Italy stands out as one of the first countries to have established a detailed legal regime for arms export control, with Law No. 185 of 1990. Despite having ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, Italy has never introduced any implementing legislation or undertaken a substantial revision of Law 185/1990 to align it with the ATT obligations. The reform of such law – long awaited due to partial divergence from ATT provisions – thus appeared to many as necessary. Against this background, the draft amendments to Law 185/1990 were formally submitted to the Senate of the Republic on 11 August 2023 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in coordination with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior, of Justice, of Economy and Finance and of Enterprises and Made in Italy. However, it is striking that the current reform makes no explicit reference to the ATT, nor does it seem to address the need for legal harmonisation.[1] This calls for a closer examination of the actual drivers behind the reform of Italy’s legislation on arms export control.

In the introduction to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill, it is stated:

it is no longer possible to forgo an adjustment of the decision-making mechanisms […] in order to ensure appropriate coordination, at the highest political level, of strategic choices regarding the trade in armament materials. This activity, in fact, requires close coordination of decisions among the various ministries involved, as this matter entails a series of complex assessments, characterised by deep interconnections between foreign policy, security and defence policy, and economic and industrial policy.[2]

The bill was first assigned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate in a drafting capacity (sede redigente) on 14 September 2023 and subsequently reassigned to the same Committee in a deliberative capacity (sede referente) on 21 November 2023. Within this framework, the Committee concluded its examination of the bill on 23 January 2024 (65th Meeting, XIX Legislature). Following this phase, the draft legislation proceeded to the Senate, where it was formally approved on 21 February 2024 (161st Meeting).

One week prior to the Senate vote, on 15 February 2024 (159th Meeting), the acting majority rapporteur, Mr. Raffaele Speranzon, in presenting the Government’s proposed reform package, commented:

The bill under discussion, consisting of a single article, introduces certain updates to the regulatory framework governing the authorisation of armament material transfers, with the aim of making it more responsive to the challenges arising from the evolving international context, particularly with regard to the sensitive nature of decision-making mechanisms.

Specifically, the reform modifies the mechanism through which export bans are applied, in order to eliminate certain interpretative ambiguities, without, however, altering the substantive legal framework. Responsibility for the application of such bans is entrusted to the Interministerial Committee for the Trade of Defence Armament Materials (CISD), composed of the President of the Council of Ministers and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Interior, Defence, Economy and Finance, and Enterprises and Made in Italy. This collegiate body is also tasked with defining the general guidelines for the implementation of the law, the overarching directives for the transfer of armament materials, and the general criteria for the application of export bans.

The measure is intended to ensure stronger coordination in decision-making processes concerning a highly sensitive area of policy, which entails significant political implications. Furthermore, the bill introduces certain provisions aimed at simplifying the procedures for the exchange of armament materials, to the benefit of Italian companies operating in the sector. In particular, the reform seeks to reduce the current administrative burden associated with documentation requirements, which weighs heavily on authorised enterprises conducting such transfers.

On 14 March 2024, the bill was referred, as Act No. 1730, to the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and the Committee on Defence (IV) of the Chamber of Deputies, in a deliberative capacity. On that date, a preliminary examination took place, followed by a deferral. The discussion of the bill resumed within the same Committees only on 6 February 2025 and is ongoing at the time of writing.[3]

It is also worth highlighting that, alongside the parliamentary debate on the proposed reform of Law 185/1990, discussions were held in both houses of Parliament concerning the transfer of arms under such law to Ukraine[4] and, especially, to Israel following the events of 7 October 2023.[5] With regard to the latter case, concerns were voiced before the Senate regarding the compatibility of such transfers with Law 185/1990, whose Article 1(6)(a) prohibits the export of military equipment towards countries in a state of armed conflict contrary to the principles of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, without prejudice to Italy’s international obligations or differing resolutions of the Council of Ministers to be adopted after consulting the Chambers. Statements made by members of the Italian Government, asserting that Italy had suspended the transfer of “any type of weaponry” since the outbreak of hostilities,[6] were later contradicted by data on foreign trade released by ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics).[7]

On 14 March 2024, a couple of weeks after the release of these data, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, responded to parliamentary question no. 3-01018 before the Senate (169th Meeting),[8] remarking that following the 7 October attack by Hamas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Unit for the Authorizations of Armament Materials (UAMA) suspended the issuance of new arms export licences to Israel under Law 185/1990 – a suspension still in force. As for licences issued before 7 October, most had been executed; the remainder were being assessed individually, excluding items with potential impact on Gaza’s civilian population. Minister Crosetto further recalled that both European Union and ATT rules require risk-based evaluations tied to specific items, not general assessments of a State’s conduct.

This position was later reiterated by the Government. On 15 October 2024, before the Senate (231st Meeting), it was the President of the Council of Ministers herself, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, who wished “to clarify the matter concerning arms exports to Israel”. She stated:

following the launch of Israeli operations in Gaza, the Government immediately suspended the issuance of any new export licenses for military equipment destined for Israel, pursuant to Law No. 185 of 1990; therefore, all contracts signed after 7 October have not been implemented. As for export licenses to Israel that had been authorised prior to 7 October, these were all reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the competent authority, namely the […] UAMA within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with Italian, European, and international regulations.

I wish to recall that the Italian position […] – namely, the complete suspension of all new export licenses – is significantly more stringent and restrictive than that adopted by our main partner countries, that is, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These partners continue to conduct case-by-case assessments also for new licenses. Instead, we do not conduct such assessments for new licenses, having suspended them entirely; we only perform case-by-case evaluations for licenses issued prior to 7 October.

Clearly, where there is a risk that the materials may be employed in the ongoing conflict, we do not proceed, whereas we do proceed when we are certain that the materials cannot be used in the conflict. This was the case, for instance, with training naval ammunition (license signed before 7 October, initially suspended and then revoked), because we could not be certain of its non-use. Conversely, this is not the case with aircraft components that are assembled in Israel for subsequent export to the United States, since there is no risk of their employment in the current hostilities.

However, an issue of transparency of data was also raised in Parliament. Answering (in writing)[9] parliamentary question no. 4-00950 about the reasons for the rejection by UAMA of the requests, submitted by the magazine Altreconomia, for access to documents concerning arms sales to Israel,[10] the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Edmondo Cirielli, stated:

The documents concerning the activities of UAMA are in absolute and relative terms excluded from document access, whether civic or general, under the relevant legislation […]. The legislation on arms exports (Law No. 185 of 1990, Article 5) stipulates that Parliament must be informed, by 31 March each year, regarding the transfers authorised in the previous year. On 25 March 2024, Parliament received the report on all authorised transfers for 2023, including those to Israel. The procedure for authorising arms exports, to Israel and any other country, is carried out in strict compliance with the provisions set out in the aforementioned Law No. 185.

The report referred to by the Deputy Minister is the “Report on the operations authorised and carried out for the control of exports”, as provided for under Article 5 of Law 185/1990 in its unamended version.[11] In light of the foregoing, it is worth noting that the 2023 Report indicates a stable volume of authorised exports to Israel (€9.9 million), while also stating that, following the launch of Israeli operations in Gaza after the 7 October attack, the issuance of new export licences was suspended.[12] This position was reiterated in the 2024 Report, which clarifies that

Israel does not appear in the data for 2024 because – as it is known – the nature of the Israeli intervention in Gaza in response to the criminal assault carried out by Hamas on 7 October 2023 led the national authority UAMA to refrain from issuing new export authorisations pursuant to Law no. 185/1990.[13]

Among the various aspects of the reform of Law 185/1990 mentioned at the outset of this contribution, one of the most controversial regards precisely Article 5[14] and, in particular, the specific content of the annual report to Parliament. Pursuant to the current version of the provision,

1. The President of the Council of Ministers shall submit to Parliament a report by 31 March of each year concerning the operations authorised and carried out by 31 December of the preceding year […]. 3. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain analytical information – by type, quantity, and monetary value – regarding the items involved in the contractually defined operations, indicating their annual state of advancement with respect to exports, imports, and transit of military equipment, as well as exports of services subject to the controls and authorisations provided for under this law.

According to the reform bill under examination, the new version of paragraph 3 of Article 5 would require the Government to report solely “the destination countries, along with the corresponding amounts broken down by type of equipment, and, using the same breakdown, the authorised companies”, thus eliminating the obligation to include more detailed tables relating to Italian arms exports.[15]

Overall, the reform of Law 185/1990 presents several shortcomings. First, it fails to introduce provisions aimed at aligning the Italian legal framework with the ATT or European Union’s Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, both of which establish obligations for arms transfer controls. This includes, inter alia, the fact that small arms and light weapons, which are covered under the ATT, remain excluded from the application of Law 185/1990. This is of particular relevance in light of recent findings by Altreconomia, which revealed that such weapons are widely used by Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[16] Second, the reform significantly weakens Italy’s commitment to transparency by reducing the scope and detail of reporting obligations. The bill also removes the obligation to report on financial institutions involved in arms transactions – an important safeguard for accountability. Such issues raise pressing concerns about the consistency of Italy’s arms export practices with its international obligations.

It remains to be seen whether, and in what form, the legislative process for the proposed reform will proceed. Should the bill be approved, it will be crucial to understand its concrete implications for the transparency, accountability, and substantive obligations assessment of Italian arms exports, particularly in relation to countries involved in ongoing armed conflicts. As illustrated by the example of Israel in 2023 and 2024, the stakes are high: the mechanisms governing the authorisation of, and reporting on, arms exports concern not only compliance with international obligations, but also the role of parliamentary oversight and civil society engagement in shaping arms export policies in democratic contexts, and any substantive change to the normative framework may significantly affect the scope and transparency of future export operations.

Filomena Medea Tulli

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Filomena Medea Tulli, “The Ongoing Reform of the Italian Law on Arms Export and Recent Policy Trends in This Field”, IYIL XXXIV (2024), 2025, pp. 443-448; available here.

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[1] For a comprehensive account of the Italian legal framework governing arms exports, particularly in light of the proposed reform of Law No. 185/1990, see Pertile, “The Legality of Arms Transfers to Israel after 7 October: The Relationship Between the International Legal Framework on Arms Trade and Law No. 185 of 1990”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIII, 2023, p. 538 ff. (also published on this site).

[2] The text is available here (p. 3).

[3] Information on the discussion in the Committees is available here.

[4] On this see the note by Turrini here(and also published on this site).

[5] In this regard the note by Cagol here(and also published on this site).

[6] See for example an interview given on 20 January 2024 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Tajani, to a newspaper, where he stated that “Italy has halted the shipment of any type of weapon to Israel since the beginning of the war in Gaza. Everything is suspended” (available here).

[7] Reference is hereby made to the data published by ISTAT, pertaining to foreign trade statistics updated to the months of October and November 2023. According to these figures, Italy is reported to have exported “arms and ammunition” to Israel for a total declared value of €817,536, part of which remains undisclosed. For the data and the related investigation, see the article published by the magazine Altreconomia on 27 February 2024.

[8] On these same remarks by Mr. Crosetto and on the authorisation of arms transfers to Israel, see also Pertile, cit. supra note 1, p. 543.

[9] The text of the answer can be found in Issue No. 63 collecting written answers to parliamentary questions raised in Senate.

[10] Altreconomia has on several occasions published investigations regarding Italian arms exports to Israel after 7 October 2023 (see e.g. supra note 7). On the specific issue of UAMA’s refusal to grant the requested access to documents, see the article published on 16 January 2024.

[11] The reports submitted by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the Italian Parliament pursuant to Article 5 are available (for the years 2022 to 2024) here.

[12] Chamber of Deputies, “Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento Anno 2023”, Doc. LXVII, No. 2, Vol. I, p. 5.

[13] Chamber of Deputies, “Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento Anno 2024”, Doc. LXVII, No. 3, Vol. I, p. 20.

[14] Although no scholarly commentary on the proposed reform has been published in the major Italian academic journals yet, numerous civil society organisations have long been mobilising to highlight the critical weaknesses of the reform. With regard to the issue of reporting addressed here, see, for example, a document submitted to the Chamber by the organisation Rete Pace Disarmo, where the proposed overhaul of the content of the annual report ex Art. 5 is identified as one of the most concerning aspects of the reform: see Documento Riassuntivo delle Considerazioni e delle Proposte, 3 April 2024.

[15] A textual comparison between the current version of Article 5 and the newly proposed version is available in the dossier prepared by the Chamber of Deputies, “Modifiche alla legge 9 luglio 1990, n. 185, recante nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento”, 13 March 2024, pp. 18-20.

[16] The magazine investigated the cases of Italian arms companies Fiocchi and Beretta, claiming that Italy continues to export weapons and ammunition for “civilian” use to Israel, which are then resold in illegal settlements, in a context of weak oversight and increasing violence against Palestinians. The inquiry, published on 1 January 2025, is available here.