In 2024, Italy’s migration policy continued to be heralded by the Italian Government and parliamentary majority as a success and a model for other countries, while being vehemently criticised by opposition parties as well as civil society organisations active in the area of the protection of migrants. Even though Italy’s policy in this field has been wide-ranging in its acts and effects, the externalisation of migration management is arguably one of its guiding principles. Albeit not a legal notion, externalisation – by referring to a multitude of practices of controlling and managing migration beyond a State’s borders – raises compelling legal issues.[1] Therefore, it is not surprising that the Italian Government aimed to justify its outward-looking approach, affecting virtually all phases of the migration process, on a variety of legal grounds.

Starting with the departure of migrants, references to a supposed “right not to migrate” were again abundant in the Italian diplomatic and parliamentary practice of 2024. This has been a leitmotiv of the current Italian Government and one of the theoretical premises and legal backbones of Piano Mattei, namely Italy’s flagship plan for investment in and cooperation with Africa. Among other instances, the Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, referred to this right in her address before the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the Summit of the Future, on 23 September 2024. In connection with Piano Mattei and its approach (“neither paternalistic nor charitable or predatory”), Ms. Meloni stated that “[Piano Mattei] is our recipe to promote the development of a continent too often undervalued, build its stability, and finally guarantee one right that until now has been denied to too many young people – the right not to have to emigrate”.

In her address at the 79th UNGA general debate on the following day, Ms. Meloni restated the “right [of people] not to have to emigrate, not to have to sever their roots simply because they have no other choice”. Notwithstanding multiple references on other occasions, including by other Government representatives,[2] in no instance was the legal basis of such right explicitly identified. Therefore, it remains unclear whether this right is derived from any existing treaty provision or whether the Italian Government is intending to contribute to the development of a new customary norm.[3]

The emphasis put on the role of partnerships with African countries, especially those overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, is also at the heart of Italy’s efforts in shaping the migration policy of the EU. In the context of her communications to Parliament (Senate of the Republic, 170th Meeting, XIX Legislature, 19 March 2024) in view of the meeting of the European Council on 21 and 22 March 2024, Ms. Meloni celebrated the signature of a joint EU-Egypt declaration – as a preliminary step towards a strategic and comprehensive partnership agreement – of which the management of migration flows represents a crucial component. Relatedly, President Meloni highlighted the significant role played by Italy in the conclusion of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding and expressed her pride in the fact that “the model of enhanced cooperation with the countries of the wider Mediterranean, on which our Government invested a lot of energy, is becoming in these months the paradigm for the European Union as a whole as well”.

Ms. Meloni concluded her remarks on migration by underlining the priority given by the Italian Government to the external dimension of the EU migration strategy. In this respect, the conclusion of the bilateral Protocol on migration management with Albania is considered by the Government the cornerstone of its migration policy and the most promising model for the wider EU approach to migration management in its external dimension. In a nutshell, on the basis of the Protocol, certain categories of migrants are taken to centres managed by Italian authorities in Albanian territory, where their applications for international protection are examined and from where they can be returned to their countries of origin should their applications be rejected.[4] The migrants detained in the centres are placed under Italy’s jurisdiction. The Protocol was signed by Ms. Meloni and her Albanian counterpart, Mr. Edi Rama, on 6 November 2023. While the Italian Government initially maintained that the Protocol would not require the Parliament’s authorisation for its ratification, following opposition parties’ protests and doubts raised by legal experts as to the compatibility of such a determination with Article 80 of the Italian Constitution,[5] the Parliament approved the ratification of the Protocol through Law No. 14 of 21 February 2024.

While a greater part of the parliamentary debate in the plenary appears to have focused on the delays in the building of the centres on the Albanian territory and on the costs of the overall operation, the issue of the compatibility of the Protocol with Italy’s international obligations (particularly in the area of human rights) and with EU law was also addressed by opposition parties and by Government representatives in their replies. On 16 October 2024, before the Chamber of Deputies (366th Meeting), the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Matteo Piantedosi, confined himself to stating that the Protocol does not “negatively impact on the protection of fundamental rights” of migrants. On the other hand, during the 371st Meeting of the Chamber on 23 October 2024, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, illustrated in some more detail the Government’s position regarding the Protocol’s compliance with the EU notion of “safe country of origin”, as the applicants for international protection in the Albanian centres should primarily come from such countries. However, the Tribunal of Rome ordered the transfer to Italy of several asylum seekers detained in the Albanian centres on the ground that their countries of origin could not be considered safe in light of the judgment rendered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 4 October 2024.[6] According to that judgment, a country cannot be designated as “safe country of origin” unless it is safe – according to the conditions laid down in Directive 2013/32 (Asylum Procedures Directive) – in the entirety of its territory.[7] Moreover, national courts are expected to verify, on their own motion, whether the conditions set out by the Directive for the designation of a country of origin as safe have been met, on the basis of the information available to the court.[8] Mr. Nordio, while stating that “in all countries the notion of ‘safety’ of a [third] country can be an exclusively political choice”, acknowledged the judgment by the CJEU. Still, he maintained that, as the orders by the Tribunal of Rome did not include, in his opinion, an exhaustive and case-specific examination of the applications, they were not in compliance with the CJEU judgment.

Following multiple references from Italian courts, a preliminary ruling by the CJEU on other aspects of the notion of “safe country of origin” is expected in 2025: these aspects include, among others, the sources of information that can be used to determine the safety of a country and if a country can be designated as safe if it is not so for everyone (in addition to everywhere).[9] Pending these clarifications, only a very limited number of migrants have been held in the Albanian centres. This situation has not prevented President Meloni from claiming that the Italy-Albania Protocol is a model for those “innovative solutions” that the EU should pursue in its migration policy. In support of her position, in the context of her communications to Parliament (Chamber of Deputies, 314th Meeting, 26 June 2024) in view of the meeting of the European Council on 27 and 28 June 2024, Ms. Meloni referred to a letter signed by multiple EU Member States’ governments and to declarations by the German Minister of the Interior expressing interest in the Italy-Albania Protocol as a blueprint for the EU approach to migration management in its external dimension.[10]

Another facet of Italy’s externalisation approach consists in the conclusion of agreements with and the provision of financial support to the Libyan coastguard with a view to preventing the departures of migrants from Libya and returning those intercepted at sea to the country. This situation has led on multiple occasions to confrontations between the Libyan coastguard and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) carrying out search and rescue (SAR) missions in the Mediterranean Sea. One such incident occurred in April 2024, where shots were fired by a Libyan patrol vessel in the direction of an NGO’s boat that was conducting a SAR operation.[11] The incident led to parliamentary question no. 3-01168 of 23 April 2024 (Chamber of Deputies, 284th Meeting), in response to which Mr. Piantedosi reiterated the Italian Government’s position that SAR operations are primarily the responsibility of State authorities and that the involvement of private vessels chartered by NGOs is detrimental to the objective of saving the lives of migrants:

Search and rescue at sea is a delicate and complex activity, which has its own rules to comply with, as any form of spontaneity or disorder in this context could have an impact on the priority need of protecting the safety and lives of people. The relevant normative framework introduced by the Government responds to this need, as it regulates those rescue operations to which at times private vessels contribute, often outside the Italian SAR area, and which, therefore, must be subject to the coordination of the States having responsibility for those operations, in accordance with specific rules deriving precisely from those international conventions that are often invoked.

While it is undisputed that, according to international law, and especially according to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention), States retain the primary responsibility for the coordination of SAR operations, multiple provisions lay down a role for private vessels, based on the overarching obligation for every ship to rescue people in distress at sea.[12] Accordingly, pursuant to the SAR Convention, “[i]f rescue units (including warships) are not available to assume the duties of an on-scene commander but a number of merchant vessels or other vessels are participating in the search and rescue operations, one of them should be designated by mutual agreement as co-ordinator surface search” (Article 5(8)(1)); and “[a]ny unit receiving information of a distress incident shall take whatever immediate action to assist as is within its capability […] and shall notify the rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre in whose area the incident has occurred” (Article 5(9)). While the NGO’s vessel in question appears to have notified the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), Mr. Piantedosi, in his account before the Senate (178th Meeting) on 11 April 2024, maintained that “the private vessel Mare Jonio was never tasked by the competent authorities [i.e., in the view of Minister Piantedosi, the Libyan ones] with carrying out the rescue operation in the SAR area where the facts took place”. Whereas it is unclear from the parliamentary debate whether the NGO’s vessel also notified the Libyan MRCC, no mention was made by Minister Piantedosi of the fact that the Libyan MRCC is seldom responsive to distress calls; that members of the Libyan coastguard engage in human trafficking and, on such basis, are subject to sanctions by the United Nations Security Council;[13] and that Libya is not considered a “place of safety” by Italian courts.[14]

Returns are considered a crucial component of the Italian Government’s migration policy. In this regard, the Government insisted again that maintaining and creating new centri di permanenza per i rimpatri (CPRs, holding centres for repatriations), which have become infamous for the widespread violations of the rights of migrants taking place there,[15] is not only compatible with EU and international law, but it is an obligation for the Italian Government. In this respect, during the abovementioned 178th Meeting of the Senate, Mr. Piantedosi stated that “the creation of CPRs is the subject of a precise European obligation on the responsibility of States of first entry with regard to EU external border control, which Italy cannot escape, otherwise we would incur in the violation of Union’s norms and ensuing sanctions”. Additionally, according to Mr. Piantedosi, responsibility for any inadequacy of these centres lies “almost invariably” with the migrants “vandalising” the centres during their protests.

Also in relation to returns, the externalisation approach has assumed a new prominence in the Italian Government’s policy. Firstly, this translates in the emphasis put on strengthening the EU strategy on assisted voluntary returns from countries of transit such as Tunisia and Libya to countries of origin.[16] Secondly, following the adoption of Decree-Law No. 37 of 28 March 2025, the Government intends to increasingly use the centres in Albania for detaining migrants awaiting expulsion, including individuals transferred from CPRs in Italy. These two elements are, in the view of President Meloni, significant examples of those “innovative solutions” that should take centre stage in the future EU migration policy. As reported by the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers in relation to an informal meeting held among several EU Member States’ heads of government on the matter of migration management on 19 December 2024:

The leaders’ discussion focused on the need for an increasingly clear and effective European regulatory framework, in particular with a strengthening of the ‘safe country of origin’ and ‘safe third country’ concepts in order to support innovative solutions, starting with the Italy-Albania model and the possible creation of ‘returns hubs’ in third countries. There was also particular interest around the strengthening of Europe’s actions along migration routes with the UNHCR and IOM regarding assisted voluntary returns.[17]

Both components are indeed reflected in the proposed Common European System for Returns unveiled by the European Commission in March 2025. In designing a comprehensive review of the EU legal framework on returns, with the declared aim of increasing their rate, the proposed regulation specifically includes the creation of “return hubs”, which are yet to be defined in detail[18] but seem to derive some inspiration from the Italy-Albania Protocol.

Ultimately, the Italian Government’s policy on migration appears to align with a more general trend characterising the EU and its Member States’ approach to the matter, towards increasing externalisation of migration management and control. As various components of such policy are currently being scrutinised by the CJEU and national courts in relation to their compatibility with international law and EU treaties, it remains to be seen whether externalisation will pass the judicial test.

Chiara Tea Antoniazzi

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Antoniazzi, “Italy’s Migration Policy in 2024: Pursuing the Externalisation Path”, IYIL XXXIV (2024), 2025, pp. 417-422; available here.

---

[1] See Nicolosi, “Externalisation of Migration Controls: A Taxonomy of Practices and Their Implications in International and European Law”, NILR, 2024, p. 1 ff.

[2] See, among others, the statement by the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Edmondo Cirielli, during the 324th Meeting of the Chamber on 12 July 2024; and the statement by the Undersecretary of State for the Interior, Ms. Wanda Ferro, during the 249th Meeting of the Senate on 4 December 2024.

[3] Regarding the uncertain legal basis of the alleged right not to migrate, see Antoniazzi, “Italy’s Migration Policy in 2023: Respect for or Empty References to International Law?”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIII, 2023, p. 507 ff.

[4] For an analysis of the Protocol, see Mussi, “The Recent Italian Response to Migration: Everything Must Change So That Everything Can Stay the Same?”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIII, 2023, p. 377 ff. On the subsequent extension of the Protocol to third country nationals already detained in centri di permanenza per i rimpatri in Italy, see below.

[5] According to Art. 80 of the Italian Constitution, Parliament shall authorise by law the ratification of those international treaties that have a political nature, provide for arbitration or judicial settlement, or entail territorial changes, public spending or amendments to existing laws. See, among others, Spagnolo, “Sull’illegittimità del Protocollo Italia-Albania in materia migratoria”, SIDIBlog, 9 November 2023.

[6] For a comment on the judgment, see Peers, “‘Safe Countries of Origin’ in Asylum Law: The CJEU First Interprets the Concept”, EU Law Analysis, 14 October 2024.

[7] Case C‑406/22, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, ECLI:EU:C:2024:841, para. 63 ff.

[8] Ibid., para. 84 ff.

[9] See, for the questions referred, Case C-758/24, Alace, pending, which has been joined with Case C‑759/24, Canpelli, and is subject to the expedited procedure.

[10] Reference is presumably made to the Joint Letter from the undersigned Ministers on new solutions to address irregular migration to Europe, 15 May 2024.

[11] “Migranti, milizie libiche sparano su nave Ong Mare Jonio durante un soccorso in mare”, Sky Tg24, 4 April 2024.

[12] For an overview of the relevant instruments, see Gauci, “When Private Vessels Rescue Migrants and Refugees: A Mapping of Legal Considerations”, BIICL, 24 November 2020.

[13] See the Security Council’s sanctions in relation to Libya and the narrative summaries of reasons for listing.

[14] See recently, Corte di Cassazione (Sez. V Penale), 1 February 2024, No. 4557, commented by Borgia, “Flag State Obligations in Search and Rescue Beyond Territorial Waters: Insights from the Asso 28 Case”, IYIL, Vol. XXXIV, 2024, p. 394 ff.

[15] In addition to several NGOs’ reports and journalistic investigations, see the concerns recently expressed by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) in its Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out from 2 to 12 April 2024, 13 December 2024, CPT/Inf (2024) 34.

[16] As mentioned, among others, by Minister Piantedosi on the occasion of the informal meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 22 July 2024.

[17] “Informal meeting in Brussels on migration management and innovative solutions”, 19 December 2024.

[18] Presently, they are described as “the legal possibility to return individuals who are illegally staying in the EU and have received a final return decision, to a third country based on an agreement or arrangement concluded bilaterally or at EU level”; see European Commission, “Commission proposes a new Common European System for Returns”, 11 March 2025.