Italy stands out as one of the first countries to have established a detailed legal regime for arms export control, with Law No. 185 of 1990. Despite having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, Italy has never introduced any implementing legislation or undertaken a substantial revision of Law 185/1990 to align it with the ATT obligations. The reform of such law – long awaited due to partial divergence from ATT provisions – thus appeared to many as necessary. Against this background, the draft amendments to Law 185/1990 were formally submitted to the Senate of the Republic on 11 August 2023 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in coordination with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior, of Justice, of Economy and Finance and of Enterprises and Made in Italy. However, it is striking that the current reform makes no explicit reference to the ATT, nor does it seem to address the need for legal harmonisation.[1] This calls for a closer examination of the actual drivers behind the reform of Italy’s legislation on arms export control.
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Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change
Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.
Continue readingItaly’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace
In 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained one of the main topics of debate in foreign policy matters in Italy. Among the aspects discussed by governmental representatives, the most significant ones are the extent of Italian support to Ukraine’s war effort, the final aim this support pursues (i.e., the conditions attached to a future peace arrangement), and military aid to Russia from other States.
Continue readingThe Enforcement of Arrest Warrants Issued by the International Criminal Court: Between the Duty to Cooperate and Realpolitik
In late 2024 and early 2025 the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued several arrest warrants in the context of politically sensitive investigations, including those regarding the ongoing armed conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine.[1] Some of these decisions concern alleged perpetrators holding high-level political positions in States that are close allies of Italy, such as Israel. Furthermore, in January 2025, Italy was requested by the Court to execute on its territory an arrest warrant issued against General Osema Almasri Najeem in the context of the investigation in Libya. Italy’s recent behaviour in relation to arrest warrants in the situations in Palestine and Libya is indicative of a shift from the traditionally supportive attitude to a more cautious (and lees cooperative) one in its relations with international criminal tribunals. This contribution analyses the Italian Government’s conduct, which shows a discrepancy between the rhetorical support for the ICC and the lack of actual cooperation in the execution of its requests.
Continue readingItaly’s Migration Policy in 2024: Pursuing the Externalisation Path
In 2024, Italy’s migration policy continued to be heralded by the Italian Government and parliamentary majority as a success and a model for other countries, while being vehemently criticised by opposition parties as well as civil society organisations active in the area of the protection of migrants. Even though Italy’s policy in this field has been wide-ranging in its acts and effects, the externalisation of migration management is arguably one of its guiding principles. Albeit not a legal notion, externalisation – by referring to a multitude of practices of controlling and managing migration beyond a State’s borders – raises compelling legal issues.[1] Therefore, it is not surprising that the Italian Government aimed to justify its outward-looking approach, affecting virtually all phases of the migration process, on a variety of legal grounds.
Starting with the departure of migrants, references to a supposed “right not to migrate” were again abundant in the Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice of 2024. This has been a leitmotiv of the current Italian Government and one of the theoretical premises and legal backbones of Piano Mattei, namely Italy’s flagship plan for investment in and cooperation with Africa. Among other instances, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, referred to this right in her address before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the Summit of the Future, on 23 September 2024. In connection with Piano Mattei and its approach (“neither paternalistic nor charitable or predatory”), Ms. Meloni stated that “[Piano Mattei] is our recipe to promote the development of a continent too often undervalued, build its stability, and finally guarantee one right that until now has been denied to too many young people – the right not to have to emigrate”.
Continue readingThe Arrest and Detention of Ilaria Salis in Hungary
On 13 February 2023, the Italian Embassy in Hungary was informed that Ilaria Salis, an Italian national, had been arrested in Budapest two days earlier. She had been taken into custody on charges of armed group violence for assaulting far-right activists during a demonstration. She was accused of being part of organised groups that allegedly planned to attack people present at the demonstration. The Embassy was informed that Ms. Salis was being held in a Budapest prison and that the prosecution was seeking a prison sentence of 11 years.
In 2024, while expressing concern for non-compliance with fair trial and minimum standards on detention, Italy initially only stressed the need to respect Hungary’s sovereignty and the impartiality of its judiciary.[1] On 29 January 2024, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, emphasised that “the Hungarian judiciary is sovereign” and that Italy could only take action through diplomatic channels to improve the conditions of detention.[2] Further statements by both Mr. Nordio and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, underlined that the principle of judicial sovereignty of a State would prevent interference in the conduct of the trial and Ms. Salis’s detention status.[3]
Continue readingThe Legality of Arms Transfers to Israel after 7 October: The Relationship Between the International Legal Framework on Arms Trade and Law No. 185 of 1990
In Italy, as in several other countries, the debate on the legality of arms transfers to Israel assumed considerable political importance in late 2023 and early 2024.[1] After an initial period of shock over the Hamas attack on Israeli territory on 7 October, public and parliamentary attention to arms transfers to Israel increased in parallel with the growing number of Palestinian civilian casualties caused by the Israeli army’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Between November 2023 and April 2024, the Italian Government had to address the issue on at least five occasions during parliamentary debates.
Continue readingThe Response to the Houthis’ Attacks in the Red Sea: Bathing in Ambiguity
In October 2023, the Yemen-based and Iran-backed Houthi movement started a series of attacks (continuing well into 2024) against several vessels navigating the Red Sea, with the declared intention to support the population of Gaza in the rekindled Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 10 January 2024, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, taking note of “the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms”. This ambiguously-worded text does not provide for an autonomous legal basis for reaction and leaves open the question of the legality of the forcible measures subsequently taken by (mostly Western) States.
Continue readingThe Authorization of Military Assistance to Ukraine and the Recognition of the Holodomor as Genocide
The Hamas Attack of 7 October and Israel’s Military Response
On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched an attack on the State of Israel, firing rockets from the Gaza Strip and breaching the Gaza “border” by air, sea and land. This attack resulted in approximately 1,200 deaths,[1] as well as the abduction of hostages in the Gaza Strip. The incident – and Israel’s subsequent military response – had a profound impact on the international community and occupied a significant part of the Italian parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in 2023, which continued in 2024.
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