On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched an attack on the State of Israel, firing rockets from the Gaza Strip and breaching the Gaza “border” by air, sea and land. This attack resulted in approximately 1,200 deaths,[1] as well as the abduction of hostages in the Gaza Strip. The incident – and Israel’s subsequent military response – had a profound impact on the international community and occupied a significant part of the Italian parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in 2023, which continued in 2024.
Continue readingCategory Archives: Use of Force
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Issues of Accountability in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Not surprisingly, in 2022, the Italian Government(s)[1] extensively dealt with several international humanitarian law (IHL) implications of the Russia-Ukraine war: firstly, the systematic violations of the rules on targeting that protect civilians and civilian objects against the effects of hostilities; secondly, the forcible transfer of civilians from occupied territories under the law of belligerent occupation; lastly, the prospects for accountability for serious violations of IHL. These aspects are explored in the following analysis.
Continue readingThe Reaction to the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Debate on the Provision of Weapons to the State Victim of Aggression
At the beginning of 2022, when the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation started, several factors would have led one to question Italy’s ability to condemn the unlawful use of force. Italy was heavily dependent on gas supplies from Russia by virtue of a decades-long policy of cooperation in the energy sector (a situation that changed radically in the space of a year).[1] Some parties with governmental responsibilities in both the executive led by Mario Draghi and the subsequent one led by Giorgia Meloni,[2] had also shown over time that they had a network of relations with the Russian leadership.[3] Furthermore, the presence of a strong pacifist movement within public opinion had led some analysts to doubt whether the country would adopt a firm political stance towards the Russian Federation involving the supply of weapons or some form of participation in the conflict.[4]
Continue readingOn Some International Agreements Concerning Nuclear Weapons in Light of the New Challenges Posed by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
The year 2022 was undoubtedly marked by a strong prominence of the debate related to nuclear weapons, driven by a series of institutional events such as the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the plenary United Nations (UN) meeting against nuclear testing and the first World Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
Continue readingThe Non-Recognition of the Separatist Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk and of Their Subsequent Accession to Russia with Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
On 21 February 2022, at the end of a TV speech to the nation, the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, signed the act of recognition of the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. On 23 February, before the Chamber of Deputies (644th Meeting, XVIII Legislature), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Luigi Di Maio, made an urgent Government briefing on this issue.
Continue readingThe Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Issues of Recognition, Sanctions and the Supply of Weapons
During 2022, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, three main topics of discussion emerged in the Italian parliamentary practice: the recognition of the self-proclaimed “republics” of the Donbass, the issue of sanctions against the Russian Federation, and, finally, the question of the legality and political expediency of supplying arms to Ukraine. All these topics are explored in the ensuing analysis, highlighting the position taken by the Italian Government on each of them.
Continue readingThe Resumption of Hostilities between Israel and Palestinian Armed Groups and the Qualification of Palestinian Civil Society Associations as Terrorist Organizations
The year 2021 was marked by the most violent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza since 2014. In May, clashes and protests for scheduled forced evictions of Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem, and for increasing Israeli settlement activity, spiraled into eleven days of military confrontation. On 17 May 2021, at the Security Council open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the European Union (EU) expressed its concerns over the upsurge in violence and called “for an immediate cessation of hostilities”.[1] Similarly, on 12 May, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General remarked that “de-escalation is an absolute must to protect the lives of civilians”.[2]
Continue readingTerritorial Issues Concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict
On the Status of the Golan Heights
On 25 March 2019, the President of the United States (US), Mr Donald Trump, issued a Presidential Proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The text of the Proclamation clarifies that the main reason behind this decision was Israeli security. More specifically, the relevant part of the text reads:
The State of Israel took control of the Golan Heights in 1967 to safeguard its security from external threats. Today, aggressive acts by Iran and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, in southern Syria continue to make the Golan Heights a potential launching ground for attacks on Israel. Any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel’s need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats. Based on these unique circumstances, it is therefore appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.[1]
Continue readingThe Scope and Means of Action of the United Nations Security Council as Seen by Italy during its “Shared Membership”
Italy has a long tradition of taking public stances on issues concerning the United Nations (UN) in general, and the Security Council (SC) in particular. The most important of such issues is perhaps the reform of the SC, a hotly debated question on which Italy has been taking a leading position for many years, promoting a series of proposals around which a group known as “Uniting for Consensus” has gathered.[1] This very same theme has been discussed by Italian representatives at the UN also in 2017 and 2018, when they reiterated and further clarified their country’s view.[2] Those years also correspond to the biennium that saw Italy and the Netherlands share a split non-permanent seat at the SC (the former being a member in 2017). Therefore, Italy has recently had many occasions to express its ideas on the action of the SC.
It is well known that the role of the SC has been progressively expanding since the end of the Cold War, so that nowadays its activities have a far wider scope than that envisioned in 1945 by the drafters of the UN Charter. Such legal developments can be said to be, by now, largely accepted by the international community, and even those States that occasionally veto or anyhow oppose certain SC resolutions, sometimes do that inconsistently and by putting forth political rather than legal justifications.[3] This notwithstanding, the issue of how far-reaching the powers of the SC are remains the subject of scholarly debate and is still of some practical importance for States. From this perspective, it may be useful to review Italy’s stances on the action of the SC.
Continue readingThe Threatened Demolition of the Khan al-Ahmar “Rubber Tire School” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
The Khan al-Ahmar community is located in the West Bank, near the road that connects Jerusalem to the city of Jericho and the Dead Sea and not far from the Israeli settlements that rise to the east of the Holy City.[1] Its 180 inhabitants (35 Bedouin families) belong to the tribal group Jahalin, originating from Tel Arad, in southern Israel. Members of this clan were expelled by the Israeli army in 1951 and had to relocate in what was then a territory under the control of Jordan. Nowadays, their lands are formally located within the so-called Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which, under the Oslo Accords, is administered by Israel, and in particular on corridor E1, an area considered strategic for controlling the territory up to Jericho and for the expansion of the settlements. Families are extremely poor and live in temporary structures built without permits from the Israeli authorities, often funded by European countries. Villages are not connected to electricity, roads and the sewage system. They lack health and education infrastructures. Scattered in the area of Khan al-Ahmar live twelve Palestinian communities with roughly 1,400 inhabitants. The so-called “Rubber Tire School”, located in Khan al-Ahmar, serves 150 children from five different communities. The Italian NGO Terra di Vento established it in 2009 with an innovative project using mud and tires. Together with other infrastructures, it was funded by Italy, Belgium and the European Union.
Over the years, the Israeli authorities have confiscated and demolished existing facilities and issued several demolition orders to the detriment of the Bedouin communities of the Jerusalem area. As documented by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem, “from 2006 until the end of May 2018, 26 residential structures were demolished. 132 people were left without shelter, of which 77 were children and teenagers. In addition, 7 non-residential structures were demolished”.[2]
Several petitions were filed with the High Court of Justice in favor or against the demolition orders. The Israeli settlers petitioned the Court to have the demolition orders implemented, whereas the Palestinian communities tried to resist deportation. In this respect, the position of the Israeli Government is that the Khan al-Ahmar buildings were established without any permits and that residents have been offered an alternative location where the school would be reconstructed.[3]
On 28 May 2018, the Israeli High Court confirmed that the Government might demolish the homes of the residents of Khan al-Ahmar and the school.[4] On 4 July the Israeli civil administration started implementing the expulsion of the residents and the demolition of the buildings, but a subsequent petition to the Court froze the process. With a temporary injunction, the Court invited the parties to reach an agreement. The Government then insisted on the immediate relocation of the Palestinian community to a site in Abu Dis, near a garbage dump.[5] The Palestinian community refused the proposed solution and continued resisting to the expulsion and the destruction of their homes.
Continue reading