Throughout 2024, the Italian Government and Parliament remained actively engaged with the ongoing hostilities between Hamas and Israel and with their destabilising effect on the broader Middle East. Attention was also directed towards the intensification of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip, which have resulted in a severe humanitarian crisis.[1] More specifically, Italy’s position can be summarised as follows: 1) condemnation of the attacks perpetrated by both State and non-State actors against Israel; 2) recognition of Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law but, at the same time, a strong emphasis on the need to guarantee humanitarian access to Gaza and a condemnation of settler violence in the West Bank; 3) endorsement of a two-State solution negotiated between the parties as the sole viable solution to the conflict.

Condemnation of Attacks by State and Non-State Actors Against Israel

Italy has repeatedly maintained that Hamas and Hezbollah, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other, should not be equated, because the former have been designated as terrorist organisations, whereas the latter is a democratic State.[2] On 27 November 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, stated before the Chamber of Deputies (388th Meeting, XIX Legislature) that “Hamas and Israel cannot be considered equal: it is not correct from a legal point of view, and even less so from a moral and political point of view”. On 17 October 2024, the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, stated before the Senate of the Republic (233rd Meeting) that “[i]t must be remembered that, like Hamas, Hezbollah is not a State or a people, but a terrorist organisation”.

In 2024, Italy characterised the attacks carried out by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel as a form of aggression.[3] As had emerged already in the practice of Italy in 2023, it seems that the Italian Government uses the term “aggression” in a non-legal sense, since under international law the concept of aggression typically applies to acts committed by States.[4] From a different perspective, Italy condemned Hamas’s use of civilians as human shields, which is explicitly prohibited under international humanitarian law[5] and constitutes a war crime.[6] As for the taking of hostages by Hamas, on 17 May 2024, Italy’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) in New York, Mr. Maurizio Massari, clarified before the UN Security Council that:

the taking of hostages is prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and [their] Additional Protocols, in both international and non-international armed conflicts. In this respect, Italy wishes to recall that the taking of hostages may qualify as a war crime as codified in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. Widespread or systematic enforced disappearance of persons can also rise to the level of crimes against humanity.[7]

Italy has consistently maintained that the hoped-for prospect of a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel must be conditional on the release of all hostages by Hamas. For example, during a joint session (5th Meeting, 15 April 2024) of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate of the Republic and of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber, Mr. Tajani said that “support for an immediate ceasefire […] goes hand in hand for us with another priority objective: the unconditional release of all Israeli hostages still in the hands of Hamas”.

Besides condemning attacks against Israel perpetrated by non-State actors, the Italian Government also condemned the attacks launched by Iran against Israel following the latter’s strike on the Iranian Embassy in Damascus on 1 April 2024. While reiterating the European Union’s stance,[8] which condemned Israel’s raid and reaffirmed the inviolability of diplomatic premises under international law, Italy maintained that Iran’s response cannot be justified as a legitimate exercise of Iran’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.[9] Rather, Italy regarded Iran’s actions as an act of aggression against the State of Israel.[10] Although not providing a detailed legal justification for this position, in a statement delivered on 15 April 2024 during the abovementioned joint session of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs and on Defence of the Chamber, Minister Crosetto appeared to imply that this characterisation was grounded in the scale, methods and timing of the offensive.[11]

Israel’s Right to Self-Defence, Its Obligations Related to Humanitarian Access and Condemnation of Settlers’ Violence in the West-Bank

In 2024, Italy reaffirmed its strong support for Israel’s right to self-defence against attacks by both State and non-State actors, while underscoring that such a right must be exercised in full compliance with international law.[12] In this regard, Italy condemned violations of international law committed by Israel and called on Israel to abide by its obligations, most notably under international humanitarian law. Specifically, Italy condemned Israel’s attacks on the bases of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) arguing that “any attack on the soldiers of the mission must be considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law and Resolution 1701”.[13] On 26 November 2024, Italy agreed that “[d]isplaced persons on both sides of the Blue Line must be allowed to return their homes in safety and security”.[14] With regard to Israel’s military operations in Gaza, on 19 March 2024, the Italian President of the Council of the Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, stated before the Senate (170th Meeting) and the Chamber (265th Meeting):

Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence must be exercised proportionately and in accordance with international humanitarian law. We cannot remain insensitive to the enormous toll of innocent civilian victims in Gaza, victims twice over: first of the cynicism of Hamas, who use them as human shields, and then of Israeli military operations.

On 9 January 2024, before the General Assembly (52nd plenary meeting, 78th session), Mr. Massari clarified that “[p]rotection of civilians and unhindered humanitarian access must be ensured by all parties at all times in all conflicts”.[15] Moreover, he underlined that “[r]apid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian access is an obligation under international law for the parties and is needed to deliver life-saving aid to avoid a further worsening of an already catastrophic situation”.[16] Nonetheless, after the attack by Hamas on 7 October 2023, Italy decided to suspend funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which was accused by Israel of providing operational support to Hamas. On 20 April 2024, the Independent Review Group of Mechanisms and Procedures to Ensure Adherence by UNWRA to the Humanitarian Principle of Neutrality, commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, released a report which concluded that the UN agency had established and updated procedures to comply with humanitarian principles required under international humanitarian law.[17] In light of the results of the investigation, Italy decided to resume the funding, earmarked for specific projects. On 18 June 2024, during a joint session (10th Meeting) of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber, Mr. Tajani stated that “[t]he independent commission […] confirmed that UNRWA had adopted measures to protect the principle of neutrality that all United Nations agencies are required to respect”. Given the conclusion reached by the commission, the Italian Government expressed concerns about the legislation adopted in October 2024 by the Knesset which revoked the immunities and privileges held by UNRWA and its workers.[18]

In 2024, Italy also supported[19] the unprecedented decision[20] of the European Council to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Nevertheless, Italy abstained from voting on the General Assembly’s draft resolution A/ES-10/L.31/Rev.1, which called for action in response to the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 19 July 2024 on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).[21] The draft resolution called upon all States to, inter alia, “implement sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against natural and legal persons engaged in the maintenance of Israel’s unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in relation to settler violence”.[22] Mr. Massari justified Italy’s abstention before the General Assembly by arguing that “the resolution still goes beyond, in some respects, the determinations of the Court, such as, for example, the imposition of sanctions and the indication of deadlines for the withdrawal of Israel’s presence in the OPTs”.[23] It is worth noting that, while Italy has taken a clear stance in favour of sanctions targeting private individuals (violent settlers), it seems to be way more cautious when it comes to endorsing measures against State officials directly responsible for implementing unlawful policies in the West Bank.[24]

Prospects for Peace: Support for a Two-State Solution Negotiated Between the Parties

In 2024, Italy expressed its position regarding the prospective scenarios that might unfold in the medium to long-term following the cessation of hostilities. Italy reaffirmed its consistent support for the two-State solution, which it continues to regard as the only viable path to a lasting peace.[25] However, Italy abstained from voting[26] on the General Assembly resolution that determined that the State of Palestine is qualified for membership in the UN in accordance with Article 4 of the UN Charter.[27] Explaining this position, Mr. Massari argued that the two-State solution “must be achieved through direct negotiations between the parties”.^[28] On 6 August 2024, Mr. Tajani maintained, during a joint session (12th Meeting) of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber, that “there are not […] in this moment the conditions for a Palestinian State to exist”.[29] On 18 June 2024, the Italian Government elaborated further on its stance before the same Committees (10th Meeting). On that occasion, Mr. Tajani released the following statement:

We are in favour of recognising the Palestinian State; however, for there to be a State there must be an authority and there must be national unity, because it seems to me that in the Gaza Strip, Hamas does not recognise the Palestinian National Authority. If Hamas negotiates with Israel and does not let the Palestinian National Authority do the same, I’d like to know which is the Palestinian State: Hamas’s or the Palestinian National Authority’s? So, for recognition to be possible, there must be territorial integrity, otherwise it becomes a theoretical recognition, which only serves to worsen an already very complicated situation. So, territorial integrity must come first.

A combined reading of these statements suggests that, from Italy’s perspective, two of the three requirements necessary for the establishment of a Palestinian State are missing: territorial integrity and an effective government. As for the former, on 2 October 2024, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber (6th Meeting), Mr. Tajani stated that “[t]he future Palestinian State must unite the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under a single national and democratic government”. Notably, however, Mr. Tajani made no reference to East Jerusalem, which arguably ought to be considered part of the territory of the Palestinian State.[30] As for the second element (effective government), on 6 August 2024, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber (12th Meeting), Mr. Tajani emphasised that, “[f]or Italy, Hamas has no place in the future government of Gaza. The only way forward is the return to the Strip of a reformed Palestinian National Authority, with adequate international support”.[31]

Italy also expressed support for a transitional phase of Palestinian reunification, characterised by the presence of a UN international mission under Arab leadership, modelled on the UNIFIL operation in Lebanon.[32] In this regard, on 2 October 2024, Mr. Tajani released the following statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber (6th Meeting): “[w]e support the establishment of a Palestinian State, with the presence, during a transitional phase of reunification, of a United Nations mission under Arab leadership, and we have expressed our willingness to deploy our own troops”.

In conclusion, Italy’s parliamentary and diplomatic practice in 2024 concerning the Israeli-Palestinian question[33] largely reflected its traditional foreign policy positions, while also incorporating some developments. Italy reaffirmed its condemnation of attacks against Israel by both State and non-State actors, reiterating Israel’s right to self-defence in accordance with international law. More specifically, Italy emphasised that Israel’s response must comply with the applicable rules of international humanitarian law and relevant UN resolutions. Moreover, Italy stressed that unhindered humanitarian access constitutes a legal obligation for all parties to the conflict under international law. Notably, Italy’s condemnation of violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers in the West Bank was accompanied by explicit support for sanctions targeting specific private individuals. Nevertheless, Italy remained considerably more cautious in endorsing measures directed at State officials responsible for advancing unlawful policies in the OPT. Furthermore, while Italy reaffirmed its commitment to a two-State solution, it clarified that, under current conditions, the legal requirements for the effective existence of a Palestinian State are not yet in place and, therefore, recognition is not deemed feasible at this time.

Giulia Cagol

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Giulia Cagol, “Italy’s Stance on the Israeli-Palestinian Question and the Gaza War: Continuity and Change”, IYIL XXXIV (2024), 2025, pp. 448-455; available here.

---

[1] According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, as of 4 June 2025, the reported number of Palestinian fatalities in the Gaza Strip stands at 54,607. Among them, at least 15,613 are children, 3,839 are elderly, and 9,304 are women. See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip, 4 June 2025.

[2] On 2 October 2024, the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Crosetto, released the following statement during a joint session (6th Meeting) of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (3rd) of the Senate and of the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) and on Defence (IV) of the Chamber: “[w]e cannot make the mistake of putting terrorist organisations and democratic countries on the same level, even when democratic countries do things that we don’t agree with and that we condemn”.

[3] For example, on 19 March 2024, the President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, reiterated before the Senate (170th Meeting) Italy’s “firm condemnation of the brutal aggression perpetrated by Hamas on 7 October” (emphasis added).

[4] Alternatively, the use of this term may be interpreted as suggesting that Italy is willing to extend the concept of aggression to acts committed by non-State actors. See Cagol, “The Hamas Attack of 7 October and Israel’s Military Response”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 533 ff. (also published on this site).

[5] For international armed conflicts, see Art. 51(7) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. The prohibition against using human shields also applies to non-international armed conflicts, as it is a rule of customary humanitarian law. See Rule 97 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Database maintained by the International Committee of the Red Cross. See also Sassoli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 369.

[6] Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court classifies as a war crime the act of “[u]tilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations”.

[7] Statement by Italy’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations Security Council Arria Formula meeting “Condemning Hostage-Taking in Israel on October 7 as a Psychological Tool of Terrorism”, 17 May 2024.

[8] European Union External Action, “Iran: Statement by the Spokesperson on the attack in Damascus”, 3 April 2024.

[9] See the statements released by Mr. Crosetto and Mr. Tajani on 15 April 2024 during the abovementioned joint session of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs and on Defence of the Chamber.

[10] Joint Statement from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy on the Middle East, 12 August 2024. The leaders of these countries expressed their “support for the defense of Israel against Iranian aggression and against attacks by Iran-backed terrorist groups” (emphasis added).

[11] More specifically, Mr. Crosetto argued that “[b]eyond the justifications put forward by Tehran, which invoked the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, what occurred – given its methods, timing, and potential consequences – should prompt reflection on the role and responsibilities of Tehran, and its partners, in the ongoing crisis in the Middle East”.

[12] For example, on 17 October 2024, Mr. Crosetto released the following statement before the Senate (233rd Meeting): “Italy has clearly stated, and reiterated, that it recognises Israel’s right to exist and to defend itself from attacks from anyone, whether sovereign States or terrorist organisations. This is a statement and a position in which we believe and not a matter of protocol. At the same time, with the same force, we have asked and ask Israel to strictly abide by the rules of international law”.

[13] Minister Tajani’s mission to Israel and Palestine, 20 October 2024. On 2 October 2024, during the joint session mentioned supra note 2, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Crosetto, stated that “[b]oth Hezbollah and Israel have, over the years, consistently failed to comply with UN Resolution 1701, which authorises only the armed presence of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line”.

[14] G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Statement (Fiuggi-Anagni, 26 November 2024).

[15] Statement by Italy’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly’s 52nd plenary meeting, 78th session, 9 January 2024.

[16] Ibid. During the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Fiuggi-Anagni, the G7 Foreign Ministers, including the Italian one, issued the following statement: “[w]e urge the Israeli Government to abide by its international obligations, and fulfil its responsibility to facilitate full, rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian assistance in all its forms as well as the provision of sorely needed basic services to the civilian population in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem” (see supra note 14).

[17] Independent Review of Mechanisms and Procedures to Ensure Adherence by UNRWA to the Humanitarian Principle of Neutrality, Final Report, 20 April 2024. The four principles that are fundamental to humanitarian action are humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence (Sassoli, cit. supra note 5, p. 138). See also the two UN General Assembly resolutions titled “Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations”: Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 and Resolution 58/114 of 17 December 2003.

[18] On 17 October 2024, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Giorgio Silli, released the following statement before the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber: “[t]he Italian Government […] shares the concern about the bills under consideration by the Knesset aimed at revoking UNRWA’s privileges and immunities and prohibiting any contact between the Agency and Israeli officials”.

[19] While the votes before the European Council are not made public, Mr. Tajani, during the abovementioned joint session of 15 April 2024 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs and on Defence of the Chamber, stated: “[i]t is not true that we have been passive, and I also said this during my speech, in the face of some mistakes that have been made by the settlers, because there have been sanctions against the settlers, European sanctions, which we have supported even though we are friends of Israel”.

[20] European Council, “Extremist settlers in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem: Council sanctions four individuals and two entities over serious human rights abuses against Palestinians”, 19 April 2024. On 15 July 2024, the Council decided to extend those sanctions to five further individuals. See European Council, “Extremist Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as violent activists, blocking humanitarian aid to Gaza: five individuals and three entities sanctioned under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime”, 15 July 2024.

[21] Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024.

[22] UN General Assembly, “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences arising from Israel’s policies and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and from the illegality of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, UN Doc. A/ES-10/L.31/Rev.1, 13 September 2024, p. 7.

[23] Explanation of Vote by Italy on Resolution A/ES-10/L.31/REV.1.

[24] However, it should also be noted that, on 11 July 2024, the Foreign Ministers of the G7, of which Italy held the Presidency in 2024, criticised several decisions undertaken by Israel in relation to the West Bank as follows: “[w]e […] join the UN and the European Union in condemning the announcement by Finance Minister of Israel Smotrich that five outposts are to be legalised in the West Bank. We also reject the decision by the Government of Israel to declare over 1,270 hectares of land in the West Bank as ‘state lands’ – the largest such declaration of state land since the Oslo Accords – and the decision to expand existing settlements in the occupied West Bank by 5,295 new housing units and to establish three new settlements. The Government of Israel’s settlement program is inconsistent with international law, and counterproductive to the cause of peace. We reaffirm our commitment to a lasting and sustainable peace in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, on the basis of a two-state solution. We have therefore consistently expressed our opposition to the expansion of settlements and, as in previous cases, we urge the Government of Israel to reverse this decision” (G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the West Bank, 11 July 2024).

[25] On 26 June 2024, Ms. Meloni released the following statement before the Senate (202nd Meeting): “[i]t is in Europe’s interest to make every effort to find a peaceful solution in the Middle East, which can only be based on the principle of two peoples, two States. With Israel’s right to live in peace, without constant aggression, fully recognised by all regional actors, and the right of the Palestinian people to have their own State to grow and prosper”.

[26] UN General Assembly, 10th emergency special session, “Admission of new Members to the United Nations”, Meeting record, UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.49, 10 May 2024, p. 11.

[27] UN General Assembly, “Admission of new Members to the United Nations”, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-10/23, 14 May 2024.

[28] UN General Assembly, 10th emergency special session, cit. supra note 26, p. 17.

[29] Similarly, during the joint session of 15 April 2024, cit, inter alia, supra note 19, Mr. Tajani clarified that “there is the people and there is not the State”.

[30] See Pertile, “The Borders of the Occupied Palestinian Territory are Determined by Customary Law: A Comment on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Territorial Jurisdiction of the ICC in the Situation Concerning Palestine”, JICJ, 2020, p. 967 ff.

[31] On a different occasion, Mr. Tajani stated: “Italy is ready to make its contribution and to firmly support the Palestinian National Authority, focusing on the strengthening of its institutions; it is crucial that the Authority be able to develop solid and reliable institutional capacities, not only to provide essential services to the population, but also to assume future control of the Gaza Strip. Only a strong Palestinian government, legitimised by the international community and supported by democratic institutions, will be able to confront the challenges posed by extremist groups and reduce their influence. In short, Palestine is not Hamas” (statement released on 2 October 2024 before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign and European Community Affairs and on Defence of the Chamber (6th Meeting)).

[32] “Tajani: ‘Italia pronta a invio forza modello Unifil a Gaza’”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 16 January 2025.

[33] Italy has also expressed its position on the issue of arms transfers to Israel and on the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against senior Israeli officials. These aspects are discussed by Tulli (here and on this site) and Poltronieri Rossetti (here and on this site).