Throughout 2019, the issue of migration made the headlines in Italy, constantly monopolizing the political debate. Besides such mediatization, the topic was discussed by the Italian Government in two main respects: on the one hand, in relation to its domestic facet – security needs underlying the measures restricting the protection status of migrants and the rescue activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – and, on the other hand, as regards its external projections – the relationship between Italy and Libya and the relocation of migrants among the States of the European Union (EU).
The Adoption and Application of the Security Decrees
Between 2018 and 2019, Italy adopted two “Decreti Sicurezza” (“Security Decrees”) dealing with migration. The first one,[1] adopted in October 2018, abolished the possibility of granting the so-called protezione umanitaria (humanitarian protection)[2] to migrants who have reached Italy, and expelled the holders of such permits from the State-funded shelters where they had been hosted under a reception scheme known as SPRAR – Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati (Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees). The second, also known as Security Decree-bis[3] and entered into force in August 2019 – despite the concerns expressed by the President of the Republic,[4] Mr Sergio Mattarella – provided for a general ban on disembarkation of migrants on Italian coasts and high fines for NGOs acting in breach of such a prohibition.
As noted in a report issued by the Council of Europe in January 2019,[5] the adoption of the first Security Decree raised the problem of ensuring that vulnerable individuals who do not qualify for refugee status have access to some kind of secondary protection. On 25 January 2019, at the 114th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, the Undersecretary of State for the Interior, Mr Luigi Gaetti, stated the following:
In identifying some cases of special residence permit, the new rules have the primary aim of reorganizing the system of recognition of international protection, also with a view to avoiding a possible deceitful use of asylum requests. Indeed, according to the rules previously in place, the residence permit for humanitarian reasons could apply to a range of different situations, not always linked to the protection of inviolable personal rights, leaving a margin of discretion that favored excessively extensive interpretations. This is the reason why, in reforming humanitarian protection, the Decree regulates specific needs of complementary protection, classified as ad hoc cases, in order to ensure temporary protection to foreigners for humanitarian needs that, in light of the national and international legal framework, would not allow for their repatriation.
I thus wish to underline that humanitarian protection was not abolished: those who find themselves in a condition of particular humanitarian need are still protected.
A few months later, on 17 April 2019, in response to a parliamentary question on the situation of irregularity of migrants expelled from the reception centers held in the context of the 165th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister of the Interior, Mr Matteo Salvini, maintained that with the adoption of the Decree
the Government de facto accelerated the proceedings for the recognition of international protection, truly helping those fleeing from war and rejecting the request of those who are not fleeing any war, but were rather bringing war to Italy. In that respect, the reform of the SPRAR system cannot be interpreted as a limitation to the right of entering a reception system but as a rationalization in line with European standards.
When it comes to the Security Decree-bis, it is important to consider that its adoption in early August 2019 – only a few days before the conservative Government led by Mr Giuseppe Conte (“Conte 1”) was replaced by a new one (“Conte 2”), with the same President of the Council of the Ministers but backed by a progressive majority in the Parliament – came at the height of months of tension. In those months NGOs were frequently labelled as criminals and the Government’s main aim was that of preventing as many arrivals as possible, often by denying access to Italian ports to NGO ships that had rescued migrants off Libya’s coasts.[6]
Already on 19 March 2019, during the 99th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Senate of the Republic, Mr Conte had stressed that, although questionable as a matter of policy, the practice of disincentivizing disembarkations was not only implemented in full respect of the migrants’ fundamental rights and health needs, but was also an effective way to combat human trafficking and prevent people from putting their lives at risk. However, in May 2019, six Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council addressed a letter to Italy,[7] expressing concern over the draft decree. The letter also contained a request for clarification on the directives recently passed, which banned NGO vessels from accessing Italian ports, and made direct reference to an episode involving the seizure of the Mare Jonio ship by Italian authorities.[8] In particular, the experts expressed their deepest concern for the fact that the allegations brought against the Mare Jonio were not confirmed by any competent judicial authority. They also stated that Italian authorities had failed to properly consider several international norms, such as Article 98 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a provision on the duty to help any person in danger at sea that applies to all maritime zones, to all persons in distress and to all ships.
This notwithstanding, Italy’s course of action did not change and another NGO ship, the Sea Watch, was banned from entering Italian ports. After days at sea, on 29 June 2019 the shipmaster eventually decided to ignore the ban and disembarked the migrants in Italy, ending up being arrested and shortly afterwards released by the authorities.[9] The Minister of the Interior, Mr Salvini, repeatedly blamed the EU for not taking action vis-à-vis the fate of the migrants on the Sea Watch, also pointing to the Netherlands’ responsibility as flag State of the vessel.[10] Similar arguments were used on 27 June 2019 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr Enzo Moavero Milanesi, in the context of a joint session (6th Meeting, XVIII Legislature) of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) and the Commission on Policies of the European Union (XIV) of the Chamber of Deputies, and the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Emigration (3rd) and the Commission on Policies of the European Union (14th) of the Senate of the Republic. Making no reference to the obligation of the ship to bring people on board to a safe place, nor to States’ duty to cooperate with a view to finding such place of safety for disembarkation pursuant to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), the Minister framed the issue in terms of the relationship between Italy and the flag State,[11] presenting it as the only possible avenue for collaboration:
With respect to the measures adopted by the Italian Government, the law is being applied. […] The Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Infrastructures and Transports signed the directive providing for a prohibition to access territorial waters. The ship decided to enter; the law shall be of course applied by the competent authorities. […] Yesterday we instructed our Ambassador in the Hague to talk to the Dutch Government with a view to understanding to what extent they deemed to have a role to play vis-à-vis a ship flying the Dutch flag. […] We need to keep talking with the Dutch Government, because the circumstances make it necessary to collaborate. Such collaboration shall inevitably be framed within a bilateral – potentially trilateral, given that the crew and master of the ship are German – relationship, since there is no European solution.
In highlighting the fact that the persons in urgent need of humanitarian assistance had been disembarked, Mr Moavero Milanesi added:
We are facing a situation of deficiency – of both rules and action – and therefore tension inevitably rises. This tension needs to be resolved at the bilateral, in this case trilateral, level, if the conditions arise; otherwise, the Italian Government will have to apply the Italian law.
In the same context, when asked to comment upon the Minister of the Interior’s threat to stop the identification of the migrants as a reaction against the EU’s lack of action,[12] he replied:
I think that the rules on the matter leave a margin of appreciation. The key point, however, is the non-negotiable need to apply the law as a whole, instead of asking for the application of some rules as opposed to their ensemble. Hence, if the European and international legal frameworks have to be applied, as it is a duty to apply the law in a country that respects the rule of law, it is however also important that the other States and the European Union apply their share of rules – which, on the contrary, are too often left unapplied or negligently omitted.
The second Security Decree entered into force a few weeks after the Sea Watch episode, granting the Minister of the Interior the power to prevent ships from entering, navigating and stopping into Italian territorial waters in case of prejudicial passage of a foreign ship in breach of the laws on immigration in force in the country, pursuant to Article 19(2)(g) UNCLOS,[13] as well as for reasons of public order and safety.
The Memorandum Between Italy and Libya
A further topic of discussion was the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Italy and Libya in 2017,[14] providing for the allocation of financial resources to Libya for the management of detention centers and the training of the Libyan Coast Guard by Italian authorities. Although the Memorandum came under heavy criticism, especially for its implicit designation of Libya as a safe country,[15] the Government always underlined its full compliance with international standards. On 13 March 2019, at the 141st Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, stressing the importance of Libya as a strategic partner, Mr Salvini submitted the following:
Italy, in full respect of Libyan sovereignty and of the international conventions to which it is a party, has provided and will provide its support to the efforts undertaken by the Libyan authorities recognized by international bodies, also within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration and human trafficking. Our country is committed to ensure full respect of human rights by the Libyan authorities and the improvement of humanitarian conditions of migrants and refugees in Libya.
Mentioning the involvement of international organizations in the management of the detention centers, he added:
We are doing and we will do all that is possible and impossible to ensure that all human rights are respected in the camps that are instituted, recognized and managed in partnership with international organizations such as the [UN High Commissioner for Refugees]; instead, illegal camps are a whole different thing. Clearly, if we succeed in crushing illegal human trafficking […] the documented violence will also cease.
The Minister’s words prompted some remarks on the lack of legitimacy of the Libyan partners as effective representatives of Libya. In particular, the opposition submitted that the “Libyan Government” is in fact a para-State entity lacking effective control and the “Libyan Coast Guard” an armed militia in charge of human trafficking, and accused the Government of providing them with uniforms and means to capture migrants.
The new Government in charge since August 2019 generally avoided to take a firm position on the Memorandum, stressing its compliance with international law and the Libyan requests while, at the same time and on different occasions, conceding that the Memorandum could be improved from a human rights perspective. For instance, after having underlined the key role it played in reducing arrivals and deaths at sea, at the 249th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, on 30 October 2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Luigi Di Maio, acknowledged that the Memorandum could be improved both in relation to the detention conditions in the centers and as regards the assistance provided to migrants at sea, particularly in light of the fact that Libya is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. On 6 November 2019, addressing the Chamber of Deputies (253rd Meeting, XVIII Legislature), the Minister of the Interior, Ms Luciana Lamorgese, also highlighted the necessity to consolidate the positive results that the Memorandum had produced in the fight against human trafficking and in the reduction of the migration influx towards Italian coasts, as well as in terms of access to the camps granted to international organizations. At the same time, stressing the importance of involving rather than isolating the Libyan authorities, Ms Lamorgese, too, stated that it was possible to aim for better results:
I am convinced that the Memorandum could be developed through further interventions, first of all by strengthening the initiatives aimed at the protection of human rights, the respect for the dignity of all persons, the support to situations of particular vulnerability, and by increasing the level of responsibility of the competent Libyan authorities.
It is clear that the Government’s reiterated conviction that the Memorandum complies with human rights standards somehow clashed with the admission that there was room for improving the instrument – an admission that is partly explained by the fact that some members of the new parliamentary majority of the “Conte 2” Government confirmed the criticisms they had already leveled against the Memorandum when they were part of the opposition to the “Conte 1” Government. Accusations of complicity in the commission of genocide and crimes against humanity in relation to the management of the migration flows in partnership with Libya were made at the 227th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, on 25 September 2019, in light of the opening of an investigation against European countries before the International Criminal Court.[16]
Also, part of the new majority kept criticizing the choice of identifying the internationally recognized Libyan Government as the negotiating partner, underlining how – despite the transition from a phase in which Libyan authorities did not exercise any surveillance along the coast to a phase in which the Libyan Coast Guard did patrol the country’s SAR zone – Libya amounted to a technically failed State, and the composition of the Libyan Coast Guard remained deeply problematic.[17] In particular, the inclusion of one of the members of the Libyan Coast Guard (who even participated in an official meeting with Italian authorities)[18] in a UN sanctions list for his human smuggling activities[19] was indicated as proof of the fact that the Libyan Coast Guard was a de facto human trafficking organization.
Due to these criticisms, reinforced by the explicit suggestions issued by the Council of Europe and the UN Secretary General,[20] in February 2020 the Government announced having sent its Libyan counterpart a request for some modifications to the Memorandum, whose validity had been extended a few days before by means of automatic renewal.[21]
The Role of the European Union
When it comes to the Italian position vis-à-vis the EU, the Government stressed on several occasions throughout 2019 the need for further cooperation and solidarity at the European level, reiterating that Italy cannot be left alone in the fight against human trafficking. Depicting migration as a burden to share, the Government repeated several times and in different fora that the only possible solution ought to be a multilateral one.[22]
This position emerged clearly in the discussions on the renewal of Operation EUNAVFOR MED (also known as Operation Sophia), an EU operation led by Italy that, although having as a primary task that of fighting human trafficking, also played a role in rescuing migrants. In March 2019 the EU extended the mandate of the mission for six months, but it also decided to freeze the deployment of naval assets. This was due to the claim that the presence of EUNAVFOR MED’s ships in the Mediterranean Sea had acted as a “pull-factor”, coupled with the fact that Italy had been indicated as the primary port of disembarkation and on many occasions the Government had made clear that the country could not be the only one to open its ports in the Mediterranean.[23] As a consequence, already in 2018 Italy had made compliance with the operation’s mandate conditional upon a different burden-sharing in the relocation of migrants.[24] In the alternative – as explained on 29 March 2019 by the Undersecretary of State for Defense, Mr Angelo Tofalo, at the 152nd Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies – Italy proposed to modify the mission’s mandate and re-focus it on the enforcement of the arms embargo and the fight against illicit oil-trade.[25]
The issue of the EU involvement in the management of migration came to the fore also when, in May 2019, Mr Moavero Milanesi sent a letter to the EU Commission asking to consider the possibility of triggering Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) in light of renewed conflict in Libya. Paragraph 3 of the Article provides that, in the event one or more Member States is confronted with an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. On 3 May 2019, at the 5th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister referred to the possibility of taking specific measures:
These are precise measures provided for by the Treaty, therefore with binding character, as further confirmed by the Court of Justice […]. I have thus asked the Commission to acknowledge the fact that we think it should stand ready to make proposals. Indeed, the Treaty envisages, in this case as well, a proposal by the Commission.
He then added that the triggering of Article 78 came to the fore in the face of a non-activation of Article 79 of the TFEU, which gives the Commission the task of developing a common immigration policy. While reiterating that Italy was in favor of a reform of the Dublin Regulation,[26] and acknowledging that Member States never reached the agreement needed to use the common tools provided by the TFEU, the Minister stated that the triggering of Article 78 had to be seen as independent from the negotiations on a reform of the Dublin system. In this regard, Mr Moavero Milanesi maintained that the stalemate on the so-called Dublin reform did not take away the Commission’s mandate under Article 78, submitting that in his view the EU body had failed to advance all the proposals that should have been put forward. As a consequence, he made an implicit reference to the possibility of promoting an action under Article 265 of the TFEU for the Commission’s failure to act:
Of course it is a discretionary power, but as all discretionary powers it also needs to be read against the rule and can be the object of a failure to act in case these emergency flows occurred. […] Should the conditions arise for the application of this different rule, which is provided for in the Treaty, we believe that the Commission ought to do it [i.e., apply Article 78].
The “Conte 2” Government equally addressed the role of the EU on different occasions. Under the premise that “a functional control of the external borders is an absolute prerequisite to guarantee the security and the correct functioning of the Union’s policies”, the Minister for European Affairs, Mr Vincenzo Amendola, stressed at the 227 the Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, on 25 September 2019, the necessity to make concrete steps towards the reform of the Dublin Regulation, portraying the agreement on a temporary arrangement for disembarkations reached by some European countries in Malta in September 2019[27] as a first step in that direction. Later on, on 18 December 2019, at a joint session (8th Meeting, XVIII Legislature) of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) and the Commission on Policies of the European Union (XIV) of the Chamber of Deputies, and the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Emigration (3rd) and the Commission on Policies of the European Union (14th) of the Senate of the Republic, the Minister for European Affairs stressed the need for a permanent, structural solution at the EU level – as opposed to a positive but temporary solution such as the Malta agreement.
Potential Solutions: Humanitarian Corridors and Repatriations
Humanitarian corridors and repatriations – be they voluntary or resulting from orders of expulsion – have been put forward by the “Conte 1” Government as potential solutions to facilitate the arrival of those who have a right to find refuge in Italy, but at the same time proceeding with the expulsion of those who do not qualify for protection.
In particular, the conservative Government has been consistent in stressing how the recourse to humanitarian corridors, a long-standing Italian practice, can be seen as the solution with respect to refugees.[28] In his speech before the competent parliamentary commissions on 27 June 2019, Mr Moavero Milanesi was careful to stress the difference between refugees and economic migrants:
As to the former [refugees], it is in my opinion crucial to resort to humanitarian corridors […] so that they can travel in conditions of outmost security; when it comes to economic migrants, not only Italy or single countries, but the whole of Europe needs to ask itself about its capacity to absorb economic migration.
Humanitarian corridors, resettlement programs and humanitarian evacuations were also listed by the new Government that took over in August 2019 among the measures whose implementation showed the Italian commitment to the issue of migration. In particular, the objective of turning humanitarian corridors into a European practice was put forward on different occasions by representatives of the “Conte 2” Government.[29]
When it comes to repatriations, subject to the conclusion of ad hoc agreements with the countries of origin and to the latter’s qualification as safe countries, Italy adopted in October 2019 an Inter-ministerial Decree providing for a list of “safe countries”,[30] allowing for accelerated procedures for the examination of requests submitted by nationals of those States. Commenting on the Decree on 13 November 2019, at a joint session (7th Meeting, XVIII Legislature) of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) of the Chamber of Deputies and the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Emigration (3rd) of the Senate of the Republic, Mr Di Maio stressed that: “it is clear and evident that if in one of those countries, or in general in countries that are considered safe, cases of human rights violations occur, those who come to Italy and ask for asylum are protected by our Constitution”.
Conclusions
In light of the above, it is interesting to note that, despite the change of government in August 2019, the Italian practice on migration seems to have undergone few concrete changes.
This is particularly true with respect to the country’s call for a more concerted effort in the sharing of the burden of migration flows. Beyond a change in the language used, a more institutionalized approach to the matter and a generally more conciliatory position towards finding a shared solution at the European level, the Government’s stance vis-à-vis the EU shows a certain amount of continuity. For instance, a revision of the Dublin Regulation has been repeatedly called for by Italy over the years – although, in practice, the country failed to take the issue at the negotiating table at the EU level. [31]
Similarities are also present when it comes to the perceived need to prevent further departures and discourage arrivals. A fil rouge emerges in the two successive Governments’ framing of humanitarian corridors and repatriations as best practice instruments in the management of migration flows, based on the distinction between refugees, whose legal claim to arrive in Italy should be facilitated, and so-called economic migrants, whose presence in the country should on the contrary be curtailed.
The “Conte 2” Government also confirmed the importance of a cooperation instrument such as the Memorandum between Italy and Libya, firmly premised on the choice as partner of the internationally recognized al-Sarraj Government. At the same time, however, the new Government was open to the possibility of improving the Memorandum, in particular when it comes to the conditions of detention in the Libyan camps. In addition, the progressive Government adopted a collaborative stance vis-à-vis NGOs, reverting one of the most visible aspects of the previous Government’s approach.[32] In particular, it partially reviewed the practice of denying access to Italian ports to NGO ships asking for a place of disembarkation of rescued migrants: since Autumn 2019 the time needed to get permission to entry into an Italian port has halved.[33] More importantly, the Minister of the Interior declared that the Security Decrees – still in force as of June 2020 – will be subject to structural changes, including those needed to adjust them to the remarks by the President of the Republic.[34]
Bianca Maganza
A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Maganza, “The Italian Policy on Migration as Expressed by the Government(s) in 2019”, IYIL XXIX (2019), 2020, pp. 483-495; available here.
[1] See Decree-Law No. 113 of 4 October 2018, subsequently converted into Law No. 132 of 1 December 2018.
[2] Humanitarian protection was a residual form of international protection that, under Italian law, could be granted for humanitarian reasons by local authorities to migrants who did not qualify for either refugee status or subsidiary protection. As clarified in the subsequent quotation, humanitarian protection was replaced in 2018 by a narrower form of protection – the so-called special protection – that only applies in specific circumstances, and can thus be granted to a smaller number of applicants. See further Antoniazzi, “Migration Policy and Management”, IYIL, 2019, pp. 527-528.
[3] See Decree-Law No. 53 of 14 June 2019, subsequently converted into Law No. 77 of 8 August 2019.
[4] See the remarks expressed by President Mattarella, 8 August 2019, available here.
[5] Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by Italy, 25 January 2019.
[6] See “Standoffs at sea highlight the shameful criminalization of rescuing migrant”, The Conversation, 18 July 2019.
[7] See UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Italy: UN experts condemn bill to fine migrant rescuers”, 20 May 2019.
[8] See “Italian authorities order seizure of migrant rescue ship”, The Guardian, 20 March 2019.
[9] In February 2020, the Italian Court of Cassation found that the master of the Sea Watch did not violate any rule, because her duty to bring people in distress to a place of safety only ended at the moment of disembarkation, and not at the moment of their rescue: see Corte di Cassazione (III Sezione Penale), Criminal proceedings against Carola Rackete, No. 6626/2020.
[10] See “Italy holds Netherlands, EU ‘responsible’ for migrant boat”, EURACTIV, 24 June 2019. Interestingly, while denying its duty to take care of the migrants on the Sea Watch, the Netherlands admitted being responsible for the ship’s conduct as her flag State: see “Netherlands says not obliged to take Sea Watch migrants”, ANSAmed, 27 June 2019.
[11] In other circumstances the Italian Government had been more “generous” in establishing criteria of involvement: see Turrini, “Between a ‘Go Back!’ and a Hard (to Find) Place (of Safety): On the Rules and Standards of Disembarkation of People Rescued at Sea”, IYIL, 2018, p. 29 ff. On the “State-centered” interpretation of the SAR Convention by the Italian Government in the case at hand, see De Sena and Starita, “Navigare tra istanze ‘stato-centriche’ e ‘cosmopolitiche’: il caso ‘Sea-Watch’ in una prospettiva conflittuale”, SIDIBlog, 14 July 2019.
[12] See “Sea Watch a Lampedusa, Salvini: ‘Se lasciano l’Italia sbarcano in 5 minuti’”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 26 June 2019.
[13] For a comment on the compliance of the Security Decree-bis with UNCLOS, see Papanicolopulu, “Tutela della sicurezza o violazione del diritto del mare?”, SIDIBlog, 26 June 2019.
[14] See Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, 2 February 2017. A non-official English translation is available here. See further Gracis, “Italy’s Involvement in Post-Conflict Libya. The Libyan Coast Guard Training Mission”, IYIL, 2017, p. 486 ff., pp. 487-488.
[15] See 162nd Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, 12 April 2019.
[16] See “ICC submission calls for prosecution of EU over migrant deaths”, The Guardian, 3 June 2019. In addition to the case before the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights is also due to issue a decision on the cooperation of Italy with the Libyan Coast Guard, following a submission by the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) and the Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (ASGI) available here.
[17] See 253rd Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, 6 November 2019.
[18] See “Human trafficker was at meeting in Italy to discuss Libya migration”, The Guardian, 4 October 2019.
[19] See the UN Security Council’s listing of Abd Al Rahman Al-Milad, available here.
[20] Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, “Commissioner calls on the Italian government to suspend the co-operation activities in place with the Libyan Coast Guard that impact on the return of persons intercepted at sea to Libya”, 31 January 2020, and Report of the UN Secretary General, United Nations Support Mission in Libya, UN Doc. S/2020/41 (2020).
[21] See the note issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 February 2020, available here.
[22] See 3rd Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Emigration (3rd) and the Commission on Defense (4th) of the Senate of the Republic, and of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) and the Commission on Defense of the Chamber of Deputies (IV), 31 May 2019 (intervention of Mr Moavero Milanesi); 192nd Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, 19 June 2019; and 156th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Senate of the Republic, 16 October 2019.
[23] See, most recently, 196th Meeting (XVIII Legislature) of the Chamber of Deputies, 25 June 2019. See also Petrangeli, “EUNAVFOR MED Sophia: una missione prorogata ma depotenziata”, 2 April 2019.
[24] Indeed, Italy opted for a policy of disobedience: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Eunavformed Sophia: posizione italiana sulle disposizioni sui porti di sbarco del ‘piano operativo’”, 17 July 2018.
[25] Eventually, in February 2020, the Operation was assigned the different mandate of monitoring compliance with the arms embargo against Libya: see “Operation Sophia to be closed down and replaced”, Politico, 17 February 2020.
[26] See Regulation No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, 26 June 2013.
[27] See “4 EU countries agree on migration relocation system”, Politico, 23 September 2019.
[28] See 5th Meeting of the Commission on Foreign and European Affairs (III) of the Chamber of Deputies, 3 May 2019; and the 3rd Meeting of the competent parliamentary commissions mentioned supra note 22.
[29] See 251st Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (XVIII Legislature), 4 November 2019, and Statement by Ms Emanuela Del Re, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, at the Global Refugee Forum, 17 December 2019, available here.
[30] See Legislative Decree No. 25 of 4 October 2019. The countries enlisted as safe are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Morocco, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tunisia and Ukraine.
[31] See “Salvini accusa l’Europa ma boicotta le riforme per evitare altri casi ‘Sea Watch’”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 30 June 2019.
[32] See “Italian Interior Minister Lamorgese meets with migrant NGOs, calls it ‘first step’”, ANSA, 29 October 2019.
[33] See Villa, “Migrazioni nel Mediterraneo: tutti i numeri”, ISPI Online, 22 Febbraio 2020.
[34] See “Piano Lamorgese, verso modifiche separate per immigrazione e sicurezza”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 17 February 2020. On President Mattarella’s remarks, see supra note 4.
Italy's Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice on International Law 