Italy stands out as one of the first countries to have established a detailed legal regime for arms export control, with Law No. 185 of 1990. Despite having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, Italy has never introduced any implementing legislation or undertaken a substantial revision of Law 185/1990 to align it with the ATT obligations. The reform of such law – long awaited due to partial divergence from ATT provisions – thus appeared to many as necessary. Against this background, the draft amendments to Law 185/1990 were formally submitted to the Senate of the Republic on 11 August 2023 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in coordination with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior, of Justice, of Economy and Finance and of Enterprises and Made in Italy. However, it is striking that the current reform makes no explicit reference to the ATT, nor does it seem to address the need for legal harmonisation.[1] This calls for a closer examination of the actual drivers behind the reform of Italy’s legislation on arms export control.
Continue readingCategory Archives: International Humanitarian Law
Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change
Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.
Continue readingThe Legality of Arms Transfers to Israel after 7 October: The Relationship Between the International Legal Framework on Arms Trade and Law No. 185 of 1990
In Italy, as in several other countries, the debate on the legality of arms transfers to Israel assumed considerable political importance in late 2023 and early 2024.[1] After an initial period of shock over the Hamas attack on Israeli territory on 7 October, public and parliamentary attention to arms transfers to Israel increased in parallel with the growing number of Palestinian civilian casualties caused by the Israeli army’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Between November 2023 and April 2024, the Italian Government had to address the issue on at least five occasions during parliamentary debates.
Continue readingThe Hamas Attack of 7 October and Israel’s Military Response
On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched an attack on the State of Israel, firing rockets from the Gaza Strip and breaching the Gaza “border” by air, sea and land. This attack resulted in approximately 1,200 deaths,[1] as well as the abduction of hostages in the Gaza Strip. The incident – and Israel’s subsequent military response – had a profound impact on the international community and occupied a significant part of the Italian parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in 2023, which continued in 2024.
Continue readingViolations of International Humanitarian Law and Issues of Accountability in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
Not surprisingly, in 2022, the Italian Government(s)[1] extensively dealt with several international humanitarian law (IHL) implications of the Russia-Ukraine war: firstly, the systematic violations of the rules on targeting that protect civilians and civilian objects against the effects of hostilities; secondly, the forcible transfer of civilians from occupied territories under the law of belligerent occupation; lastly, the prospects for accountability for serious violations of IHL. These aspects are explored in the following analysis.
Continue readingThe Resumption of Hostilities between Israel and Palestinian Armed Groups and the Qualification of Palestinian Civil Society Associations as Terrorist Organizations
The year 2021 was marked by the most violent escalation of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza since 2014. In May, clashes and protests for scheduled forced evictions of Palestinian families from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem, and for increasing Israeli settlement activity, spiraled into eleven days of military confrontation. On 17 May 2021, at the Security Council open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the European Union (EU) expressed its concerns over the upsurge in violence and called “for an immediate cessation of hostilities”.[1] Similarly, on 12 May, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General remarked that “de-escalation is an absolute must to protect the lives of civilians”.[2]
Continue readingTerritorial Issues Concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict
On the Status of the Golan Heights
On 25 March 2019, the President of the United States (US), Mr Donald Trump, issued a Presidential Proclamation recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The text of the Proclamation clarifies that the main reason behind this decision was Israeli security. More specifically, the relevant part of the text reads:
The State of Israel took control of the Golan Heights in 1967 to safeguard its security from external threats. Today, aggressive acts by Iran and terrorist groups, including Hizballah, in southern Syria continue to make the Golan Heights a potential launching ground for attacks on Israel. Any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel’s need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats. Based on these unique circumstances, it is therefore appropriate to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.[1]
Continue readingThe Threatened Demolition of the Khan al-Ahmar “Rubber Tire School” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
The Khan al-Ahmar community is located in the West Bank, near the road that connects Jerusalem to the city of Jericho and the Dead Sea and not far from the Israeli settlements that rise to the east of the Holy City.[1] Its 180 inhabitants (35 Bedouin families) belong to the tribal group Jahalin, originating from Tel Arad, in southern Israel. Members of this clan were expelled by the Israeli army in 1951 and had to relocate in what was then a territory under the control of Jordan. Nowadays, their lands are formally located within the so-called Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which, under the Oslo Accords, is administered by Israel, and in particular on corridor E1, an area considered strategic for controlling the territory up to Jericho and for the expansion of the settlements. Families are extremely poor and live in temporary structures built without permits from the Israeli authorities, often funded by European countries. Villages are not connected to electricity, roads and the sewage system. They lack health and education infrastructures. Scattered in the area of Khan al-Ahmar live twelve Palestinian communities with roughly 1,400 inhabitants. The so-called “Rubber Tire School”, located in Khan al-Ahmar, serves 150 children from five different communities. The Italian NGO Terra di Vento established it in 2009 with an innovative project using mud and tires. Together with other infrastructures, it was funded by Italy, Belgium and the European Union.
Over the years, the Israeli authorities have confiscated and demolished existing facilities and issued several demolition orders to the detriment of the Bedouin communities of the Jerusalem area. As documented by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem, “from 2006 until the end of May 2018, 26 residential structures were demolished. 132 people were left without shelter, of which 77 were children and teenagers. In addition, 7 non-residential structures were demolished”.[2]
Several petitions were filed with the High Court of Justice in favor or against the demolition orders. The Israeli settlers petitioned the Court to have the demolition orders implemented, whereas the Palestinian communities tried to resist deportation. In this respect, the position of the Israeli Government is that the Khan al-Ahmar buildings were established without any permits and that residents have been offered an alternative location where the school would be reconstructed.[3]
On 28 May 2018, the Israeli High Court confirmed that the Government might demolish the homes of the residents of Khan al-Ahmar and the school.[4] On 4 July the Israeli civil administration started implementing the expulsion of the residents and the demolition of the buildings, but a subsequent petition to the Court froze the process. With a temporary injunction, the Court invited the parties to reach an agreement. The Government then insisted on the immediate relocation of the Palestinian community to a site in Abu Dis, near a garbage dump.[5] The Palestinian community refused the proposed solution and continued resisting to the expulsion and the destruction of their homes.
Continue readingThe Airstrikes Against Syria in Response to the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons
On 17 April 2018, Mr Paolo Gentiloni Silveri, President of the Council of Ministers, reported before the Senate of the Republic on the developments of the situation in Syria (5th Meeting, XVII Legislature). In doing so, he also summarized the Government’s position on the airstrikes against Syria conducted by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on 14 April 2018, presented as a response to the chemical weapons allegedly used in Douma by the Syrian army a few days before. Mr Gentiloni firstly commented upon the credibility of these allegations:
Eventually, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (which is a partnership between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations) determined that in the last years, at least three times, the Syrian army resorted to using chlorine gas.
Moreover, it confirmed the use of nerve gas in the attack in KhanShaykhun that occurred exactly one year ago. You will recall that on that occasion there was a response by the United States. But the same body – the Joint Investigative Mechanism – determined that Daesh as well, on a couple of occasions, resorted to using chemical weapons in the Syrian context.
Continue readingItaly’s stance on the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel
On 6 December 2017, the United States (US) President, Mr. Donald Trump, put into effect his presidential campaign promise to effectively recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thereby indicating a future move there for the US embassy from Tel Aviv. Such a decision has been interpreted by many as marking a turning point in the US approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Indeed, even though the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act adopted by the US Senate and House of Representatives committed the Federal Government to moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, since its enactment every US President has regularly availed himself of the possibility to invoke a six-month waiver of the application of the law. President Trump himself signed such a waiver twice, before (June 2017) as well as after (December 2017) his own declaration. Nonetheless, his announcement sparked controversy and many countries voiced their dissent. Italy is among those States and its stance will be discussed below. However, in order better to understand the dissent it expressed along with a number of other countries, it is useful to provide a factual and legal context, starting with Mr. Trump’s actual words.
In his speech, Mr. Trump motivated his decision as follows:
Israel is a sovereign nation with the right, like every other sovereign nation, to determine its own capital. […] But today we finally acknowledge the obvious. That Jerusalem is Israel’s capital. This is nothing more or less than a recognition of reality. It is also the right thing to do. It’s something that has to be done.
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