Afghanistan, where the Taliban have been in charge since 2021, but are widely unrecognized. Here, non-recognition is emphasized as a way to take a clear stance against a regime deemed to be in flagrant violation of several rules of international law. Referring to the continued violations of human rights and, specifically, to the Taliban’s treatment of women,[6] Italian authorities have taken every chance to underline that Italy does not recognize the current Government. This has happened through specific acts, such as the relocation of the Italian embassy to Doha, or through explicit declarations, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Tajani, unambiguously stating that “we [Italy] do not entertain diplomatic relations with Kabul since the Taliban returned to power”.[7] Non-recognition is evident, moreover, in several additional language choices: Italian authorities are careful to refer consistently to “de facto authorities” or “de facto ministers” when mentioning, for example, the individuals against whom sanctions were imposed.[8] Similarly, Italy has clarified that even minor exchanges with the Taliban, mostly in the context of policies aimed at preventing human trafficking and humanitarian assistance, do not represent “an endorsement of the regime”.[9]
Between these two extremes lies the Italian approach to the new Syrian Government, which is engaged in an attempt to rebuild the country’s international relations after the fall of the Assad regime. In this case, Italy’s position has been one of cautious recognition, with Minister Tajani stating that
Our Government was among the first to initiate direct dialogue with the new authorities […]. [T]he prospects for relations with the current authorities will naturally depend on their respect for the commitments they are making both domestically and internationally. The Government is ready to do its part to contribute to the political transition process in Syria, which must be peaceful and inclusive.[10]
In short, Italy did not immediately and expressly recognize the new Syrian Government, but it expressed its intention to monitor the new regime’s compliance with human rights and to subordinate any possible bilateral relations to Syria’s respect of its domestic and international obligations.[11] In this case, Italian authorities presented the possibility of recognition as an incentive for the new Government, conditioned on positive developments in the State.
Except in the case of Afghanistan, Italian authorities appeared to prefer a carefully calibrated ambiguity to avoid impairing the effectiveness of foreign governments and, thus, falling into the risky entanglement between recognition and non-interference in a State’s domestic affairs.[12] The best example of this approach to the recognition of governments can be seen in Italy’s long-standing position regarding Maduro’s Government in Venezuela, before his control over the country was brought to an end by the United States’s operation in January 2026.[13]
As is widely known, on 28 July 2024, presidential elections were held in Venezuela, and the incumbent president, Nicolás Maduro, was declared the winner.[14] Still, the electoral process was broadly contested,[15] with the opposition, led by Edmundo González Urrutia, providing credible evidence that the votes were significantly in their favour and that Maduro and his party had manipulated the election results.[16] Amid electoral discontent, many protested, leading to a harsh crackdown by Maduro’s Government and reports of killings, torture, and forced disappearances.[17] While some countries continued to express their support for Maduro,[18] the United States and the EU strongly condemned the manipulation of the electoral process and the ensuing events.[19]
Against this backdrop, Italy took a strong stance on the matter in 2024. On 15 October, the President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, stated before the Senate of the Republic (231st Meeting, XIX Legislature):
We do not recognize Maduro’s victory, proclaimed following highly non-transparent elections […], and we continue to condemn the regime’s unacceptable repression, calling for the release of all political prisoners. […] Together with the European Union, we are working toward a democratic and peaceful transition in the country, so that the will of the millions of Venezuelans who continue to risk their lives for a more democratic, prosperous, and secure future may finally be fulfilled.
This position aligns with Italy’s stance on the 2018 elections, when it also did not recognize Maduro’s Government.[20] In both cases, non-recognition of the Venezuelan Government seemed to depend on legitimacy criteria rather than on effectiveness.[21] Indeed, Italy linked its refusal to recognize the Government to the election’s non-transparency and the general regime of repression.
Moreover, Italy joined the EU[22] in declaring that González Urrutia, “according to verifiable data published by the opposition, is the winner of the elections”.[23] This may have been the logical consequence of raising the matter of the opposition’s claims about frauds in the July 2024 elections. Interestingly, Meloni reportedly recognized González Urrutia as the president-elect of Venezuela.[24] This is a remarkable circumstance, since, in 2019, Italy did not recognize Guaidó as president-elect, despite his having declared himself interim president and other European States having offered such recognition.[25] However, a closer look at the statements issued by Meloni on 20 November 2024, during an official visit to Argentina, leads one to doubt the groundbreaking nature of her affirmations. She stated: “[t]ogether with the European Union, we are working for a democratic and peaceful transition in Venezuela, so that the preference expressed by the Venezuelan people for the president-elect González Urrutia and their legitimate aspirations for freedom and democracy may finally be fulfilled”.[26]
The expression president-elect appears to have been used in the context of an attempt to promote democracy, rather than to recognize a new and distinct government in Venezuela. This statement alone, not combined with any other indications of considering González Urrutia the actual head of the Venezuelan Republic, seems to remain within the realm of political declarations.[27] Still, it certainly contributed to Maduro’s January 2025 decision to reduce the number of Italian diplomats allowed into Venezuela and to limit their freedom of movement in the country.[28]
This cautious approach to recognition was accompanied by strong stances on matters collateral to the recognition of the Government itself. For example, Italy condemned the detention measures taken against Venezuelan citizens, including Italo-Venezuelans, in line with the EU position on the matter,[29] and, on 15 October 2024, the Senate passed Resolution no. 6-00112 which, inter alia, expressed the “strongest condemnation of the numerous human rights violations that have occurred in Venezuela following the presidential elections of July 28”.[30] Similarly, Italy was clear in its call for transparency in the electoral process and its support for the Venezuelan people’s right to free and fair elections. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the election, on 31 July 2024, the Italian-led G7 issued a statement calling on “relevant representatives to publish the detailed electoral results in full transparency” and asking “electoral representatives to immediately share all information with the opposition and independent observers”.[31] A few days later, Mr. Tajani expressed his support to the Venezuelan people, referring expressly to “manipulations of the vote’s outcome”.[32] In the months that followed, Italy consistently emphasized the need for a “democratic and peaceful transition”, one that respects the “will of the people”.[33]
This practice confirms Italy’s preference for ambiguity when dealing with new governments: by applying the same flexibility adopted for the cases of Georgia, Afghanistan, and Syria, and building on the lack of any obligation to recognize a foreign government,[34] Italy seems to have condemned Maduro’s Government while maintaining active relations with the country, for example, through the embassy in Caracas. It is doubtful whether the Italian position amounts to recognition of a different government, which would raise concerns on non-interference and premature recognition. As shown above, even the stance taken by Italy on the outcome of the elections – in favour of González Urrutia – was never accompanied by the typical acts connected to recognition. This is significantly different from what happened, for example, when several States recognized the interim government of Guaidó and, consequently, only entertained diplomatic relations with him and his diplomats.[35] This ambiguity allows ample leeway to Italy, as evident from its switch in position in January 2026. After years of strained relations, and following the release of several Italian nationals detained in Venezuela,[36] Italy seemed to recognize the presidency of Delcy Rodríguez – originally part of the same unrecognized Maduro Government – with news of the Italian Government’s decision to “upgrade the status of [the Italian] diplomatic representation in Caracas from chargé d’affaires to fully-fledged ambassador”[37] and, ultimately, with Meloni referring to her as “president”.[38]
Caterina Milo
A quotable version of this post will be published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Caterina Milo, “Recognition of Governments: Italy’s Practice Concerning Contested Elections and Regime Changes”, IYIL XXXV (2025), 2026.
[1] Tsereteli, “Georgian Dream as a Nightmare for Democracy”, Verfassungsblog, 21 November 2024.
[2] EU Parliament, Resolution 2025/2522(RSP), 13 February 2025.
[3] “Hungary and Slovakia veto EU sanctions on Georgian officials as protests continue”, Euronews, 16 December 2024.
[4] Answer by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Tajani, to Question no. 3-01722 before the Senate (279th Meeting, 27 February 2025).
[5] Written reply, dated 29 October 2025, by Mr. Silli to Question no. 4-02293 raised in the Senate.
[6] In reiterating that the Afghan de facto authorities are under the obligation of respecting human rights, Mr. Silli noted that filing a claim against Afghanistan before the International Court of Justice for breaches of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – an idea raised by Germany and the Netherlands – might confer legitimacy to the regime; therefore, he stated that, in case such a possibility became real, Italy would assess all the implications of the proceedings (written reply, dated 1 July 2025, to Question no. 4-03505 raised in the Chamber of Deputies). Interestingly, Mr. Silli, in his written reply, dated 8 October 2025, to Question no. 4-05586 raised in the Chamber, said that the Government would not support defining the discrimination of Afghan women as “gender-based apartheid”, as the concept of “apartheid” identifies racial discrimination: the term “gender-based persecution” would thus be preferable under international law.
[7] Answer by Mr. Tajani to Question no. 3-01780 before the Chamber (440th Meeting, 5 March 2025).
[8] Written reply, dated 30 April 2025, by Mr. Silli to Question no. 4-01435 raised in the Senate. See also his written reply to Question no. 4-05586, cit. supra note 6.
[9] Answer by Mr. Tajani to Question no. 3-01780, supra note 7.
[10] Answer by Mr. Tajani to Question no. 3-01642 before the Chamber (405th Meeting, 8 January 2025).
[11] See also the answer by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Edmondo Cirielli, to Question no. 4-03998 before the Chamber (515th Meeting, 22 July 2025).
[12] The issue was already raised in 1945 by Lauterpacht in “Recognition of Governments: I”, Columbia Law Review, 1945, p. 815 ff., p. 824.
[13] See the note by Amoroso here (and also published on this site) (to be updated).
[14] “Venezuela election: Maduro declared winner by government-controlled authority”, The Guardian, 29 July 2024.
[15] “Venezuela’s Election Was Deeply Flawed. Here’s How”, The New York Times, 31 July 2024.
[16] “How Venezuela’s opposition proved its election win: ‘A brilliant political move’”, The Guardian, 10 August 2024. A United Nations Panel of Experts also monitored the elections, coming to similar results: see “Interim report: UN panel of experts – Venezuelan presidential elections 28 July 2024”, 9 August 2024.
[17] “Venezuela: Brutal Crackdown Since Elections”, Human Rights Watch, 30 April 2025.
[18] As reported, China, Russia and Iran congratulated Maduro on the electoral win. See “World leaders, ordinary Venezuelans protest Maduro’s reelection claim”, The Washington Post, 19 July 2024.
[19] “Overwhelming evidence Venezuela opposition won election – Blinken”, BBC, 3 August 2024.
[20] Turrini and Antoniazzi, “The Non-recognition of the Venezuelan President between Democratic Standards and the Principle of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of Other States”, IYIL, Vol. XXIX, 2019, p. 461 ff. (also published on this site). For an analysis of previous Italian practice concerning Venezuela see Antoniazzi, “The Venezuelan Crisis”, IYIL, Vol. XXVII, 2017, p. 476 ff. (also published on this site).
[21] On these criteria see Cole, Hachem and Hathaway, “Recognition Rules: The Case for a New International Law of Government Recognition”, New York University Law Review, 2025, p. 795 ff.; Frowein, “Recognition”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2010, para. 14 ff.; d’Aspremont, “Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2006, p. 877 ff.
[22] “The Venezuelan people have to decide their own destiny. Their will must prevail”, Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on recent post-election developments, 24 August 2024.
[23] Italy-Argentina joint declaration of 7 October 2024.
[24] “Giorgia Meloni reconoció a Edmundo González Urrutia como presidente electo de Venezuela”, Infobae, 20 November 2024.
[25] Turrini and Antoniazzi, supra note 20.
[26] Statement issued on 20 November 2024 by Ms. Meloni as part of the joint statements with the President of Argentina, Mr. Javier Milei. This happened the day after the United States recognized González Urrutia as president-elect; see “US recognizes Edmundo González Urrutia as Venezuelan ‘president-elect’”, The Guardian, 19 November 2024.
[27] On non-intervention and Venezuela see Puma, “The principle of non-intervention in the face of the Venezuelan crisis”, QIL, Zoom-in 79 (2021), p. 5 ff. On the difficulty of distinguishing between cases of genuine recognition of a government and mere political support declarations toward opposition parties see Pertile, “Sul riconoscimento di governo nella crisi venezuelana: la trasformazione alchemica è completa?”, Quaderni di SIDIBlog, 2019, p. 138 ff.
[28] “Venezuela restricts French, Italian and Dutch diplomats”, Le Monde, 14 January 2025.
[29] Statement cit. supra note 22.
[30] See also the Statement by the Italian Government on the situation in Venezuela of 10 August 2024.
[31] “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Venezuela”, 31 July 2024. This position was further restated in a Joint Declaration on Venezuela issued on 3 August 2024, and in the statement issued on 5 August 2024 by the EU on the matter.
[32] “Tajani: Italy supports the Venezuelan people”, 2 August 2024.
[33] “President Meloni meets González Urrutia, winner of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought”, Press release, 28 October 2024.
[34] Pavlopoulos, The Identity of Governments in International Law, Oxford, 2024, p. 39.
[35] For a recollection of the different degrees of recognition of Guaidó see “Interactive Map: Degrees of Diplomatic Recognition of Guaidó and Maduro”, Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights.
[36] “Italy to upgrade relations with Venezuela as two more Italians freed”, Reuters, 12 Janaury 2026.
[37] Statement of Mr. Tajani before the Chamber of Deputies (592nd Meeting, 13 January 2026).
[38] “Venezuela, dichiarazione del Presidente Meloni”, 9 January 2026.
