In 2023, Italy repeatedly expressed its position on the veto power of the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This position is reflected in the statements concerning the work of the UNSC^[1] and in those outlining the reform proposal of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group. The views expressed by Italian representatives developed along two lines: a harsh criticism of the veto power because of its contradiction with the principle of sovereign equality, and the need to monitor – but in the short term maintain – the use of this voting mechanism in the light of the necessities of multilateralism.

The first aspect is to some extent in continuity with the long-standing criticism of the veto power and Article 27(3) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN).^[2] On 26 April 2023, Ambassador Maurizio Massari, Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, outlined Italy’s position as follows before the UN General Assembly:

the veto power is anachronistic. While understandable in the specific historical context of 1945, nowadays it blatantly contradicts one of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter: the principle of sovereign equality of States, which needs to be at the basis of any future reform of the UN Security Council.^[3]

Along similar lines and again before the General Assembly, on 19 July 2023 the Ambassador reiterated that “the veto power blatantly contradicts [… the] sovereign equality of States, and in too many occasions has prevented the Security Council from discharging its vital responsibilities on international peace and security”.^[4]

The idea that the veto power is “anachronistic” is not new,^[5] and these statements^[6] outline a classic problem: giving the P5 unchecked power to stop non-procedural resolutions seems to contradict the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. This contradiction was noted by some scholars soon after the birth of the UN, who admitted that “[t]he Charter does […] recognize the inequality of Members in respect to power and political influence by according the ‘Great Powers’ permanent membership in the Security Council and the so-called ‘right of veto’”.^[7] Historically, this problem was solved by framing equality as a general rule, from which deviations could be allowed if justified by specific interests of the international community. In 1986, Cassese noted that “the principle of equality laid down in Article 2.1 is to be interpreted merely as a general guideline which is weakened by the exceptions specifically laid down in law” and that “the UN is not based on the full equality of all its members, for Article 27.3 grants the so-called right of veto to the permanent members of the Security Council only”.^[8] The reason for this specific exception was often found in the need to protect peace and security,^[9] as stated by the Italian Corte Costituzionale:

The drafters of the Constitution […] were well aware that paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the [UN] Charter placed the five member States of the Security Council to whom the exercise of the ‘veto’ power is attributed in a privileged position compared to other members. […] What should be demanded, if anything, is that where disparities in treatment exist, they be justified by the need to promote and implement peace and justice.^[10]

However, consideration for specific interests of the international community seems to lead Italy to opposite results than those reached by the Corte Costituzionale in 1984: instead of allowing for the achievement of peace and security, the veto power would be a threat to them.

As mentioned, the Italian position has also developed in another direction, as many of the statements of 2023 point toward a more lenient approach to the veto power and to equality, admitting the exception but calling for greater transparency and accountability in the name of multilateralism. For example, on 12 September 2023, before the General Assembly, Ambassador Gianluca Greco, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, underlined the adverse effects of a Russian veto by referring to the sabotage of the UNSC in favour of unilateralism.^[11] While the equality argument was also raised by stating that “[t]he veto power contradicts the principle of sovereign equality of States”, the main focus of the Ambassador’s speech was on multilateralism and international cooperation. Indeed, Ambassador Greco argued that veto was “in contrast with the general principles of multilateralism”. In the abovementioned statement of 26 April 2023, Ambassador Massari developed this argument by admitting that Italy does not expect the P5 to renounce the veto privilege but rather to “act responsibly and to provide a full explanation to the whole membership represented in the General Assembly when they cast a veto”.^[12] Unsurprisingly, this statement was pronounced on the anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 76/262, co-sponsored by Italy in 2022, which provides that a meeting of the General Assembly shall be convened by the President of the General Assembly within ten working days “should a veto be cast by one or more permanent members of the Security Council”.^[13] The Italian position thus appears to combine an emphatic reference to sovereign equality with a more practical approach aimed at promoting multilateralism through procedural mechanisms to lessen the impact of the veto power on the UN system. This was well summarized by Ambassador Massari on 5 September 2023, during an open debate on the UNSC working methods:

We are convinced that, within the Council, Permanent and Non-Permanent members should work on equal footing as much as possible, with the exception of what is currently contemplated by the Charter in terms of veto power. […] We believe it is important to hold public meetings of Security Council as much as possible […] Italy supports all initiatives aimed at self-restraining the exercise of the veto […] and was among the co-sponsors of the innovative GA resolution 76/262.^[14]

This position, with all its underlying tensions, is reflected in the reform proposal of the Italian-led UfCgroup, directed at increasing the number of non-permanent members and limiting the veto power of the P5.^[15]The debate on the reform, whose urgency in 2023 was often reiterated,^[16] did not much reflect Italy’s emphasis on sovereign equality.^[17] Rather, the emphasis was put on the importance of multilateralism and equitable representation. As Ambassador Massari explained as early as 26 January 2023, during the intergovernmental negotiations on the UNSC reform, “‘[e]quitable geographical distribution’ […] means that the composition of the Council must equitably reflect the different geographical groups within the UN membership and their respective weight according to the size of the group”.^[18] Moreover, Italy’s statements in 2023 focused mainly on representativeness and permanence^[19] rather than on limiting the veto power.^[20] The same statement of 26 January 2023 continues as follows:

we are convinced that adding new permanent members to the Security Council does nothing to increase regional representation. In fact, while elected members of the Council must always heed the interests of those they are representing, permanent members – not subject to elections – do not represent the wider membership: they represent themselves alone. […] additional permanent members – all the more with their veto powers – would make the Council less accountable and less representative.^[21]

In conclusion, while Italy presented the veto power as something to be limited as far as possible, because it interferes with the sovereign equality of States and multilateralism, in its reform proposal the country appears to aim less at abolishing the veto than at making the UNSC “more representative, transparent and effective” in the short term.^[22]

Caterina Milo

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Milo, “The Veto Power at the Security Council: Emerging Trends and Continuity with the Past”, IYIL XXXIII (2023), 2024, pp. 516-519; available here.

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^[1] On the Italian position on the scope of the UNSC mandate, see the contribution by Antoniazzi here.

^[2] See, for an overview of the veto power, Fassbender, “Veto”, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, last updated June 2019; Id., UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto, Den Haag, 1998; Conforti and Focarelli, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, Leiden, 2010, pp. 74-95.

^[3] Statement delivered by Ambassador Massari at the General Assembly on Item 60, Use of the veto, 26 April 2023.

^[4] Statement by Ambassador Massari at the General Assembly on Item 60, Use of the veto, 19 July 2023.

^[5] See Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2012, Vol. I, p. 928.

^[6] See also Statement by Ambassador Greco at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting, 12 September 2023.

^[7] Leland and Hambro Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary & Documents, 2nd ed., London, 1949, p. 100.

^[8] Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, Oxford, 1986, p. 129.

^[9] On this reading of the veto power and its limits, see Fassbender, UN Security Council, cit. supra note 2, pp. 290-295.

^[10] Corte Costituzionale, Judgment of 20 December 1984, No. 300, para. 4.

^[11] Statement cit. supra note 6.

^[12] Statement cit. supra note 3.

^[13] UN General Assembly, Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council, UN Doc. A/RES/76/262, 26 April 2022.

^[14] Statement delivered by Ambassador Massari at the Open Debate on Working Methods of the Security Council, 5 September 2023.

^[15] The UfC group’s position on the veto power is complex: while advocating for its abolition, the group agrees that negotiations should focus in the immediate future on how best to limit it. For a review of reform proposals, see Nesi, “La riforma del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite tra politica e diritto”, in Gargiulo, Ingravallo and Rossi (eds.), L’ONU nei nuovi assetti sistemici internazionali: le riforme necessarie, Napoli, 2023, p. 19 ff.

^[16] See, among many, the Statements by Ambassador Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group of 26 January 2023 and of 16 November 2023.

^[17] An isolated reference to sovereign equality can be found in the Statement by Ambassador Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group, 3 April 2023: “[t]he United Nations is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. In a reformed Security Council, only the inclusion of elected (non-permanent) new members would be truly consistent with the principle of democracy”.

^[18] Statement of 26 January 2023, cit. supra note 16. See also the Joint Press release of the “Uniting for Consensus” Group, 27 March 2023.

^[19] See, among many, the Statements by Ambassador Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group of 9 March 2023 and of 4 May 2023; and “Interview with Italy’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Maurizio Massari”, 16 February 2023.

^[20] A brief reference can be found in the Joint Press release of the “Uniting for Consensus” Group, 20 September 2023, but it is limited to stating that “UfC promotes limiting the use of the veto of the 5 permanent members”.

^[21] Statement of 26 January 2023, cit. supra note 16.

^[22] Prime Minister Meloni’s speech at the 78th United Nations General Assembly, 21 September 2023.