Italy has traditionally been very vocal about matters regarding the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), with a recent peak between 2017 and 2018, when Italy shared a seat with the Netherlands as a non-permanent member of the Council.^[1] This special interest has first and foremost concerned the reform of the UNSC membership and working methods. In this respect, in 2023, the Italian Government reiterated its well-established positions on the need for a more “representative, democratic, transparent, accountable and effective” UNSC^[2] and against the use of the veto.^[3]

As the stalemate regarding the UNSC reform process continues, it is worth examining the Italian Government’s approach to the scope of the UNSC mandate. Indeed, Italy has pushed for a gradual expansion of such scope over the years, by including a growing number of issues among the threats to international peace and security that could justify the adoption of binding measures by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). This is a reflection of Italy’s long-held position that a “holistic approach” to peace and security is needed, going beyond conventional threats and solutions. Such an approach, while in a sense traditional for Italy, is inherently expansive, being ready to include ever-new (alleged) threats.

In this respect, the positions expressed by Italy in 2023 before the UNSC and other UN fora would seem to consolidate the trend toward the increasing “securitization” of the international community’s response to global challenges.^[4] Nevertheless, Italy’s position seems to oscillate between a clearer identification of emerging issues as threats to international peace and security, which would allow the UNSC to intervene; and a more nuanced recognition of the interconnections between these issues and international peace and security. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point.

The Italian Government has repeatedly stated that “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development”, most recently during a UNSC open debate on “Peace and Security in Africa”.^[5] Similarly, “no peace without justice” has long been a motto of the Italian diplomacy, often recurring in debates on accountability for international crimes, including, in 2023, in Ukraine and Syria.^[6]These expressions remain rather vague – as do references to the “linkages” between peace, human rights, and sustainable development,^[7] and to “the rule of law in international relations as a key ingredient to ensuring peaceful and just relations among nations and peoples”.^[8] In these cases, the Italian Government does not clearly advocate the expansion of the scope of action and powers of the UNSC in a legal sense.

Human rights, however, are a different matter. Since the late 1980s, the UNSC has increasingly considered human rights within its remit – by inter alia discussing human rights in its thematic work or in relation to specific countries, adopting sanctions, establishing commissions of inquiry and international tribunals, and including human rights components in peace missions.^[9] This well-established (though not uncontroversial^[10]) practice might explain why, in addition to generic references to human rights as “connected” to peace and security, Italian representatives have used more clearcut language in this area.

Accordingly, during the Arria-formula meeting on “The Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, held on 17 March 2023, Ambassador Gianluca Greco, Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, stated the following: “[h]uman rights, including gender equality, are intrinsically linked to peace and security. This intimate link between violations of human rights and their repercussions on the maintenance of international peace and security cannot be denied, and the security Council has an important role to play in this endeavour”.^[11] Subsequently, when an open briefing on the human rights situation in North Korea was held on 18 August, a joint statement was issued by 52 States including Italy, which declared that “alone, these human rights violations and abuses demand the Council’s attention” (that is, independently of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea).^[12]

Although not as well-established, the protection of cultural heritage is now also included in the mandate of the UNSC. The Italian Government has played a prominent role in this respect, including by co-sponsoring UNSC Resolution 2347 on the protection of cultural heritage in situations of armed conflict in 2017 and by establishing the Group of Friends for the Protection of Cultural Heritage with Cyprus in 2018.^[13] On 2 May 2023, the UNSC Arria-formula meeting on “Protection of Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflicts” gave Ambassador Maurizio Massari, Permanent Representative of Italy to the UN, the opportunity to reiterate Italy’s view on the security dimension of the protection of cultural heritage. Ambassador Massari referred to cultural heritage as “a catalyser of peace and dialogue” and added that:

Any deliberate attack against cultural heritage is […] an attack against the future of humanity, as it hampers post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding, deprives minority groups of their roots and fuels conflicts and hatred. Ensuring accountability and bringing the perpetrators of crimes against cultural heritage to justice is also crucial, also to prevent future attacks.^[14]

Even more emphatically, he concluded: “[d]efending cultural heritage is more than a cultural issue: it is a security imperative, inseparable from the imperative of defending human lives”.^[15]

In 2023, Italy also took a strong stance on sea level rise as an international security issue. Over the years, Italy has shown an increasing propensity to recognize the importance of the climate-security nexus and a role for the UNSC in the fight against climate change. In 2021, Italy was one of the 113 co-sponsors of a UNSC draft resolution (S/2021/990) on climate and security, which failed because of a veto by the Russian Federation. On 14 February 2023, during a UNSC open debate on “Threats to International Peace and Security: Sea Level Rise Implications for International Peace and Security”, Ambassador Massari unequivocally identified sea level rise as a “threat to international peace and security” and an “existential threat”, with serious consequences beyond the States currently most affected.^[16] Accordingly, in the words of Ambassador Massari, “the Security Council should tackle ensuing security implications [of climate change], such as those caused by sea level rise”.^[17] After calling for the further integration of climate change mitigation and adaptation into the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions and for greater financial support, he concluded that “it is [Italy’s] hope that the Security Council will continue to address the threats posed by sea level rise”.^[18]

The UNSC open debate on “Climate Change, Peace and Security”, held on 13 June 2023, further allowed Italy to reiterate its position on the impacts of climate change on global security more generally. Ambassador Massari, after lamenting the “deadlock” of the UNSC on the climate-security nexus, stated that “responsible Member States remain determined to pursue full recognition of the climate and security nexus, while factoring in climate change issues into conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding efforts”.^[19]

At one end of the spectrum, therefore, are the rather tenuous references to the linkages between international peace and security and several elements, including sustainable development and the rule of law. At the other end is the strong assertion of the UNSC competence over human rights, the protection of cultural heritage and the fight against climate change, although the contours of such competence are generally not clarified. In between are a number of issues in respect of which Italy used the language of security, but without spelling out the consequences for the UNSC mandate. This is the case for hunger and global food insecurity, which arose inter alia in 2023 in relation to the Black Sea Grain Initiative (which allows for the export of grain, related foodstuffs and fertilizers from three Ukrainian ports) and are frequently found in Italy’s statements as the host country of the UN food agencies.^[20]

This is also the case for migration, which has long been framed as a (global) security issue by successive Italian governments and even more so by the current one. While in 2023 the issue has not been explicitly raised before the UNSC or in relation to its mandate, the securitization of migration has nonetheless materialized, among others, in the bilateral and European Union-wide agreements on migration and security with Albania, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt;^[21] in the emphasis placed on the fight against human trafficking when outlining Italy’s migration policy; in the decision to reintroduce border controls between Italy and Slovenia after the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, based on a perceived security threat following a possible increase in migration flows; and even in the call for greater involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the matter.^[22]

Overall, Italy’s positions in 2023 have contributed to strengthening the general trend toward an expansion of the UNSC mandate and a securitization of the international discourse on global challenges. However, what leads the Italian Government to qualify a specific issue as a threat to international peace and security is not clear from the relevant statements, although some hypotheses can be made. In general, the Italian Government is more resolute when it appears that there is broad consensus among States to label a certain issue as a security threat. Thus, while specific UNSC debates and resolutions on human rights matters have been contested on the basis of the principle of non-intervention, it is not contested as such that widespread and severe violations of human rights can constitute a threat to international security. Moreover, while the nexus between the protection of cultural heritage and international peace and security has only been recognized recently, it can also be said to be widely accepted by the international community.

The case of the climate-security nexus is particularly interesting in this respect. The appropriateness of securitizing the response to climate change and its impacts is widely debated among scholars.^[23] Some States have also expressed their opposition to the extension of the UNSC competence to this area, with arguments ranging from the well-sounded to the clearly instrumental.^[24] Nevertheless, the UNSC involvement in the area of climate change is now supported by a majority of States, from both the Global North and the Global South. In such a rapidly evolving context, it is significant that, during the above-mentioned UNSC debate on “Climate Change, Peace and Security”, the Italian Government referred to the position of the States most affected by climate change, almost as a justification for its own position: “the countries most affected by climate change are sending us a clear message: instead of questioning the climate peace and security nexus, we should act to counter it”.^[25]

In conclusion, greater clarity from the Italian Government on its interpretation of the scope of the UNSC mandate, on the specific implications for the nature of the powers that the UNSC can exercise, and on the reasons for qualifying a particular issue as a threat to international peace and security would benefit legal certainty and the consolidation of political agreement among States.

Chiara Tea Antoniazzi

A quotable version of this post was published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law: Antoniazzi, “Italy and the United Nations Security Council: Strengthening the Securitization Trend”, IYIL XXXIII (2023), 2024, pp. 520-525; available here.

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^[1] On the basis of the agreement, Italy held the seat in 2017 and the Netherlands the following year. For a comprehensive overview of Italy’s positions on the UNSC mandate as expressed during the 2017-2018 term, see Turrini, “The Scope and Means of Action of the United Nations Security Council as Seen by Italy During Its ‘Shared Membership’”, IYIL, Vol. XXVIII, 2018, p. 536 ff., available here.

^[2] See, among many, the Statement by Ambassador Massari, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group during the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Security Council reform for the 77th Session of the General Assembly, 26 January 2023.

^[3] On this subject, see the contribution by Milo available here.

^[4] The international relations theory of “securitization” has been developed by the so-called Copenhagen School and focuses on speech acts construing certain issues as security threats. For a contextualization and critical overview of the theory, see Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and Cases”, International Relations, 2016, p. 494. While originally directing attention primarily to governments’ rhetoric at the national level, the theory can be easily applied to governments’ statements in international fora and to the language employed in collective deliberations as well, including UNSC resolutions: see Turner, “International Law and the Securitisation of Peacemaking: On Chapter VII, the Security Council and the Mediation Mandate in Yemen”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2023, p. 161 ff.

^[5] Statement delivered by Ambassador Massari, 30 March 2023.

^[6] Statement delivered by Ambassador Massari during the Security Council Briefing on the Humanitarian Situation in Ukraine, 6 February 2023; and Statement delivered by Ambassador Greco at the General Assembly on Item 30(a), Prevention of armed conflicts, 25 April 2023.

^[7] See, e.g., the Statement delivered by Ambassador Greco during an Ambassadorial-Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission, 19 May 2023.

^[8] Statement delivered by Ambassador Massari during the UNSC open debate on “The Promotion and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Rule of Law among Nations”, 12 January 2023.

^[9] For an overview of the role of the UNSC in the protection of human rights, see Genser and Stagno Ugarte (eds.), The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights, New York, 2014.

^[10] For a critical appraisal of the advantages and limitations of the UNSC engagement with human rights, see Fassbender(ed.), Securing Human Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council, Oxford, 2011.

^[11] Emphasis added. The Statement is available here.

^[12] Joint Statement on the Human Rights Situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 18 August 2023.

^[13] Both developments are mentioned in Turrini, cit. supra note 1.

^[14] The Statement is available here.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] The Statement is available here.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] The Statement is available here.

^[20] See, among others, the Statement by Ambassador Greco at the UNSC open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts of 23 May 2023. On the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the context of the law of neutrality, see Bartolini and Pertile, “Relic of the Past or Immortal Phoenix? The Legal Relevance of Neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian War”, IYIL, Vol. XXXII, 2022, p. 201 ff.

^[21] On 16 July 2023, the EU concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic and global partnership with the Tunisian Government; an important component of the Memorandum, and certainly the most touted by the Italian Government, is the fight against “irregular migration”. More recently, on 17 March 2024, a Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the European Union was issued. Again, while the Declaration is wide-ranging, it was no mystery that the main driver for the deal on the EU’s part was the stemming of migration flows. On 6 November 2023, Italy and Albania concluded a much-debated Protocol on strengthening cooperation in migration matters, on which see the contribution by Mussi in this Volume. Finally, a controversial Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Italian Government and the Libyan Government of National Accord on 2 February 2017 and focusing on border security and the fight against “illegal immigration” was automatically renewed in February 2023.

^[22] On 29 November 2023, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Antonio Tajani, and his Finnish counterpart, Ms. Elina Valtonen, met to discuss the “instrumentalization” of migration by the Russian Federation and other “malicious actors”. The two Ministers stated their determination to fight this threat in the context of the EU and NATO.

^[23] See, among many, Scott and Ku, Climate Change and the UN Security Council, Cheltenham, 2018; and Maertens, “Climatizing the UN Security Council”, International Politics, 2021, p. 640 ff. For an overview of the UNSC engagement with climate change, see Security Council Report, “The UN Security Council and Climate Change”, 2021; and Security Council Report, “The UN Security Council and Climate Change: Tracking the Agenda after the 2021 Veto”, 2022.

^[24] For an analysis of the arguments used by States opposing the involvement of the UNSC, see McDonald, “Immovable Objects? Impediments to a UN Security Council Resolution on Climate Change”, International Affairs, 2023, p. 1635 ff.

^[25] See the Statement cit. supra note 19.