Author Archives: Paolo Turrini

Italy’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace

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In 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained one of the main topics of debate in foreign policy matters in Italy. Among the aspects discussed by governmental representatives, the most significant ones are the extent of Italian support to Ukraine’s war effort, the final aim this support pursues (i.e., the conditions attached to a future peace arrangement), and military aid to Russia from other States.

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The Response to the Houthis’ Attacks in the Red Sea: Bathing in Ambiguity

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In October 2023, the Yemen-based and Iran-backed Houthi movement started a series of attacks (continuing well into 2024) against several vessels navigating the Red Sea, with the declared intention to support the population of Gaza in the rekindled Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 10 January 2024, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, taking note of “the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms”. This ambiguously-worded text does not provide for an autonomous legal basis for reaction and leaves open the question of the legality of the forcible measures subsequently taken by (mostly Western) States.

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Of Castaways and Pirates: Migrants’ Rights from Departure to Arrival

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The victory of the right-wing coalition at the general elections of September 2022 brought the topic of migration back to the center of the Italian political debate. In the first half of the year the Parliament had discussed migration issues with a theretofore unknown positive attitude: the shock caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine nourished the sympathy for those displaced by the war and led to the welcoming of tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees and the financing of support initiatives. However, the steady rise in the number of migrants reaching the country’s shores, as compared to those arrived in the period immediately after the conclusion of the 2017 agreement between Italy and Libya, led the newly elected President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, and her center-right coalition to adopt a tighter approach.

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The Legality of Sanctions Between the Condemnation of Their Extraterritorial Application and Humanitarian Concerns

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On 23 March 2021, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council passed a resolution entitled “The negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights”,[1] with the negative vote of 15 States, including Italy. One week later, on 31 March, during a joint session (7th Meeting, XVIII Legislature) of the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber of Deputies and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emigration (3rd) of the Senate of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Luigi di Maio, addressed and dispelled the allegations that Italy’s vote amounted to an endorsement of sanctions on Cuba (a Country that voted in favor of the resolution).

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The Dispute with France over the Territorial Boundary in the Mont Blanc Area

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The boundary between Italy and France in the Alpine region is set by the treaty signed in Turin, on 24 March 1860, by the Kingdom of Sardinia and the French Empire concerning the cession to the latter of the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice, as well as by the actual delimitation agreements – implementing the 1860 Treaty – signed by the same parties on 27 June and 25 November 1860, 7 March 1861, and 26 September 1862.[1]

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The Classification of Italy’s Ports as Places Unsafe for Migrants Rescued by Foreign Vessels Outside the Country’s SAR Area

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Even though greatly reduced compared to the peaks of the previous years, migratory flows across the Mediterranean Sea towards Italy’s coasts continued in 2020 – as did the tragic deaths of migrants, compounded by the inaction of Southern European States, in particular Italy and Malta.

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Developments Concerning Austria’s Attempts to Grant Dual Nationality and Consular Assistance to German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans

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Toned down during the first part of 2019, the diplomatic row between Italy and Austria over Vienna’s draft laws on dual nationality and consular assistance for German- and Ladin-speaking South Tyroleans resurfaced[1] following the fall of the Austrian Government in May 2019.

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The Non-recognition of the Venezuelan President Between Democratic Standards and the Principle of Non-intervention in the Internal Affairs of Other States

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Throughout 2018, the situation in Venezuela remained highly volatile. In May, snap presidential elections took place and the incumbent President, Mr Nicolás Maduro, declared victory; however, the election results were recognized neither by the opposition (which had mostly boycotted the poll) nor by a large part of the international community.[1] On 5 August 2018, following an alleged drone attack against Maduro, a further crackdown on opposition leaders ensued.[2] In the meantime, a report by the International Monetary Fund estimated a 1,370,000 percent inflation by the end of the year,[3] while the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 1.5 million Venezuelans had left the country since the beginning of the crisis and the number of asylum applications had spiked.[4]

The year 2019 started with the official inauguration of Maduro’s second term as President of Venezuela, on 10 January. On 23 January, however, Mr Juan Guaidó, President of the National Assembly (the Venezuelan Parliament) and leader of the opposition,[5] declared himself interim President of Venezuela by relying on Article 233 of the Constitution, which attributes the interim presidency to the head of the National Assembly should the President become “permanently unavailable to serve”.[6] Venezuela thus plunged into political and institutional chaos.

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The Scope and Means of Action of the United Nations Security Council as Seen by Italy during its “Shared Membership”

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Italy has a long tradition of taking public stances on issues concerning the United Nations (UN) in general, and the Security Council (SC) in particular. The most important of such issues is perhaps the reform of the SC, a hotly debated question on which Italy has been taking a leading position for many years, promoting a series of proposals around which a group known as “Uniting for Consensus” has gathered.[1] This very same theme has been discussed by Italian representatives at the UN also in 2017 and 2018, when they reiterated and further clarified their country’s view.[2] Those years also correspond to the biennium that saw Italy and the Netherlands share a split non-permanent seat at the SC (the former being a member in 2017). Therefore, Italy has recently had many occasions to express its ideas on the action of the SC.

It is well known that the role of the SC has been progressively expanding since the end of the Cold War, so that nowadays its activities have a far wider scope than that envisioned in 1945 by the drafters of the UN Charter. Such legal developments can be said to be, by now, largely accepted by the international community, and even those States that occasionally veto or anyhow oppose certain SC resolutions, sometimes do that inconsistently and by putting forth political rather than legal justifications.[3] This notwithstanding, the issue of how far-reaching the powers of the SC are remains the subject of scholarly debate and is still of some practical importance for States. From this perspective, it may be useful to review Italy’s stances on the action of the SC.

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Italy’s stance on the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel

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On 6 December 2017, the United States (US) President, Mr. Donald Trump, put into effect his presidential campaign promise to effectively recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thereby indicating a future move there for the US embassy from Tel Aviv. Such a decision has been interpreted by many as marking a turning point in the US approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Indeed, even though the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act adopted by the US Senate and House of Representatives committed the Federal Government to moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, since its enactment every US President has regularly availed himself of the possibility to invoke a six-month waiver of the application of the law. President Trump himself signed such a waiver twice, before (June 2017) as well as after (December 2017) his own declaration. Nonetheless, his announcement sparked controversy and many countries voiced their dissent. Italy is among those States and its stance will be discussed below. However, in order better to understand the dissent it expressed along with a number of other countries, it is useful to provide a factual and legal context, starting with Mr. Trump’s actual words. 

In his speech, Mr. Trump motivated his decision as follows: 

Israel is a sovereign nation with the right, like every other sovereign nation, to determine its own capital. […] But today we finally acknowledge the obvious. That Jerusalem is Israel’s capital. This is nothing more or less than a recognition of reality. It is also the right thing to do. It’s something that has to be done. 

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