In 2024, the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained one of the main topics of debate in foreign policy matters in Italy. Among the aspects discussed by governmental representatives, the most significant ones are the extent of Italian support to Ukraine’s war effort, the final aim this support pursues (i.e., the conditions attached to a future peace arrangement), and military aid to Russia from other States.

Military Support Provided to Ukraine

As already recounted in previous volumes of this Yearbook,[1] Italy’s military support to Ukraine is primarily based on some legislative acts providing for the free cession of materiel to that country. The first such acts are Decree-Laws No. 14 of 25 February 2022[2] and No. 16 of 28 February 2022, which authorised the cession of unspecified military supplies – to be identified by decree jointly by the Ministers of Defence, of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and of Economy and Finance – until the end of the same year. Later, the authorisation has been extended multiple times, till the end of 2025.[3] As stated in both of the mentioned decree-laws, this mechanism derogates from Law No. 185 of 9 July 1990, which constitutes the general framework governing the import and export of military supply.[4] However, this derogation only applies to the direct provision of materiel by the Government, since Law No. 185 continues to apply to the private sector willing to sell weapons to Ukraine. In this respect, it is worth noting that, as affirmed by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, in replying to parliamentary question no. 3-01095 before the Chamber of Deputies (271st Meeting, XIX Legislature, 27 March 2024), “the supply of arms to Kyiv, which is exercising its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations [UN] Charter, is not prohibited by Law No. 185 of 1990”.[5]

The right of self-defence, both individual and collective,[6] is also mentioned by another legal instrument that frames the provision of military aid to Kyiv.[7] In February 2024, Italy concluded with Ukraine a security cooperation agreement[8] in order “to increase Ukraine’s resilience so that it is sufficient to deter and defend against future attacks and coercion”:[9]

To this end, the Participants will cooperate on ensuring a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future. Italy will support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty within its means and capabilities, in accordance with national legislative and constitutional requirements and will provide Ukraine with timely security assistance, modern military equipment (including military medical support) and weapons, across the land, air and sea, space and cyber domains, prioritizing, but not limited to, air defence, artillery, long-range firepower, armoured vehicles, demining, reconnaissance means, unmanned systems, engineer means, information technologies, electronic warfare, air force and maritime capabilities and other key capabilities as required by present and future circumstances.[10]

Even though, before Parliament, Minister Crosetto downplayed the importance of the agreement – which he described as less of a military than of a political nature, and also as non-binding[11] – Italy in fact pledged to continue the abovementioned support to Ukraine for the ten-year duration of the agreement.[12] More generally, support to Ukraine’s defence was promised by Italy “for as long as it takes”,[13] a formula that is widespread in Italy’s declarations of commitment (“per tutto il tempo necessario”).[14] Italian institutions evoked the idea of “need” in relation not just to the temporal aspect of their support, but also to the means to be adopted: thus, for instance, Resolution No. 6-00104, approved by the Senate of the Republic on 26 June 2024 (202nd Meeting), committed the Government “to continue to provide full support and solidarity to the Ukrainian people and institutions, through all necessary forms of assistance, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter”. However, Italy’s invocation of (collective) self-defence under Article 51 in providing “all necessary forms of assistance” must be read against the country’s declared willingness not to be considered a party to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.[15]

Already in the previous legislature, the Italian Government had expressed such a concern,[16] which was reiterated by the current Minister of Defence when, not long after taking office, he expressed before the Senate (17th Meeting, 13 December 2022) his cabinet’s intention “to help an invaded people in any way possible without entering directly into the conflict”. This caution has manifested in three respects. First, with regard to the nature of military aid, which must be defensive: as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, stated before the UN Security Council, “[o]ur support is focused on the defence of Ukrainian territories”, as “[w]e are not at war with Russia”.[17] Second, in relation to the target of the weapons provided by Italy: commenting on the proposal by the then High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell, to authorise the use of European weapons on Russian soil, Mr. Tajani rejected the idea of “bombing Moscow” because, again, “we are not at war with Russia”.[18] These very same words were uttered, once more, by Mr. Tajani also with respect to the third issue, that is, boots-on-the-ground involvement of Italy in Ukraine: in taking off the table the idea, put forth by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Emmanuel Macron, of sending troops to Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that “[w]e are not at war with Russia” and that no direct intervention of Italy’s tanks, planes or soldiers is envisaged.[19]

The first two aspects, in particular, seem to be strictly interrelated. Occasionally, the issue of the defensive nature of Italy’s contribution to Ukraine’s war effort has been phrased in terms of the type of weapons provided. Thus, in January 2023, Minister Crosetto defended Italy’s sixth “package” of military aid by remarking the inherent defensive character of the weapons – “unlike the previous five ‘packages’”.[20] This is the case, for instance, of the anti-missile and anti-aircraft system known as SAMP-T.[21] Most often, however, the Italian authorities have stressed the defensive purpose of the aid provided.[22] Speaking before the Chamber (384th Meeting, 20 November 2024) of the decision by the then United States (US) President, Mr. Joe Biden, to allow the use of US missiles to strike Russia, Minister Crosetto stated: “Italy’s position does not change and remains anchored to the cornerstone of international law. It is against this background that one must see the transfer of military materiel and equipment to Ukraine that has taken place to date and was meant to defend the population and infrastructure in Kyiv”.[23]

However, it can be doubted that the Italian Government believes that allowing strikes on Russian soil with weapons supplied by it would constitute an unlawful act under general international law.[24] Italy’s refusal to allow for such use is likely to stem mainly from its political intention not to provoke a military escalation by appearing to be “at war with Russia”. If legal considerations play a role, they are based, in the opinion of the Italian Government, on the bilateral arrangements between donor countries and Ukraine,[25] and on domestic law: other European States may decide otherwise, since “every State has its laws, its constitution”, but Italy cannot allow the use of its weapons outside Ukraine because this would be contrary to Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.[26] Therefore, the use of Italian-supplied weapons must be restricted, for the Italian Government, to Ukraine’s territory. This would include an offensive use of such armaments on the front line within Ukraine, as well as an offensive launched deep into Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.[27]

As for Italy’s stance on the possible involvement of Italian military personnel in Ukraine, both the Italian Government[28] and Parliament[29] dismissed the hypothesis multiple times. The country’s approach is so driven by prudence that this position appears to cover not just combat personnel, but also trainers. Italy provides training to Ukrainian troops in the framework of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, whose activities are all located on EU soil.[30] The Government addressed this concern in Parliament, when the Undersecretary of State for Justice, Mr. Andrea Delmastro delle Vedove, speaking before the Chamber (351st Meeting, 20 September 2024) of the cession of SAMP-T systems to Ukraine, said that the training of Ukrainian troops in the use and maintenance of such weapons would take place “entirely in Italy”. The same caution is manifest in Article 4 of the Italy-Ukraine Agreement on Security Cooperation, devoted to training and combined military exercises, which envisions activities also in Ukraine, but only “[a]s soon as the situation will permits” [sic].

Military Support Provided to Russia

In 2024, also Russia received some military aid. Italy, together with its allies, singled out four providers of such support: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Belarus and China.

With regard to the first three, on 22 January 2024 the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, Mr. Sergiy Kyslytsy, delivered a Joint Press Stakeout, also on behalf of other countries including Italy, which stated:

We condemn continued military support for Russia’s war of aggression, including by Iran, Belarus and the DPRK, and we continue to urge all countries not to provide weapons and military equipment, including missiles and drones or other support for Russia’s war of aggression. This includes Russia’s and the DPRK’s violations of the UN arms embargo on the [DPRK], adopted through successive Security Council resolutions. We urge the DPRK and Russia to abide by these Security Council resolutions, and remain concerned that the Russian Federation’s use of ballistic missiles from the DPRK provides the DPRK valuable insights into the technical capabilities of its weapons. Additionally, there is clear evidence of Iran’s unlawful transfers of armed Iranian UAVs [i.e., Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] to the Russian Federation when restrictions prohibiting such transfers under UN Security Council resolution 2231 were in place. The Russian Federation has used these UAVs repeatedly in striking critical infrastructure, including grain silos, energy facilities, and residential buildings in Ukraine.

The transfer of weaponry and other military means by the DPRK and Iran to Russia was condemned on several occasions by Ukraine’s allies, later that year. It is worth noting that, with respect to both supplying countries, these transfers have been considered unlawful only against relevant UN Security Council resolutions.[31] Neither the DPRK nor Iran (just like Belarus) are parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. It is noteworthy that, in the absence of clear customary rules concerning the unlawfulness of the cession of arms to a belligerent,[32] Iran’s export of ballistic missiles to Russia, which constitutes “a further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine”, has been deemed to be “unacceptable” rather than illegal by the G7 countries.[33] A possible interpretation of this stance would go as follows: if there is no evidence of the actual use of transferred weapons on the battlefield, complicity in the commission of a breach of international law (i.e., the aggression of Ukraine) under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility cannot be proved. This view is compatible with the fact that, when the DPRK sent troops to Russia, who could “potentially” be deployed in Ukraine for fighting, some of Ukraine’s allies stated, by using the conditional tense, that “[t]he DPRK’s direct support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine […] would be a further breach of international law, including the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter”.[34] Complicity can indeed be claimed in the case of Belarus, which provided material contribution to Russia’s war effort as it “continues to make its territory and infrastructure available to Russia”.[35] However, one might wonder why this would not be the case of Iran, if – as repeatedly affirmed by the G7[36] – its supply of ballistic missiles demonstrated the country’s support to the Russian unlawful conduct. Also, if Iran did not commit any breach of international law by providing such weapons to Russia, the legal basis for the sanctioning of Iran may be questioned.[37]

Something similar can be said about China. This country, too, increased its “support to Russia”, “which is decisively enabling [the latter] to maintain its illegal war in Ukraine and to reconstitute its armed forces and has significant broad-based security implications”.[38] Also in this case, no overt claim of illegality (e.g., due to complicity in the commission of a wrongful act) seems to have been made by Italy and its allies. Nonetheless, sanctions were adopted against Chinese firms.[39]

The Future Peace Arrangement

On multiple occasions, Italy and other allies of Ukraine “reaffirmed their unwavering support to Ukraine as it defends its freedom, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity”.[40] These principles would lie at the basis of any future peace arrangement between Ukraine and Russia. Indeed, according to Italian Ambassador Vincenzo Grassi, “[a] comprehensive, just and lasting peace cannot be achieved without the full respect of Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”, which would require Russia to “completely and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine”.[41]

The “comprehensive, just and lasting peace” formula[42] has been repeated innumerable times by the Italian Government.[43] It is most famously enshrined in the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework adopted in Bürgenstock on 16 June 2024 and endorsed by about 90 States, including Italy.[44] Such a peace must be “based on international law, including the United Nations Charter”. This is the meaning of the word “just” according to the President of the Italian Republic, Mr. Sergio Mattarella, who, addressing the UN General Assembly on 7 May 2024 (at the event “Italy, United Nations and Multilateralism. Tackling Common Challenges”), stated that “[i]t is not a matter of opting for just any settlement”, as “[i]n order for peace to be just, it must be underpinned by the high and inalienable principles of international law and the UN Charter”. As for its lasting character, one may assume that for peace to be durable, it must be ensured by effective guarantees.[45] For the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, in light of Russia’s breach of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – which protected Ukraine’s territorial integrity – the agreement concluded between Italy and Ukraine in February 2024 provides precisely for such guarantees.[46] However, one may wonder how this would be possible, if we accept the view, taken by the Italian Government, that the 2024 agreement does not provide for binding commitments.

The references to a peace arrangement based on international law and the UN Charter are ubiquitous. Ukraine’s territorial integrity must be upheld because international law so mandates. This is a consequence of the peremptory nature of the rules at stake: the prohibition of aggression, but also the right to self-determination of the Ukrainian people.[47] Also, for Italy, by abandoning the principles of sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity “we would negate the principle of equality among member states which is at the very core of the UN system”.[48] Against this background, one may wonder which room is left for negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. According to Minister Crosetto, who was speaking before the Senate (143rd Meeting, 10 January 2024), “we must soon attain a negotiated solution that is not disjoint from a just peace”.[49] For President Meloni, a “just peace” entails that Ukraine can sit at the negotiating table militarily and politically supported by its allies.[50] This principle is premised on the idea that “no initiative about Ukraine can be taken without Ukraine”,[51] and must result in the allied support setting the conditions for “a truly equal negotiation”.[52] It is not clear, though, how such negotiation can be reconciled with the maximalist approach espoused by Italy in 2024, based on the oft-cited principle of territorial integrity.

Paolo Turrini

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Paolo Turrini, “Italy’s Support to Ukraine’s War Effort: Neither Unconditional Military Aid, Nor Unconditional Peace”, IYIL XXXIV (2024), 2025, pp. …-…; available here.

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[1] The topic has been commented on in Alì, “The Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: Issues of Recognition, Sanctions and the Supply of Weapons”, IYIL, Vol. XXXI, 2021, p. 522 ff.; Pertile, “The Reaction to the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Debate on the Provision of Weapons to the State Victim of Aggression”, IYIL, Vol. XXXII, 2022, p. 522 ff.; and Alì, “The Authorization of Military Assistance to Ukraine and the Recognition of the Holodomor as Genocide”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIII, 2023, p. 544 ff.

[2] As converted into law by Law No. 28 of 5 April 2022.

[3] By means of Decree-Laws Nos. 185 of 2 December 2022, 200 of 21 December 2023, and 200 of 27 December 2024.

[4] On the ongoing reform of such mechanism, see the note by Tulli here (and also published on this site).

[5] Although not made explicit by Minister Crosetto, the legal basis seems to be Art. 1(6)(a) of Law 185/1990, which prohibits exports of materiel “to countries in a situation of armed conflict, in contrast to the principles of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”. On the same occasion, the Minister revealed that, in 2023, exports of weapons by Italian companies to Ukraine authorised by the Government under Law 185/1990 were worth US$417 million.

[6] Statements by Italian and European institutions are not always clear about the relationship between the provision of materiel to Ukraine and the right of self-defence. European Council conclusions suggest that Ukraine is the only entity acting in (individual) self-defence (after all, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/338 of 28 February 2022, enabling the use of the European Peace Facility to supply Ukrainian forces with military equipment, does not even mention Art. 51): see, e.g., the conclusions of 14-15 December 2023, stressing “the European Union’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and its inherent right of self-defence against the Russian aggression”, or the conclusions of 27 June 2024, whereby, “[a]s Ukraine exercises its inherent right to self-defence, the European Council calls for the delivery of military support to Ukraine to be stepped up”. Some of Italy’s statements seem to adopt the same perspective or are at least ambiguous on this issue. For instance, in the Joint Press Stakeout delivered on 22 February 2024 by the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, Mr. Sergiy Kyslytsya, also on behalf of the Italian Government, reference is made to “lawful arms transfers to Ukraine that are done in support of Ukraine’s inherent right of self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter”, but whether the lawfulness of such transfers would be grounded on the same provision (i.e. self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness) is not clarified. However, Italy has sometimes taken stances that appear to bring its provision of weapons to Ukraine within the purview of collective self-defence. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 7 May 2024, the President of the Italian Republic, Mr. Sergio Mattarella, declared: “[t]he defence of the independence of Ukraine, a founding country of the United Nations, involved Italy, as well as many other international partners, for the affirmation of international law and the principle stating that solidarity must be given to nations attacked by acts of arrogance that aim to replace law with military force. This is laid down under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for the right to self-defence”. In some cases, Italy even explicitly spoke of collective self-defence, such as, inter alia, in Resolutions nos. 6-00066 and 6-00092 approved by the Senate on 10 January and 19 March 2024, respectively. Additional references to Art. 51 and collective self-defence in relation to the Italian Government’s conduct are in Alì, “The Russian Aggression”, cit. supra note 66, pp. 527-528; Pertile, cit. supra note 66, pp. 529 and 531; and Alì, “The Autorization”, cit. supra note 66, pp. 546-547. For a general discussion on Art. 51 as a legal justification for arms transfers to a belligerent, in the broader framework of the law of neutrality, see Bartolini and Pertile, “Relic of the Past or Immortal Phoenix? The Legal Relevance of Neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian War”, IYIL, Vol. XXXII, 2022, p. 201 ff., and Zugliani, “The Supply of Weapons to a Victim of Aggression: The Law of Neutrality in Light of the Conflict in Ukraine”, EJIL, 2024, p. 389 ff.

[7] As for Decree-Laws Nos. 14 and 16 of 2022, they make no reference to Art. 51 of the UN Charter but rather to Arts. 3 and 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These can hardly be said to provide a normative basis for the defence of a State which is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, this is justified by the fact that Decree-Law No. 14 also provided for Italy’s participation in some NATO initiatives or operations.

[8] Agreement on Security Cooperation Between Italy and Ukraine, 24 February 2024.

[9] Ibid., Art. 1(3).

[10] Ibid., Art. 1(4).

[11] In his reply to parliamentary question no. 3-01020 before the Chamber (252nd Meeting, 28 February 2024). The same was stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Tajani, during a joint session (9th Meeting, 22 February 2024) of the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate: “[n]o obligations under international law or financial commitments arise from the text; there are no automatic guarantees of political or military support” (this is why the Italian Government excluded the need for a parliamentary authorisation to ratification). However, it must be noted that the agreement clearly appears to be a binding treaty, as it can be inferred from the language of its final provisions.

[12] Italy-Ukraine Agreement, cit. supra note 8, Art. 1(7).

[13] Ibid., Art. 1(1).

[14] See, e.g., Resolution No. 6-00088 approved by the Senate on 19 March 2024 (170th Meeting). Sometimes the Italian Parliament committed the Government to ensure the European Union’s support to Ukraine, such as in Resolutions No. 6-00099 approved by the Senate on 26 June 2024 (202nd Meeting) and No. 6-00091 approved by the Senate during the meeting of 19 March 2024. The latter resolution also specifies a parameter, in that support must be granted to Ukraine “for as long as it takes to safeguard its political freedom and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders”. Less specific is Resolution No. 6-00100, approved by the Senate on 26 June 2024, whereby “all support” must be lent “in order to restore stability and security to the region and the continent”.

[15] According to the international law of armed conflict, only a direct form of intervention would make a State a party to the conflict. “By contrast, the provision of weapons – of whatever type – or other supplies will usually not be part of a concrete military operation”, and “[t]he same can be said of general combat training” (Wentker, Party Status to Armed Conflict in International Law, Oxford, 2024, p. 181). In this perspective, not even the invocation of Art. 51 of the UN Charter as a basis for transferring materiel to a belligerent (see supra note 6) would render Italy a party to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

[16] For instance, on 16 March 2022, just a few weeks after the start of the Russian aggression, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luigi Di Maio, in addressing the Chamber (658th Meeting, XVIII Legislature), confirmed Italy’s adherence to NATO’s decision not to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as the measure “would constitute direct intervention by the Alliance in the conflict, with all the consequences that this would entail”.

[17] “Press Release MFA – UNGA79: Statement of Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Tajani at UN Security Council’s Briefing on Ukraine”, 24 September 2024.

[18] “Tajani: ‘Siamo con l’Ucraina, ma non in guerra con Mosca. Borrell parla a proprio nome’”, Corriere della Sera, 29 August 2024.

[19] “Tajani: ‘Nessuno nella Nato parla di intervento diretto in Ucraina, si rischierebbe la guerra nucleare’”, Corriere della Sera, 16 March 2024. The “no direct commitment” approach was stressed in interviews with other newspapers: see, e.g., “Tajani frena la Francia: ‘Niente fughe in avanti. Putin è molto aggressivo, ma non colpirà la Nato’”, Nazione-Carlino-Giorno, 17 March 2024.

[20] “Ucraina, Crosetto: ‘Nel nostro pacchetto di aiuti solo armi difensive’”, Open Online, 26 January 2023. Each of these “packages” is approved by means of the inter-ministerial decree mentioned at the beginning of this note. As of the end of 2024, ten such “packages” have been approved (the first five by the cabinet that preceded the current one). The list of armaments which is annexed to each decree is confidential, so it is impossible to know precisely which weapons are donated to Ukraine. But political assurances were given on other occasions. For instance, speaking of the eighth “package”, Minister Crosetto claimed that it included “equipment and weapon systems only aimed at strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces” (Chamber of Deputies, 223rd Meeting, 10 January 2024).

[21] Speaking of SAMP-T batteries, Minister Crosetto said that “[w]e are not talking about military use, but primarily in defence of the civilian population and the possibility for them to live” (“Il Ministro Crosetto a Ramstein per la riunione del Gruppo di contatto per la difesa dell’Ucraina”, 6 September 2024). The deceptive nature of this language is evident in accounts like the one made by the Rapporteur for the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber on a bill extending the Government’s authorisation to cede materiel to Ukraine, who defined the EU-funded military aid as follows: “[t]he agreed assistance measures finance the delivery of equipment and supplies such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel, as well as military equipment and platforms designed for the lethal use of force for defensive purposes” (Chamber of Deputies, 240th Meeting, 7 February 2024; emphasis added). In fact, Decision 338 (on which see supra note 6) makes funds under the European Peace Facility available “to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine” – which pertains to the purpose of weapons, not their in-built defensive character.

[22] On the second anniversary of the Russian invasion, Minister Crosetto released a note that described the eight “packages” approved up to that time as “containing the necessary equipment and weapon systems to defend themselves [i.e., Ukrainians] and their homes” (“Crosetto: Ucraina, determinazione per una pace giusta. Oggi il pensiero va a tutte le vittime di questo conflitto”, 24 February 2024). Despite the focus, here, is not on the aim (i.e., defence) that these weapons are designed to achieve, the rhetoric is still that of protecting lives and infrastructure rather than that of defending territorial integrity by reconquering occupied territory.

[23] Minister Crosetto had already clarified this concept before the same audience on 1 August 2024 (Chamber of Deputies, 338th Meeting) by stating that “Italy is acting […] by donating materiel that is for defence and not for attack – I want to reiterate this for the umpteenth time – certainly not on Russian soil”. The same was repeated over and over again in multiple public statements. However, in late August, it appears that an official note expressing the common position of the majority parties was amended to remove the prohibition on the use of Italian-supplied weapons outside Ukraine: “‘Appoggio a Kiev ma no a interventi fuori dai confini’. Il caso della frase diffusa dalla Lega ma cancellata nella nota congiunta”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 30 August 2024.

[24] This stance could be inferred from, on the one hand, the idea that the provision of weapons to Ukraine is grounded on collective self-defence (see supra note 6), and on the other hand, that attacking the territory of the occupying State would go beyond lawful self-defence – as it could be argued based on the reference to international law in Minister Crosetto’s statement of 20 November 2024. But this was never clearly stated by Italy, which has never explicitly rebutted the position taken by other European heads of government, as well as by the Secretary-General of NATO and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, according to whom attacking Russia on its territory would be compatible with the international rules on the use of force. See also the previous footnote, suggesting that the position of Italy might be less legal than political.

[25] According to Minister Crosetto, “Ukraine’s use of weapons, which were donated by countries that decided to give help, is governed by the relationship Ukraine has with each individual country”: “Guerra Ucraina – Russia, le news del 13 settembre. Biden vede Starmer: ‘Putin non prevarrà’. Zelensky apre su Mosca a summit di pace”, la Repubblica, 13 September 2024. The same was stated by Minister Tajani: “Von der Leyen porta a Kiev 35 miliardi di prestiti. Tajani dopo il voto Ue: ‘Al fianco dell’Ucraina, ma no ai lanci di missili in Russia’ – Il video”, Open Online, 20 September 2024.

[26] “Ucraina, Tajani: ‘Mai nostre armi colpiranno in Russia’. Crosetto: ‘La Costituzione lo vieta’”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 31 May 2024. This interpretation of Art. 11 – a provision affirming that “Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offence against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of settling international disputes” – has been criticised by constitutional law scholars: “La Costituzione c’entra poco con l’utilizzo delle armi italiane in territorio russo: è una decisione politica”, Huffington Post, 31 May 2024.

[27] With regard to the latter scenario, the Government’s emphasis on the defensive purpose of its military aid backfired when Members of the Chamber (301st Meeting, 29 May 2024) questioned the Minister of Defence on the announcement made by his British counterpart that Storm Shadow missiles supplied to Ukraine by some European States, including Italy, had been used to attack Crimea and other Ukrainian territories under Russian occupation (parliamentary question no. 3-01221). Asked to confirm this information and to explain how this could be compatible with the Government’s assurances that Italy’s weapons would be used for defence only, Minister Crosetto shielded himself behind the confidentiality of the subject (see supra note 20).

[28] In addition to Minister Tajani’ statement quoted above, see the speech by the President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, before the Senate (170th Meeting, 19 March 2024).

[29] See Resolution No. 6-00088, cit. supra note 14. Interestingly, when it comes to other countries’ direct intervention, the Italian Parliament has taken a more liberal position (which mirrors the one on other countries attacking Russia’s territory). On 19 March 2024 (170th Meeting) and 26 June 2024 (202nd Meeting), the Senate partially approved Resolutions Nos. 6-00090 and 6-00101, respectively; however, it refused to commit the Government “to make every effort to categorically rule out the sending of troops by EU countries to Ukrainian territory”, as this sentence was not approved.

[30] As made clear by its website: www.eeas.europa.eu/eumam-ukraine.

[31] In the case of the DPRK, these are Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2270 (2016). They have increasingly broadened the material scope of the prohibition on the import and export of weapons to and from the country, which now include all weapons. Despite this, most declarations by Ukraine’s allies concern transfers of ballistic weapons. An exception is the Joint Statement from Foreign Ministers Condemning DPRK-Russia Cooperation of 16 December 2024: “[t]he DPRK’s export of ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and other military materiel to Russia for use against Ukraine and Russia’s training of DPRK soldiers involving arms or related materiel represent flagrant violations” of the abovementioned resolutions.

[32] If the “benevolent neutrality” theory (see Bartolini and Pertile, cit. supra note 6, pp. 205-211) were considered applicable, then only the cession of weapons to the victim of an aggression (as opposed to the aggressor) would be lawful.

[33] It was also defined as “a direct threat to the Ukrainian people as well as European and international security more broadly” (G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement of 14 September 2024; Italy is a member of the G7). See also the Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union of 13 September 2024, and the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Statement of 26 November 2024.

[34] Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union on the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia of 5 November 2024. Of course, the deployment of DPRK’s troops on the battlefield would also make the country a co-party to the conflict together with the aggressor; this is not the case of Iran’s transfer of weapons to Russia, even if these were used in combat. This said, whether “direct support” would require boots on the ground, or the mere supply of arms would qualify as such (as implied in the Joint Press Stakeout on Russia’s Signature Event on Multilateral Cooperation Delivered by Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya of 16 July 2024) is unclear.

[35] See the Joint Press Stakeout mentioned in the previous footnote. The Italian Parliament openly declared Belarus to be complicit in Russia’s war in Resolutions Nos. 6-00099 and 6-00120 approved by the Senate (202nd Meeting) and the Chamber (314th Meeting), respectively, on 26 June 2024. The DPRK could be complicit too – and its responsibility goes beyond that for violating UN Security Council resolutions – since “the unlawful arms transfers from the DPRK to Russia […] have significantly contributed to Russia’s ability to conduct its war against Ukraine” (see the Joint Media Stakeout on DPRK of 28 June 2024).

[36] The idea of “support to Russia’s illegal war” is mentioned three times in the Statement of 14 September 2024, cit. supra note 33.

[37] Such measures are announced in all documents cit. supra note 33.

[38] See the Statement of 26 November 2024, cit. supra note 33.

[39] Threatened ibid. and later taken by means of the 15th “package” of EU sanctions on 16 December 2024.

[40] Statement by G7 Chair, Mr. Antonio Tajani, on Foreign Ministers’ Meeting at the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly of 23 September 2023. See also the G7 Leaders’ Statement in Support of Ukraine of 16 November 2024.

[41] Statement delivered on 19 March 2024 by Ambassador Vincenzo Grassi at the 55th session of the Human Rights Council (Interactive Dialogue with the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine). The phrasing implies the withdrawal by Russia of “its claims of annexation of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and respects Ukraine’s sovereign rights as an independent nation” (G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Ukraine of 30 September 2024). By reason of this illegal occupation, “Italy will never recognize the fabricated results of the illegitimate elections organized by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine: we call on all States to do the same, as our common obligation under international law” (Statement by Italy’s Deputy Permanent Representative at Security Council’s Briefing on “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” on 15 March 2024).

[42] It may be of interest to note that the adjectives used to qualify the peace have been the object of confrontation in the UN Security Council when, on 24 February 2025, it adopted its first resolution on the Russo-Ukrainian war. Resolution 2774 defines the peace as “lasting”, since the terms “just” and “comprehensive” were vetoed by Russia: see Kriener, “UNSC Resolution 2774: The Implications of Equidistance for Ukraine and International Law”, EJIL: Talk!, 3 March 2025.

[43] In addition to many of the Government’s statements quoted here, see the Prime Minister’s speeches before the Senate (254th Meeting) and the Chamber (399th Meeting) on 17 December 2024.

[44] Its language is drawn from UN General Assembly, Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/6, 23 February 2023.

[45] On 26 June 2024, the Senate (202nd Meeting) approved Resolutions Nos. 6-00102 and 6-00104 committing the Government to pursue a just peace, which also ensures Ukraine’s security. See also Resolution No. 6-00066, cit. supra note 6.

[46] Speeches by Ms. Meloni before the Senate (170th Meeting) and the Chamber (265th Meeting) on 19 March 2024. Italy and other countries support Ukraine so that it is “able to defend itself” and becomes “resilient to Russian threats” (Joint Declaration of Support for Recovery and Reconstruction of Ukraine of 25 September 2024). For Minister Crosetto, “no peace is just if an attacked people cannot defend itself” (Chamber of Deputies, 223rd Meeting, 10 January 2024).

[47] The latter is mentioned in Resolution No. 6-00067 approved by the Senate (143rd Meeting) on 10 January 2024.

[48] Statement by Ambassador Maurizio Massari at the UN Security Council meeting on “The Situation in the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine” held in June 2024. See also his statement at the Council’s meeting on the maintenance of peace and security in Ukraine held in November 2024.

[49] However, on 7 February 2024, before the Chamber (240th Meeting), the Undersecretary of State for Defence, Mr. Matteo Perego di Cremnago, spoke, in relative rather than absolute terms, of “a diplomatic solution that is as just as possible”. Similarly, Resolution No. 6-00067, cit. supra note 47, states that the peace must be “balanced”.

[50] Speech by Ms. Meloni before the Senate (231st Meeting), 15 October 2024.

[51] See the Statement of 26 November 2024, cit. supra note 33. See also Resolutions Nos. 6-00112 adopted by the Senate (231st Meeting) on 15 October 2024 and 6-00118 adopted by the Senate (255th Meeting) on 18 December 2024.

[52] Resolution No. 6-00064 adopted by the Senate (143rd Meeting) on 10 January 2024.