The speech delivered by Italy’s Minister of Defence, Guido Crosetto, at the University of Padua on 20 June 2025, is an unusually frank address by a sitting member of government. It stands out not only for its candid tone but also for its breadth, spanning global order, European decline, security, technological supremacy, and international law. It offers particular value to foreign observers of Italian international practice for the way it lays bare the strategic doubts that animate the highest political levels of the Country.

From the standpoint of international law, the speech is significant because it reflects a realist understanding of law’s place in the international order. Far from viewing international law as an autonomous normative system, Minister Crosetto implicitly portrays it as a superstructure – one dependent on political preconditions that are now faltering. This is quite a common reading of international law as the by-product of a political and economic configuration that may not survive in its present form. The Minister’s remarks are also noteworthy for their recognition of the crisis of multilateralism, and the consequent risks for institutions – such as the United Nations and NATO – which are ordinarily seen as pillars of the present legal order.

The speech begins with a broad reflection on the generational lag in political thinking. Minister Crosetto argues that European leaders have failed to register the transformation of the international environment. He qualifies Europe as a declining actor, both politically and economically:

We often speak as if we were still living 30 years ago, because we grew up with certain beliefs, certain ideas, in an environment that has changed profoundly – and especially those of my generation fail to realize that it has changed. We talk about Europe […] as if Europe still mattered. Europe might once have been able to matter if it had given itself a political role, which it never did. Europe never had a foreign policy because it couldn’t have one – foreign policy was national, just as defense has always been national. But the time when Europe could have played that role is over.

Then the Minister makes explicit the shift from a value-based liberal order to a power-driven one. The normative grammar of international law – linked historically to that liberal order – is called into question. International law is not conflated with order; rather, Crosetto notes the tensions between the two. ‘Order’ – as imposed by the powerful – is opposed to the underlying assumptions of law, which presumes universality and equality. In the words of the Minister:

[…] We’ve gone from a world where values mattered to a world where economic value matters. From an era of great democracies and great social achievements to an era of great powers – and we didn’t even realize it. In this shift […] we have a duty: to guard the achievements of thousands of years that led us to codify international law, which is entirely different from international order. Often, in fact, it’s in contrast to international order, because international order is usually imposed by someone – the strongest – who can decide that the law in some cases does not apply. That’s what we are experiencing now: we manage to perfectly apply international law in one situation, forget about it in another, and shelve it in yet another. Because an idea of international order prevails over a shared international law. This is because multilateralism is dead. The UN counts for as much in the world today as Europe does: nothing. Less than a nation. Not less than the United States, but less than China, and soon less than India, and less than Israel.

This stark statement, almost unthinkable from a sitting European Minister, lays bare the degree of strategic disillusionment of the Italian authorities with current multilateral institutions. It resonates with a growing sense that sovereign equality – while normatively foundational – has become irrelevant. Mr. Crosetto then describes the main features of the new global order highlighting, inter alia, the capacity for strategic foresight of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and Europe’s dependency from China for rare earths:

The new world we live in is not only fighting over pieces of territory – it’s fighting for technological supremacy. That future struggle among great nations, especially between China and the United States, is the background battle: technological supremacy. Whoever wins the race to artificial intelligence combined with quantum computing will rule the world. That was said by someone who wasn’t a scientist – Vladimir Putin – 12 years ago. But you all know very well that talking about artificial intelligence doesn’t just mean talking about resources. For instance, why was Trump interested in Greenland? Not for its 50,000 inhabitants. The future will be won through human intelligence, algorithm design, development of increasingly complex language models with fewer moral constraints – as China is doing – with a steady supply chain of energy. We all know that artificial intelligence, like major data storage centers, requires more energy production and capacity than we currently have. And raw materials. Let’s talk about Europe’s dependency – Europe, which is no longer a global player, even as a whole, for many reasons. It has no raw materials, no energy resources, an average population age that will reach 47 years. By 2100, Italy will have 27 million fewer inhabitants than it does today. Just to be clear on our growth outlook. And Africa by 2100 will have 3.7 billion inhabitants – just 100 kilometers from Europe. As of today, the US depends on China for 80% of rare earths. Europe depends on China for 100% of rare earths. And rare earths are the basis of any technological future. That’s the great underlying challenge – even beneath the wars and the reshuffling of world order we see. And in that context, we face two necessities: one national, because we are a nation, and one international. My task in this nation is to think about security and defense, together with others involved in national security, within the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. I certainly cannot ensure it alone – I can only do it through international alliances. The only one we currently have to ensure it is NATO, which I hold on to tightly. Without it, I wouldn’t be able to fulfill my assigned role. Then there’s security, a far more complex term. It includes economic and social security, because security means a nation’s ability to grow – each individual’s ability to grow – in freedom. And it’s more complex because it depends on global balances. It lies in the hands of actors beyond ourselves, which we alone cannot control. We can only help create the best conditions.

In essence, the Minister thus aligns with a realist view of international relations. International law, in this framing, seems a contingent instrument within a hard power contest. Despite the criticism of multilateralism, the Minister reaffirms the necessity of alliances. Yet, he also asserts that NATO “has no reason to exist” in its current form, given the relocation of global power centres away from the Atlantic.

[…] until we develop multilateral organizations, we won’t have anyone capable of ensuring peace solutions in ongoing conflicts. Peace can’t be brought about by those involved in the conflict, or by their allies – it must be delivered by third parties. That’s the reason multilateral organizations were born. […] for two and a half years at NATO […] I’ve been explaining that NATO no longer has a reason to exist as it is, because once the center of the world was the Atlantic Ocean. Now, the center of the world is the whole world. The world used to be the US and Europe. The US still matters globally. Europe less so. But now there’s the whole rest of the world – not just the Global South. We must build relationships with major new players. Because if NATO was born to guarantee mutual defense and peace, then the more it grows, the more it must become an organization that embraces this role globally, by talking to the Global South – from Brazil to India, to Australia, to Japan. It must become something fundamentally different, in which Article 5 becomes the foundation for a kind of UN, a multilateral organization that ensures peace in an increasingly integrated world. Otherwise, we won’t achieve the goal we all share: a security framework where everyone can engage under rules that apply equally to all.

The Minister then highlights how international law, in his view, is inevitably linked to force. With an unusually colloquial language, international law is qualified as “mother’s recommendation” if it cannot be backed by force. The decline of the neo-liberal international legal order is thus connected to the loss of political relevance of Western, and especially European, States. The role of Europe in this context lies in building “social achievements, international rights and collective guarantees”, but how that can be done is far from being clear:

Only then can we give strength to international law – because international law without force behind it doesn’t exist. It’s like a mother’s recommendation: if there are no sanctions or consequences when it’s not respected – and if those sanctions and consequences aren’t enforced by the greatest possible number of nations – it holds no weight. We are facing this difficult and complex world and in it, we are small. We count little in terms of power, but greatly in terms of potential positive influence. We carry with us hundreds of years of integration, dialogue, and coexistence. Our approach to world affairs is a priceless heritage. This is the first university founded without a papal bull: so even people of other religions could come here. Jews, Muslims, Protestants, and secular people came here because they could. And we carry within us, in our genetic heritage, the sum of many “Padovas” that have always been open and have always existed in our country. And Europe carries within it hundreds of years of tragic mistakes – up to the world wars – during which it painfully built up social achievements, international rights, collective guarantees, not just national ones. That’s our task in this period. A difficult one. Because, I repeat, we live in a time when what matters is gas, oil, minerals, numbers of soldiers, bombs, aircraft, nuclear capability.

Europe, however, according to the Minister, has lost relevance and is “utterly divided”. With words reminiscent of, and perhaps rekindling, the recurring tensions between Italy and France, the Minister singled out the transalpine country to propose an example:

Unfortunately, we’ve entered a new era. And finding a role for ourselves – and for multilateralism, for Europe – in this era must start from recognizing that we are no longer the center of the world. We’re not, because we are utterly divided. Every time I go to France, I realize that the least nationalist French party is more nationalist than the most nationalist Italian one. The farthest left party in France is more nationalist than Italy’s most nationalist party. Because each country has its own history. That’s why France’s difficulty in sharing foreign policy in Europe is probably the main obstacle. And that’s where we must work if we want a unified European policy. Because that’s the hardest barrier to overcome.

Faced with these difficulties, the only way for Europe and Italy to play a role in the changing legal order lies in their capacity to lead others through their intellectual resources, in other words, what political scientists have called “ideational power”. The Minister continued as follows:

But the more relevant issue now is: what role do we want to play in this changing global order? There’s a third element, and I say it here because it’s a fundamental role that only Italian universities can fulfill in the race for the future. There are raw materials, there’s energy—and there are brains. So the ability to create spaces for thought, cultural and research growth, is the only hope for fueling our future. And that depends on a university system that must necessarily evolve – integrating with the financial world, with the labor market, and increasing investment. For example, I believe that in the 3.5% of GDP Europe will ask me to spend on defense, there’s extraordinary space for research. Because nothing we experience now in terms of innovation has come without U.S. defense investments. There’s room to build a new multilateralism. There’s room to rethink and redesign peacekeeping missions we’ve carried out as the UN or as Europe. There is no single way to interpret even the term “defense” in the times we live in. Even in that lies a state’s capacity […] to try to lead others.

Perhaps in an attempt to offset the pessimism of his statements, the Minister then highlighted what he considers to be some achievements of Italian foreign policy: support for Ukraine, a firm stance on the Israeli military operation in Gaza and an openness to dialogue with African countries. He stated:

[…] I wouldn’t trust anyone who claims to know how to get out of these times because no one knows. We figure it out through trial. I know what we’ve done and are doing in Ukraine. I know what we’re doing regarding Gaza. We were the first to use strong language – I was the first – to say that Israel’s military operation in Gaza no longer made sense. It was over. Because I spoke with the previous Israeli defense minister, who told me that. The time for military intervention is over. Every additional day now has no military purpose. We were the first to say it because it needed to be said. But from there to finding a solution is hard because we don’t have the weight to do it alone. But we must make the effort to find it. We have a capacity for dialogue – even in Africa – that is part of our history. We must transmit that first to Europe, then to the international community. I showed the Rector earlier: I created an office at the Ministry with the task of collecting information from all global think tanks that might help me understand where the world is going because that is one of my main duties. They often give me maps. One, for example, shows population age – I won’t show it – but there’s another that helps us understand why this clash will begin between the U.S. and China. These were the main countries trading with Africa in 2003 – and this is 2023. The red is China [the Minister shows two maps where the red portion of globe has clearly widened]. This is what’s happening in the world. This is the world, colored the same way. In 2000, blue was the US. In 2024, red is still China. That’s the underlying conflict beneath everything we see happening. That’s the new arrangement, the new order being discussed.

At least as far as the Gaza issue is concerned, we may express some doubts. In fact, despite formal affirmations in favour of restoring humanitarian assistance and protecting the civilian population, Italy has not voted in favour of the review of article 2 of the association agreement with Israel, has expressed doubts about the possibility of cooperating with the International Criminal Court in the execution of arrest warrants, and has considered that it cannot proceed with the recognition of the Palestinian State. The Italian government’s action therefore seems mainly declaratory, while practical actions to put an end to the suffering of Gaza’s civilian population are lacking. In general, for the Minister, the way forward in the new global order is to prioritise the values of coexistence between states by preserving multilateral institutions where all voices can be heard. He concluded his speech as follows:

[…] it seems to me that the values we believe are fundamental for coexistence among states no longer carry the weight they had 10-15 years ago. It’s up to us to bring them back to the center of the discussion. And I believe NATO […] can become, in my view, one of the tools to preserve these values, by linking people and states, expanding its reach, and preserving those values within the organization. Why within that organization? Because at NATO, every speaker – whether my American colleague or my Estonian one – has the same time and the same weight to present their needs and values. Just like at the UN. If organizations in which every state can represent its voice and history – regardless of power – remain strong, then democracy, values, and international law can still carry weight. The day those forums die – where countries can speak even without force – then international law will die too. The places and forums where that is still possible must be defended fiercely. Because by defending them, we defend our future and that of our children. […]

Minister Crosetto’s speech is remarkable for its blend of realism and idealism. He offers a diagnosis: that the political preconditions for international law’s effectiveness – stability, multilateralism, and shared values – are rapidly deteriorating. His remarks imply that international law, as we have known it, is a historical by-product of a liberal order that is no longer hegemonic, and perhaps no longer sustainable. In this respect, his analysis aligns with a familiar realist narrative: that the rise of new global powers, the technological race, and the marginalization of Europe have all contributed to the weakening of the legal and institutional architecture built in the last century. Mr. Crosetto is lucid in identifying how power shifts – especially the growing influence of non-Western actors – have destabilized the West’s normative centrality. This is a candid and, in some ways, courageous admission coming from a senior European official. Crucially, however, Mr. Crosetto remains almost entirely silent on another key reason for the erosion of international law’s legitimacy: its selective application by Western powers. The credibility of the international legal order has been undermined not only by geopolitical shifts, but also by decades of double standards and inconsistent enforcement. The erosion of trust in international law, particularly among actors in the Global South, is not only a consequence of rising multipolarity, but also of historical grievances tied to the way law has been politicized. In this sense, Minister Crosetto’s speech reflects a Eurocentric self-critique, but not a fully global one. His call to preserve multilateral institutions, because they are the last spaces where sovereign equality still functions, is compelling. Yet he stops short of acknowledging the substantive reforms such institutions may require to regain legitimacy in the eyes of those who have long experienced them as asymmetrical. What this speech reveals, most of all, is a transitional imagination, one caught between the world that was, and the one that is coming. It gestures toward the urgency of defending international law, yet offers no clear path for its renewal. That task remains open – politically, legally, and intellectually.

The full text of the speech (in Italian) can be found here.