Arms transfers to Ukraine
In the case of Italy, the first governmental authorization of arms transfers to Ukraine dates back to February 2022. Article 2 bis (“Transfer of Military Means, Material and Equipment”) of Decree No. 14 of 25 February 2022, as amended by Law No. 28 of 5 April 2022, provided authorization for the transfer of military assets, materials, and equipment to the governmental authorities of Ukraine. This authorization was extended until 31 December 2023 by Decree-Law No. 185 of 2 December 2022, as amended by Law No. 8 of 23 January 2023.[1] Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies converted Decree-Law No. 200 of 21 December 2023, which further extended until 31 December 2024, subject to an act of guidance by Parliament, the authorization for the transfer of military means, materials and equipment in favour of the Government of Ukraine.
Article 2 bis of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2022 reads:
1. Until 31 December 2022, the transfer of military means, materials and equipment for the benefit of the Government authorities of Ukraine shall be authorized, in derogation from the provisions of Law No. 185 of 9 July 1990, Articles 310 and 311 of the Code of Military Order, referred to in Legislative Decree No. 66 of 15 March 2010, and related implementing provisions.
2. One or more decrees of the Minister of Defence, in agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Minister of Economy and Finance, shall determine the list of military means, materials and equipment subject to the transfer referred to in paragraph 1, as well as the modalities for its realization, also for the purpose of accounting discharge.
2 bis. The amounts to be received as a result of the decrees referred to in paragraph 2 shall be allocated in full to the relevant chapters of the budget of the Ministry of Defence.
3. The Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation shall report to the Houses of Parliament, at least quarterly, on the development of the current situation, also in the light of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.
The authorization is thus granted under the conditions and in the manner established by the legislation and is subject to an act of Parliament, in derogation from the ordinary procedure set forth by Law No. 185 of 1990.[2] The Minister of Defence, in agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Minister of Economy and Finance, determines the list of military means, materials, and equipment to be transferred. This list is updated and implemented through decrees. The Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation are required to report to Parliament at least every three months on the evolution of the situation regarding arms transfers. This aims to ensure continuous oversight and transparency.
Since March 2022, ministerial decrees have authorized the transfer of military equipment listed in a classified annex by the Defence staff. Each decree has resulted in the Minister of Defence being summoned before the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR) for oversight. This entails no increased financial burden for the Government, as the materials and equipment transferred are already under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Any associated cost is managed within the existing budgetary and legal framework. The military transfers to Ukraine are free of charge, in line with the practice of other Member States. The European Union (EU) partially reimburses these transfers through the European Peace Facility (EPF), a fund designed to support peace and security initiatives.[3] As of March 2024, €11.1 billion in EPF funds have been allocated for military assistance to Ukraine.[4]
Over time, Italy has consistently supported the Ukrainian resistance against the Russian invasion, linking the provision of arms to the right of self-Defence of the attacked State. Such arguments, which characterized the positions of previous governments, were also embraced by President Meloni’s Government in 2023.
On 23 January 2023, before the Chamber of Deputies (41st Meeting, XIX Legislature), during the discussion of the conversion into law, with amendments, of Decree-Law No. 185 of 2 December 2022, the rapporteur for the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber, Mr. Giangiacomo Calovini, described the bill, which had already been approved by the Senate, as crucial to fulfil Italy’s obligations to the United Nations (UN), the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the midst of the Ukraine crisis. He then stated:
In conclusion, the approval of this Decree-Law seems necessary so that Italy can continue to participate in all those initiatives which, in the European sphere and as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, support Ukraine and its people in their right to self-Defence, in accordance with the UN Charter. The mechanism in place since March 2022, which reinforces the political direction expressed in the Houses of Parliament while ensuring the necessary operational speed, has proven to be fully effective. As underlined by both NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, this is a moment that demonstrates more than ever the importance of the transversal Euro-Atlantic link and calls for closer cooperation between the Union and the Atlantic Alliance. NATO remains the bedrock of collective Defence for its Allies and is essential to Euro-Atlantic security. In turn, a stronger European Defence can only make a positive contribution to global and transatlantic security.
Speaking before the Chamber of Deputies on the same occasion, Ms. Monica Ciaburro, the rapporteur of the bill for the Committee on Defence (IV), commented on the Italian Government’s swift legislative response to the crisis in Ukraine triggered by the Russian military invasion. She described the issuance of five specific ministerial decrees outlining what military assistance was to be provided to Ukraine and how it was to be implemented. She underlined the crucial role of the Italian Parliament in regularly reviewing these measures and the streamlined procedures that would allow Italy to respond quickly to the international crisis. Finally, she assured that the financial impact on Italy’s public finances would be mitigated by reimbursements from the EPF.
In the same meeting, the Undersecretary of State for Defence, Mr. Matteo Perego di Cremnago, elaborated on Italy’s stance on the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. He referred to Italy’s constitutional bond to a peaceful foreign policy, specifically pointing to Article 11 of the Italian Constitution, and how this provision supports Ukraine’s right to self-Defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In particular, he observed:
One might think that, at this moment, we would have the capitulation of Ukraine rather than peace, if we, the Western community, had not supported the Defence efforts of this attacked country. And we are doing this, honourable Members, within the framework of Article 51, as has been mentioned several times by those present. This Article 51 of the UN Charter defines self-Defence as a natural right and […] it remains so until the Security Council does not intervene with actions to maintain peace. It is unfortunate that the UN Security Council is limited by the veto power of the Russian Federation.
The Undersecretary highlighted that without Western support, Ukraine might be forced into surrendering to Russian forces, which continue to launch attacks on its infrastructure and civilian areas. He underscored that Italy’s substantial support has been a crucial deterrent against these aggressions and highlighted the broader implications of the conflict, suggesting that a lack of support for Ukraine would risk encouraging authoritarian threats elsewhere, such as those against Taiwan. He advocated for a steadfast commitment to international law and democratic values, emphasizing that Italy’s role in the global arena is to defend these ideals. Concluding his statement, he reiterated Italy’s commitment to peace and the Defence of democratic values, which are essential for maintaining international stability and security.
On 15 February 2023, before the Chamber of Deputies (52nd Meeting, XIX Legislature), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, reaffirmed Italy’s unwavering support for Ukraine amidst its conflict with Russia. He said that the Italian Government and its allies are committed to upholding Ukraine’s independence and the international principles that govern the global order. Mr. Tajani detailed Italy’s proactive measures in support of Ukraine, such as arms transfers, strong sanctions against Russia and significant humanitarian efforts. He pointed to Italy’s leadership in seizing Russian assets and pushing for punitive measures against Russia, as well as efforts to facilitate UN-led peace talks. In addition, he underlined the broader commitment to the Defence of democratic values and peace and confirmed Italy’s continued engagement on these issues in upcoming international fora such as the Munich Security Conference and the UN General Assembly Special Session on Ukraine. Mr. Tajani clarified that Italy considers the continuation of the war unacceptable and will maintain its strong stance in Defence of freedom and international law. In particular, he underlined Italy’s willingness to
protect Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, defend the principles underpinning the international order, prosecute the crimes committed, and create the conditions for a just peace, which can only come from Defence, certainly not from the annihilation of the attacked party.
On 21 March 2023, in her address to the Italian Parliament (72nd Meeting, XIX Legislature, of the Chamber of Deputies; 50th Meeting, XIX Legislature, of the Senate of the Republic) to outline the key issues to be tackled at the forthcoming European Council, the President of the Council of Ministers, Ms. Giorgia Meloni, also dwelled upon the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. She underlined the primary importance of the unity of the EU in facing this challenge and reaffirmed Italy’s continued support for Ukraine, in its political, humanitarian, and military dimensions, which she said would continue regardless of its impact on her Government’s immediate popularity.
Furthermore, President Meloni strongly defended Italy’s provision of military assistance to Ukraine, explaining that the transferred material was already in Italy’s possession and stressing that such assistance was in line with global commitments to upholding international law and defending democracy. She countered the argument that the funds were being misused by pointing out that such assistance was crucial not only for the Defence of Ukraine, but also for maintaining Italy’s international standing and national sovereignty. She concluded by stressing the importance of diplomatic efforts to pressure Russia toward compliance with international norms and to spell out conditions that could lead to meaningful peace negotiations. Ms. Meloni affirmed that
[…] the Ukrainian people are not only defending their country, but they are also defending the values of freedom and democracy on which our civilization is based, on which the European project itself is based. They are defending the very foundations of international law, without which we would replace the rule of law with the rule of the strongest: not exactly good news, including for us. […] Military assistance to Ukraine is necessary to ensure the self-Defence of an attacked nation, in accordance with the UN Charter.
On 21 June 2023, replying to a parliamentary question before the Chamber of Deputies (123rd Meeting, XIX Legislature), the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Guido Crosetto, clarified that the ultimate objective of Italy’s support for Ukraine is not to escalate the war, but to encourage Russia to negotiate peace genuinely. Mr. Crosetto pointed out that this approach is in line with the UN Charter, as it responds to Ukraine’s request for assistance in finding a peaceful solution and returning to pre-conflict conditions.
The recognition of the Holodomor as genocide
The Holodomor, or “Extermination by Hunger”, was a period of mass starvation and famine in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933. It was caused by a deliberate policy of the Soviet regime under Stalin, which led to the deaths of millions of Ukrainians. Some historians have described the Holodomor as a genocide against the Ukrainian people, although this classification is still debated.[5]
On 20 February 2023, the Committee on Foreign and European Community Affairs (III) of the Chamber of Deputies unanimously adopted Resolution No. 7-00049 committing the Government to recognizing the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people and taking all relevant actions, in agreement with the Italian Parliament and the multilateral institutions to which Italy belongs, to promote awareness and remembrance of this tragedy, both in Italy and internationally. The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Giorgio Silli, expressed satisfaction for the initiative.
On 26 July 2023 (92nd Meeting, XIX Legislature), the Senate passed Motion No. 45, whereby, after recalling a series of international instruments strongly condemning the Holodomor, it committed itself to
1) recognizing the Holodomor as a genocide, by adopting every consequent initiative, in agreement with the Chamber of Deputies, with the Government, with European and international institutions, to promote awareness and remembrance of this tragedy in Italy and abroad;
2) implementing the recommendations expressed by the European Parliament in resolution 2022/3001 (RSP) of 15 December 2022, and by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Resolution No. 1481 of 25 January 2006.
Again, Undersecretary Silli expressed the favourable opinion of the Government on the motion.
Antonino Alì
A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Alì, “The Authorization of Military Assistance to Ukraine and the Recognition of the Holodomor as Genocide”, IYIL XXXIII (2023), 2024, pp. 544-549; available here.
[1] See Pertile, “The Reaction to the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Debate on the Provision of Weapons to the State Victim of Aggression”, IYIL, Vol. XXXII, 2022, p. 522 ff., pp. 528-532.
[2] On the criteria set forth by this law, see the contribution by Pertile here.
[3] Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021.
[5] Supporting the qualification of the Holodomor as genocide, see Lemkin, “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine”, reproduced in Serbyn, “Lemkin on Genocide of Nations”, JICJ, 2009, p. 123 ff.; contra, see Davies and Wheatcroft, The Year of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933, Basingstoke, 2009, Preface to revised edition.
Italy's Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice on International Law 