In 2022, the Italian Government addressed the issue of criminal punishment on various occasions, thus shedding light on the interpretation of its features in accordance with relevant international standards. The resulting picture is a composite one, anchored in human rights and directed at expanding the reach of international law to an area traditionally considered to be within the reserved domain of States – but not always on the basis of clear legal arguments.
Starting with the death penalty, Italy has long been at the forefront of the fight against this extreme form of criminal punishment, playing a pivotal role in the adoption of the first resolution on a moratorium on the use of the capital punishment by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2007, as well as in the adoption of analogous resolutions every two years. Italy accordingly celebrated the passing of the 2022 resolution with the largest number of votes in favor (125).[1]
Traditionally, representatives of the Italian Government and of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN have emphasized in their statements the ineffectiveness of the death penalty as a crime deterrent[2] and underlined the need for “cooperation, dialogue, mutual respect and understanding among all Members States” on the subject.[3] Such an approach is coherent with the object of the UN General Assembly’s resolutions that Italy has been supporting – namely, resolutions on a moratorium on the death penalty (not on its abolition). Although references to the negative human rights impact of the death penalty were also present in past statements by Italian representatives, it is only more recently that Italy has started to consistently equate the death penalty to a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.[4] It did so on 10 October 2022, on the occasion of the European and World Day against the death penalty, when it “reaffirm[ed] its unconditional opposition to the death penalty, a cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment that denies human dignity and has no added value in terms of discouraging crime and of assuring security while it makes any judicial error fatally irreversible”.[5] The concept was reiterated on 15 December, in a statement released following the adoption of the 9th UN General Assembly’s resolution on a moratorium on the death penalty.[6] In doing so, Italy is arguably contributing to the development of an international norm prohibiting capital punishment tout court, as a form of inhuman and degrading punishment.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), acknowledging an “evolution towards the complete de facto and de jure abolition of the death penalty within the member States of the Council of Europe”, famously concluded in 2010 that there was a “strong indication” that
Article 2 [of the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR] has been amended so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances. Against this background, the Court does not consider that the wording of the second sentence of Article 2 § 1 [which, in protecting the right to life, makes exception for the death penalty] continues to act as a bar to its interpreting the words ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ in Article 3 as including the death penalty.[7]
In his interim report of 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr. Juan E. Méndez, concluded in the sense of the existence, at a minimum, of an “evolving standard” holding the death penalty as such contrary to the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[8] He did so by referring to – in addition to the ECtHR jurisprudence – landmark decisions by the South African Constitutional Court, the Canadian Supreme Court and the constitutional courts of various European States as well as to relevant submissions by States to UN bodies.[9] Inter-American and African human rights bodies have also been moving in a similar direction.[10] Finally, in its recent General Comment No. 36 on the right to life, the Human Rights Committee held that, while not all States Parties to the Covenant might have considered the death penalty a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment per se at the time the Covenant was drafted, “subsequent agreements by the States parties or subsequent practice establishing such agreements may ultimately lead to the conclusion that the death penalty is contrary to article 7 of the Covenant [which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment] under all circumstances”.[11]
Ultimately, it can be concluded that, in addition to the multiple treaty provisions prohibiting the death penalty,[12] a customary norm on the abolition of the death penalty as an inherently inhuman and degrading punishment is emerging; and that Italy is contributing to its formation by reiterating its position in different fora. This is in line with the European Union’s (EU) and Council of Europe’s position, as expressed in 2022 in a joint statement by the EU High Representative and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, which defined the death penalty as a “cruel, inhuman and ineffective punishment” and reaffirmed that “inhuman and degrading treatment is inherent to the death penalty”.[13]
The Italian Government also addressed criminal punishment under international law in another respect – namely, the proportionality of criminal sentences. The opportunity was offered by a parliamentary question during the 426th Meeting of the Senate of the Republic (XVIII Legislature), on 21 April 2022, in relation to the heavy sentences handed down by Cuban courts against a group of participants in the anti-government protests of July 2021.[14] In a written reply to the question, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ms. Marina Sereni, illustrated the initiatives undertaken by the Italian Government following the 2021 protests and arrests. Interestingly, among others, she recalled that, on the occasion of the X Italy-Latin America and Caribbean Conference in October 2021, she asked the Cuban First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Penalver Portal,
for the release of those detained for political reasons following the demonstrations of 11 and 12 July and for the respect of the rights of the defense of those indicted, expressing the hope that the actions of the [Cuban] judicial authorities could be guided by a general principle of moderation.
Italy also acted in coordination with the other EU Member States in releasing statements that, inter alia, expressed “deep concern [for] the prison sentences that are being handed down in Cuba”, considered to be “disproportionate”.[15]
The legal issue that arises is whether, under international law, an obligation exists for States to issue proportionate sentences and whether any legal meaning can be ascribed to the “principle of moderation” referred to by the Italian Government. This is an issue separate from that of the unlawfulness of sentences delivered following trials where the rights of the defense were not fully guaranteed – sentences that would be in clear violation of all main universal and regional human rights treaties. The same treaties are, however, generally silent on sentences that, while hypothetically the result of fair trials, could appear to be in themselves disproportionate to the crimes committed.
An exception in this respect is Article 49(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which clearly states that “[t]he severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence”. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter, such principle of proportionality “is enshrined in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the Communities”.[16] Indeed, proportionality has played a central role in the EU context as a general principle of EU law; nevertheless, Article 49(3) has not been the subject of substantial jurisprudence by the Court of Justice of the European Union to date.[17]
While an equivalent provision cannot be found in the ECHR, the ECtHR has touched upon the matter, particularly in relation to the imposition of life sentences and to extradition cases. In those instances, the Court generally held that “while, in principle, matters of appropriate sentencing largely fall outside the scope of the Convention […], a grossly disproportionate sentence could amount to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3”; it also recognized, however, that “‘gross disproportionality’ is a strict test” and “it will only be on ‘rare and unique occasions’ that the test will be met”.[18] It concluded so also by referring to the case-law of several supreme and constitutional courts, both in Europe and in other regions, which led the Court to identify the “gross disproportionality” test as a “widely accepted and applied test for determining when a sentence will amount to inhuman or degrading punishment”.[19]
At the UN level, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers “disproportionality to the aim sought” a constituent element of arbitrary deprivation of liberty under customary international law;[20] however, disproportionality does not appear to be included in the categorization adopted by the Working Group to identify instances of arbitrary deprivation of liberty.[21] In the UN context, the area in which the issue of disproportionality of penalties appears to have been raised more frequently is that of drug-related crimes.[22]
In other international contexts, the (dis)proportionality of criminal sentences has also been addressed – but generally in relation to the balancing exercise potentially applicable to all restrictions on qualified rights, rather than in relation to the specific aspect of the proportionality of penalties to the crime committed. Accordingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights repeatedly ruled criminal sentencing of journalists and lawyers for defamation a violation of their right to freedom of expression.[23]
Overall, with the exception of the EU context, most universal and regional human rights regimes do not provide for general prohibitions on disproportionate criminal sentences, nor do they clarify what kind of sentences would qualify as such – save for the “gross disproportionality” test applied by the ECtHR and various national courts which, however, refers to extreme circumstances and has not been fully substantiated. While the aforementioned EU statement addressed to Cuban authorities refers to “proportionality”, it stops short of framing the reference in terms of a legal obligation for Cuba, which has signed but not ratified the 1966 Covenants and has not signed nor ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (although it is considered, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to be bound by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man).[24] As for the Italian Government’s statement, had the Government intended to formulate its admonition in legal terms, it should have preferably referred to “proportionality”, if not “gross disproportionality”, with a view to protecting the core of the protesters’ rights not to be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment, not to be arbitrarily detained, and to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
Partially related to the issue of proportionality of criminal penalties is that of the applicability of a life sentence without parole to a transferred detainee. In 2022, the Italian Government was again urged to act in relation to the case of Enrico “Chico” Forti, an Italian national convicted for murder and sentenced to life without parole in 2000 by a court in Miami (although in Italy a growing movement protests his innocence). Since 2020, negotiations have been ongoing between the Italian and United States (US) Governments to obtain the transfer of Mr. Forti to an Italian penitentiary, on the basis of the 1983 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (so-called Strasbourg Convention),[25] to which both Italy and the US are parties. In replying to a parliamentary question raised during the 705th Meeting of the Chamber of Deputies (XVIII Legislature), on 1 June 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Luigi Di Maio, outlined the initiatives undertaken by the Italian Government following Mr. Forti’s request for transfer in December 2019:
[Mr. Forti’s request] allowed to formally open the proceedings and initiate contacts with the authorities in Florida. On 23 December 2020, the request was authorized by Governor Ron DeSantis, on the condition that [Mr. Forti] would continue to serve in Italy the full sentence imposed by the US court. […] I will just illustrate the main steps [undertaken by myself and the Minister of Justice, Ms. Marta Cartabia]: at the end of 2020, our Ministry of Justice, which is competent in the transfer proceedings, immediately asked the US Department of Justice to forward the necessary documentation, as laid down in the Strasbourg Convention. This is a complex procedure, which involves several US bodies at both State and federal level. Minister Cartabia immediately provided all the necessary assurances to Governor DeSantis and the US Department of Justice. Since the beginning of President Biden’s term, the Italian Government has discussed the matter on multiple occasions; I have had several contacts with the US Secretary of State, Mr. Blinken. The dialogue with the US counterpart reached a significant milestone on 15 November 2021, on the occasion of a mission to Washington by Minister Cartabia. Most recently, Minister Cartabia discussed the matter on 6 May [2022] with the Director of the Office of International Affairs of the US Department of Justice […]. On the US side, the Department of Justice underlined the seriousness and genuineness of the guarantees provided by Italy to the Governor of Florida, who is called upon to confirm the authorization of 23 December 2020 and finally lift his reservation on the transfer of Chico Forti to Italy. The authorization should be granted by the State of Florida on an unconditional basis, as requested by the US Department of Justice. It is essential that the two levels – federal and State – can converge on a common position in full compliance with the Strasbourg Convention. The Italian Embassy in Washington and the Consulate General in Miami continue supporting Chico Forti, by providing all possible consular assistance. The Italian Government’s commitment is full and relentless.[26]
After the new Italian Government took office in October 2022, the situation has not significantly changed. A meeting between the Italian Minister of Justice, Mr. Carlo Nordio, and the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at the US Embassy to Italy, Mr. Shawn Crowley, during which the transfer of Mr. Forti was also discussed, did not yield any meaningful result.[27] A new parliamentary question has been submitted, asking for updates on the case, but it is yet to be answered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.[28]
Overall, due to the relative secrecy surrounding the details of the authorization, whose status is also unclear, it is difficult to establish whether – if the authorization will be confirmed – it will be unconditional or not and, relatedly, compatible with the Italian legal system. The main issue concerns the applicability, in Italy, of a sentence to life without parole – as Article 176(3) of the Italian Penal Code provides for the possibility, for those sentenced to life, to ask for parole after serving 26 years of their sentence; also, the ECtHR considers the irreducibility of life sentences contrary to Article 3 ECHR.[29]
A number of provisions of the Strasbourg Convention are relevant in this respect. First of all, according to Article 9(3), “[t]he enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the administering State [i.e., in this case, Italy] and that State alone shall be competent to take all appropriate decisions”. More specifically, in the case of continued enforcement of the original sentence, if such sentence is “by its nature or duration incompatible with the law of the administering State, or its law so requires, that State may, by a court or administrative order, adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence” (Article 10(2)). In the case of conversion of sentence into a decision of the administering State (the second way in which a sentence might be enforced), even fewer limitations apply regarding the kind and duration of the sentence to be applied in the administering State, whose competent authorities are only bound by the findings of fact of the judgment of the sentencing State and “may not convert a sanction involving deprivation of liberty to a pecuniary sanction” (Article 11(1)). Finally, according to Article 12 of the Strasbourg Convention, both the sentencing State and the administering State “may grant pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentence in accordance with its Constitution or other laws”.
Still, the latitude accorded to the administering State is not unlimited. In relation to the transfer of an Azerbaijani soldier, who had been convicted in Hungary for the murder of an Armenian soldier taking part in the same training course and was immediately pardoned and even rewarded once transferred to Azerbaijan, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe invoked the principles of good faith in international relations and of the rule of law to condemn the Azerbaijani authorities’ conduct, and it invited States Parties to the Strasbourg Convention “to make, where appropriate, ad hoc arrangements between a sentencing and an administering State in the form of an addendum to a transfer agreement under the convention, which would spell out mutual expectations and provide for adequate assurances by the administering State”.[30]Accordingly, the right of the administering State regarding early release can be the subject of a special agreement between the sentencing and the administering States and, in its absence, the sentencing State could decide not to proceed with the transfer (although the Parliamentary Assembly itself urged States Parties “not to refuse transfers on the grounds that the prisoner might possibly benefit from earlier release in the administering state”[31]).
It will be interesting, therefore, to understand whether any future authorization of the transfer of Mr. Forti would be conditioned on the serving of his full sentence in Italy and what kind of assurances would be provided by the Italian Government. While the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding life imprisonment has been less consistent in the case of extradition requests for suspected persons, particularly in light of the fact that the applicants had not been convicted yet,[32] the case of Mr. Forti would be different, as he has already been sentenced to life without parole. In a case regarding the transfer of two sentenced persons from Thailand to the United Kingdom, who argued that their sentences for drug-related offences were grossly disproportionate and that, accordingly, the enforcement of those sentences in the United Kingdom would be contrary to Article 3 ECHR, the ECtHR found the application to be inadmissible, inter alia because early release was available to the applicants under English law, and at an earlier point of their sentences compared to Thai law.[33]
There also exists an interesting precedent in Italy-US relations regarding the transfer of sentenced persons – namely, that of the transfer of Ms. Silvia Baraldini, an Italian political activist supporting the Black Liberation Army who was sentenced to 43 years by a US court in 1984 for criminal conspiracy and other offences. In 1999 an agreement was reached between the US Department of Justice and the Italian Ministry of Justice for the transfer of Ms. Baraldini to Italy, where she should have served her sentence in a penitentiary until 2008. Nevertheless, Ms. Baraldini was transferred to house arrest in 2001 on health grounds, following a judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court, which had been called on to rule on the legitimacy of the transfer agreement.[34] Ms. Baraldini was subsequently released in 2006, two years prior to the term laid down in the transfer agreement, as a consequence of a pardon law of general application adopted in Italy; in any case, it does not appear that the US Government objected to her release.
Future developments in the case of Mr. Forti’s transfer – which are now unforeseeable due to a lack of details and the repeated postponements of the transfer – could be of relevance for the interpretation of the Strasbourg Convention, as subsequent practice in the application of the treaty; and they might give rise to interesting national and European jurisprudence on the compatibility of whole life sentences with Italy’s (and other States’) human rights obligations, as well as on the non-discriminatory application of early release.
All in all, however, the Italian Government adopted significant positions on the international standards that govern criminal punishment, often with a view to extending the influence of international law on relevant national laws and policies. In various instances, however, such positions would have benefitted from clearer formulations in legal terms, so as to contribute more substantially to the development of customary international law or to an evolutive interpretation of treaty provisions.
Chiara Tea Antoniazzi
A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Antoniazzi, “International Standards on Criminal Punishment: Italy’s Position Between Progressive Tendencies and Lack of Legal Clarity”, IYIL XXXII (2022), 2023, pp. 510-519; available here.
[1] UN General Assembly Resolution 77/222 of 15 December 2022, UN Doc. A/RES/77/222. The resolution was adopted with 125 votes in favor (2 more than in 2020), 37 votes against and 22 abstentions.
[2] See the statement delivered by the former Prime Minister of Italy, Mr. Matteo Renzi, at the UN event on “Moving away from the Death Penalty: National Leadership”, 25 September 2014.
[3] See the Statement by Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, former Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, at the book launch “Moving Away From Death Penalty – II Edition”, 5 November 2015.
[4] See, in 2021, the press release of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN on the occasion of the World and European Day against the Death Penalty; and, in 2020, the opening remarks delivered by Ambassador Stefano Stefanile, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, at the webinar on “Death penalty: from application to a universal moratorium”, 5 November 2020. References were also made by Italy in previous years: see, for instance, UN General Assembly, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Note by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/67/279 (2012), para. 71.
[5] Statement by the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN on the occasion of the World and European Day against the Death Penalty, 10 October 2022.
[6] Statement by the Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN on the “Adoption of the 9th resolution on a moratorium on the use of the death penalty by the UN General Assembly”, 15 December 2022. On the resolution, see supra note 1.
[7] Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010, paras. 116 and 120.
[8] He added that “the Special Rapporteur is convinced that a customary norm prohibiting the death penalty under all circumstances, if it has not already emerged, is at least in the process of formation”: UN General Assembly, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, cit. supra note 4, para. 72. See also Bessler, The Death Penalty’s Denial of Fundamental Human Rights: International Law, State Practice, and the Emerging Abolitionist Norm, Cambridge/New York, 2022, maintaining that the death penalty should be recognized as a violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting torture (but has arguably not achieved such status yet).
[9] UN General Assembly, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, cit. supra note 4, para. 66 ff.
[10] The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights regularly adopts resolutions calling for a moratorium on the death penalty, with a view to abolition, inter alia by invoking the articles of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights that protect the right to life and prohibit torture: see, most recently, Resolution on the Death Penalty and the Prohibition of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment, ACHPR/Res.544 (LXXIII) (2022). On the Inter-American human rights system, see Inter-American Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “The IACHR Stresses Its Call for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the Americas On the World Day Against the Death Penalty”, 9 October 2020.
[11] Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36. Article 6: right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2019), para. 51.
[12] Apart from the main universal and regional treaties already mentioned, as interpreted by their respective courts or supervisory bodies, various protocols have been adopted whereby States specifically commit to abolish the death penalty. Among those with the largest number of ratifications are: the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, 15 December 1989, entered into force 11 July 1991 (90 ratifications); Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty, 28 April 1983, entered into force 1 March 1985 (46 ratifications); Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, 3 May 2002, entered into force 1 July 2003 (44 ratifications). On the other hand, the ratification rate of the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, 6 August 1990, entered into force among the States that have ratified it, is rather low: 13 ratifications only, out of 35 States members of the Organization of American States.
[13] European Union and Council of Europe, “European and World Day against the Death Penalty: Joint statement by the High Representative, on behalf of the European Union, and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe”, 10 October 2022.
[14] “Cuba Anti-government Protesters Jailed for up to 30 Years”, BBC News.
[15] Council of the European Union, Statement of 30 March 2022 on trials and sentences in Cuba, 30 March 2022.
[16] Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 14 December 2007, OJ EU C 303, pp. 17-35.
[17] According to the non-governmental organization Fair Trials, “[a]t the moment there is little CJEU guidance on the interpretation of this provision with regard to national substantive criminal law, however, the principle of proportionality of punishment has been applied extensively in cases relating to fines applied for infringements of competition law” (Fair Trials, “Practitioners’ Tools on EU Law: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 2020, p. 40). For an analysis of Art. 49(3), see Mitsilegas and Billis, “Article 49”, in Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford, 2021, p. 1473 ff.
[18] Babar Ahmad et al. v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, Judgment of 10 April 2012, para. 237. For other cases, see ECtHR, “Guide on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Prohibition of Torture”, 2022, para. 72 ff.
[19] Babar Ahmad et al. case, cit. supra note 18, para. 236. The comparative materials are presented at para. 137 ff. of the judgment.
[20] Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (2012), para. 61.
[21] Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, “About arbitrary detention”.
[22] See, for instance, Human Rights Council, Implementation of the joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem with regard to human rights. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/39 (2018), para. 56 ff.
[23] See, among others, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 2 July 2004; Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Judgment of 27 January 2009; and Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, Judgment of 30 August 2019.
[24] According to the consistent interpretation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is binding on States Parties to the Charter of the Organization of American States: see, e.g., with specific regard to Cuba, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Special Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Cuba, 2018, p. 15.
[25] Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 21 March 1983, entered into force 1 July 1985.
[26] Emphases added.
[27] “Incontro Nordio-incaricato d’affari Usa”, gNews – Quotidiano del Ministero della Giustizia.
[28] Senate of the Republic (XIX Legislature), Parliamentary Question No. 3/00105, submitted on 27 December 2022.
[29] See, famously, Vinter et al. v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 9 July 2013, para. 120.
[30] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 2022 (2014).
[31] Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1527 (2001).
[32] See ECtHR, “Factsheet – Extradition and life imprisonment”, 2022. See also Viganò, “Ergastolo senza speranza di liberazione condizionale e art. 3 CEDU: (poche) luci e (molte) ombre in due recenti sentenze della Corte di Strasburgo”, Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, 2010.
[33] Willcox and Hurford v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 43759/10 and 43771/12, Decision of 8 January 2013. The Court further noted that “had they not been transferred, the applicants’ conditions of continued detention in Thailand may well have been harsh and degrading. It would in the Court’s view be paradoxical if the protection afforded by Article 3 operated to prevent prisoners being transferred to serve their sentences in more humane conditions”. Additionally, the Court pointed to the fact that the applicants consented to the transfer “in circumstances where both applicants had been advised of the length of the sentences they would have to serve and their inability to challenge the convictions or sentences imposed”.
[34] Constitutional Court, Judgment of 19 March 2001, No. 73.
Italy's Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice on International Law 